Offensive Use of Force in Peace Operations: The Force Intervention Brigade

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Menent Savas Cazala

This study focuses on the establishment of the force intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an offensive armed force into the equation of peacekeeping and on the paradox related to legal, military and political issues. Introducing an overtly offensive combat force will confront controversial implications for UN peacekeeping’s basic principles regarding the use of force, consent of the host country and impartiality. The intervention brigade changed unprecedentedly the boundaries of peacekeeping while creating an environment of hesitation and reluctance in spite of successful actions and its renewed mandate since 2013.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Menent Savas Cazala

This study focuses on the establishment of the force intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an offensive armed force into the equation of peacekeeping and on the paradox related to legal, military and political issues. Introducing an overtly offensive combat force will confront controversial implications for UN peacekeeping’s basic principles regarding the use of force, consent of the host country and impartiality. The intervention brigade changed unprecedentedly the boundaries of peacekeeping while creating an environment of hesitation and reluctance in spite of successful actions and its renewed mandate since 2013.


Author(s):  
Grace Mueller ◽  
Paul F. Diehl ◽  
Daniel Druckman

Abstract Peacekeeping during the Cold War was primarily, and in some cases exclusively, charged with monitoring cease-fires. This changed significantly, as peace operations evolved to include other missions (e.g., rule of law, election supervision), many under the rubric of peacebuilding. What is lacking is consideration of how the different missions affect one another, simultaneously and in sequences. This study addresses that gap by looking at the interconnectedness of missions and their success in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was mandated to perform eight different missions over a decade. The article examines success or failure in each of those missions and how they relate to one another guided by theoretical logics based on the “security first” hypothesis and mission compatibility expectations. Early failure to stem the violence had negative downstream consequences for later peacebuilding missions. Nevertheless, MONUC’s election supervision mission was successful.


Author(s):  
Walt Kilroy

The protection of civilians was first included the mandate of a UN peacekeeping operation in 1999, and has since become a standard item on the list of tasks for integrated missions. The wording of the mandates has also become more ambitious, and force is not only permitted but has been used in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in tackling armed groups that were preying on civilians. Protecting civilians from direct physical violence is not simply a military matter, and it includes promoting political processes and improving the human rights environment. But the possibility of UN peacekeepers using force is a further step in the fundamental changes seen in peace operations since they began as a cautious, neutral presence where peace was already in place. Protecting civilians goes to the heart of peacekeeping, with very real dilemmas on whether and how to act. There can be significant consequences for civilians and conflict dynamics, whatever decisions are made.


2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 179-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis M. Tull

United Nations (UN) peace operations are once again at a crossroads, partly due to overstretched capacities. In the meantime, there are indications that peacekeepers face a new and perhaps less expected challenge. Over the last few years, rulers in Burundi, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have pushed through the reduction of peacekeeping personnel or forced the wholesale withdrawal of peace operations – despite the concerns of the UN. This paper explores whether there is a new hostility to peacekeeping in Africa’s weak states. What should and can the UN do if the assistance they offer in support of peace consolidation is rejected by their putative national ‘partners’, especially when the countries in question continue to face serious post-conflict challenges? Using the cases of UN missions in the DRC and South Sudan, this article examines why the well-established principle of consent of host state governments cannot any longer be taken for granted by peacekeepers. It argues that the increasing hostility towards peace operations is a function of their becoming actors in the domestic power game, as a result of their ever longer and intrusive presence.


Author(s):  
Masrur Mahmud Khan ◽  
Samwat Naiear Ahona ◽  
Subiggo Chakma

Despite the presence of UN peace operations for more than two decades, the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is still dire. This article illustrates the types of violations of human rights and hindrances to protect human rights in MONUSCO. Methodologically being a qualitative study, it is based on existing literature and key informant interviews. Killings of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, child soldiers, war crimes and crimes against humanity are major types of human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The study argues that due to structural challenges, like the bureaucratic structure of MONUSCO, inadequacy of budget and juristic limitation of the Peacekeeping Force, and operational challenges, like challenges in the protection of civilians and UN personnel, the paucity of logistics and manpower and also gender-based violence by some UN personnel and peacekeepers in MONUSCO, the UN forces failed to maintain and defend human rights properly.


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (6) ◽  
pp. 505-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Weierstall ◽  
Roos Haer ◽  
Lilli Banholzer ◽  
Thomas Elbert

Appetitive aggression – a rewarding perception of the perpetration of violence – seems to be an adaptation common to adverse conditions. Children raised within armed groups may develop attitudes and values that favour harming others when socialized within a combat force. Combatants who joined an armed force early in their lives should, therefore, perceive aggression in a more appetitive way than those who were recruited later. We interviewed 95 former members of armed groups operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those combatants that were having higher levels of appetitive aggression were those who joined a rebel force earlier in life. Surprisingly, neither the amount of military training nor the amount of time spent in the forces had a significant effect on the level of appetitive aggression. Our results show that when civil socialization is replaced by socialization within an armed group early in life, self-regulation of appetitive aggression may become deficient, leading to a higher propensity towards cruelty.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 142-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
James Thuo Gathii

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). At <http://www.icj-cij.org>.International Court of Justice, December 19, 2005.In its December 19, 2005, judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo v. Uganda (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Uganda to have engaged in grave violations of the prohibition on the use of force and of its international humanitarian and human rights obligations during its occupation of Congelese territory. The Court also found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations for its treatment of Ugandan diplomats and also for the destruction of their diplomatic premises and the associated archives and records.The train of events leading to this case originated in May 1997 with President Laurent-Desire Kabila's deposition of Zairean dictator Mobutu-Ssese Seko. Having come to power with Ugandan and Rwandese military assistance, Kabila was unsuccessful in his effort to remove Ugandan and Rwandese troops from the DRC (paras. 48–50). The DRC alleged that in August 1998, Ugandan armed forces invaded (para. 29) and then captured and occupied Congolese towns and territory in defiance of Kabila's decision that Ugandan and Rwandese forces should leave the DRC (para. 29–31). Further, the DRC contended that Uganda recruited, funded, trained, equipped, and supplied armed Congolese groups opposed to the Kabila government (para. 32).


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm D. Evans ◽  
Dino Kritsiotis

It might be thought an unusual or peculiar feature of international relations that, on occasion, States engaged in an armed conflict decide to appeal to international law and institutions for the provision of immediate judicial remedies.2 Yet, within the short space of 14 months, the International Court of Justice has twice found itself on the receiving end of such requests: in the first of these cases, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) filed an application on 29 April 1999 against 10 Member States of NATO for using armed force against the FRY in March 1999. At the same time, the FRY made a request for provisional measures, in which it asked the Court to indicate that the States involved “cease immediately [their] acts of use of force” and “refrain from any act of threat or use of force” against the FRY.3 In June 1999 the Court dismissed this request.4


2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 88-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Otto Spijkers

The United Nations has been engaged in peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the period of the country’s independence. First it was the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (onuc), then the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (monuc), and the most recent un peacekeeping force is called Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Congo (monusco). Most recently, monusco acquired a Force Intervention Brigade (fib). In this contribution, an analysis is made of how the bedrock principles of peacekeeping – impartiality, consent, and a restricted use of force – have evolved in the Congo. To do so, the journey begins in the 1960s, and ends in early 2015. For each principle, we will look at its traditional meaning, as well as its application to onuc, monuc, and monusco with its Force Intervention Brigade.


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