scholarly journals REVISITING THE BIPOLAR DISTINCTION IN THE CHARACTERISATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS

Author(s):  
W Ochieng

Since the Geneva Conventions, the architecture of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has been founded upon a distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Today, this claim stands to be revisited since international and non-international armed conflicts are no longer strict organising frameworks for the categorisation of rules of armed conflicts. This is seen in that over fifty years ago, when the four Geneva Conventions were negotiated, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were the cornerstones of international law and while their force today is still apparent, the interdependence of states, and global concerns such as terrorism and the commission of widespread human rights violations have eroded the traditional inviolability of borders. The dichotomy in humanitarian law is as implausible today as it is also fundamentally unworkable given the current conditions of conflicts. This dualist conception is no longer adequate to deal with current features of armed conflict, which do not fit neatly into the two categories and frequently contain mixed elements which thus make the task of classification highly complex. The codification of customary rules of international humanitarian law has narrowed the grounds on which the distinctions are predicated. In addition, the two regimes apply simultaneously on multiple situations. Moreover, the question of contemporary armed conflicts raises serious doubts as to whether the traditional understanding of international law still suffices to explain the complexities of modern day armed conflicts. This essay seeks to offer a different perspective on armed conflicts by suggesting a systematic rethinking of the categorisation of conflict. It argues that some of the dilemmas of contemporary conflicts may be attenuated by a new conceptualisation of this bipolar distinction namely a need for a unitary conception of armed conflict.

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.


1983 ◽  
Vol 23 (236) ◽  
pp. 246-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvie Junod

Human rights, particularly civil and political, have influenced the latest developments in international humanitarian law, especially 1977 Protocol II relating to non-international armed conflicts. At the Teheran Conference in 1968 the United Nations began to reconcile these two branches of international law; it was at this Conference that international humanitarian law was first called “human rights in periods of armed conflict”. This rapprochement was helped further by the adoption in the 1977 Protocols of some basic rules identical to those in the Human Rights Conventions; it helps strengthen the protection of human beings in situations of armed conflict.


1984 ◽  
Vol 24 (241) ◽  
pp. 187-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislaw E. Nahlik

The term “humanitarian law” applies to those rules of international law which aim to protect persons suffering from the evils of armed conflicts as well as, by extension, objects not directly serving military purposes.There is therefore an essential difference between humanitarian law and “human rights”, for the latter do not apply only in time of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Lina Hastuti

The tendency of the current conflict is a new type of conflict, which is not regulated by international humanitarian law. After World War II, in any war, emphasize the protection of victims of war and an obligation to be responsible for violations of international law or international humanitarian law. The purpose this research is to explore the theories or the law resources in International Humanitarian Law to facing a new type of armed conflict.  It is also significant to know where the discovered principles international humanitarian law about the problem. Based on Martens Clause and 1977 Additional Protocol I and II or Si Omnes Clause and Common Articles 2 Geneva Conventions 1949 can applied in new type of armed conflicts. As the development of international humanitarian law which always follow the development of the international community, to address issues related to a new type of armed conflict, it can be back to the theories and legal resources in international humanitarian law. Keywords: Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Law


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boyd van Dijk

AbstractThe relationship between human rights and humanitarian law is one of the most contentious topics in the history of international law. Most scholars studying their foundations argue that these two fields of law developed separately until the 1960s. This article, by contrast, reveals a much earlier cross-fertilization between these disciplines. It shows how “human rights thinking” played a critical generative role in transforming humanitarian law, thereby creating important legacies for today's understandings of international law in armed conflict.


2010 ◽  
Vol 92 (877) ◽  
pp. 197-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain-Guy Tachou-Sipowo

AbstractHaving established that massive human rights violations in armed conflict constitute a threat to peace and that women are the most severely affected by the scourge of war, the Security Council has since 1999 adopted a number of resolutions intended specifically for this group. These instruments contribute to the development of humanitarian law applicable to women and acknowledge the value of active participation by women in peace efforts. The following article first analyses the foundations on which the Council has been able to assume responsibility for protecting women in situations of armed conflict, and then considers the actual protection it provides. It concludes that the Council has had varying success in this role, pointing out that the thematic and declaratory resolutions on which it is largely based are not binding and therefore, they are relatively effective only as regards their provisions committing United Nations bodies. The author proposes that the Council's role could be better accomplished through situational resolutions than through resolutions declaratory of international law.


2019 ◽  
pp. 279-302
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted—jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies and Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 concerns belligerent occupation and Section 14.7. deals with the regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.8 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter examines those parts of international law that regulate how military operations must be conducted — jus in bello. It begins in Section 14.2 with an overview of the most important legal sources. Section 14.3 discusses when humanitarian law applies. Section 14.4 examines the issue of battlefield status and the distinction between combatants and civilians. Section 14.5 provides an overview of some of the most basic principles governing the conduct of hostilities while Section 14.6 deals with the issue of regulation of non-international armed conflict. Finally, Section 14.7 explores the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law in times of armed conflict.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 121-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

Article 75 of Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions lays down with admirable clarity and concision thateven in time of war, or rather especially in time of war, justice must be dispassionate. How does international humanitarian lawpromote this end? What can theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, an independent humanitarian institution, do in the harsh reality of an armed conflict towards maintaining respect for the fundamental judicial guarantees protecting persons accused of crimes, some of them particularly abhorrent?This article will first consider the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols in relation to judicial procedure in time of armed conflicts. Thereafter it will examine the legal bases legitimizing international scrutiny of penal proceedings instituted against persons protected by humanitarian law. The next and principal part of the article will indicate how ICRC delegates appointed to monitor trials as observers do their job. In conclusion the article will try to evaluate this little-known aspect of the ICRC's work of protection.


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