Prospects for Internal, Embodied Realism with Regard to Intrinsic Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Werner ◽  
Kiełkowicz-Werner
2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Fisher ◽  
Yany Gregoire ◽  
Kyle B. Murray
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-82
Author(s):  
Julia Genz

Digital media transform social options of access with regard to producers, recipients, and literary works of art themselves. New labels for new roles such as »prosumers « and »wreaders« attest to this. The »blogger« provides another interesting new social figure of literary authorship. Here, some old desiderata of Dadaism appear to find a belated realization. On the one hand, many web 2.0 formats of authorship amplify and widen the freedom of literary productivity while at the same time subjecting such production to a periodic schedule. In comparison to the received practices of authors and recipients many digital-cultural forms of narrating engender innovative metalepses (and also their sublation). Writing in the net for internet-publics enables the deliberate dissolution of the received autobiographical pact with the reader according to which the author’s genuine name authenticates the author’s writing. On the other hand, the digital-cultural potential of dissolving the autobiographical pact stimulates scandals of debunking and unmasking and makes questions of author-identity an issue of permanent contestation. Digital-cultural conditions of communication amplify both: the hideand- seek of authorship as well as the thwarting of this game by recipients who delight in playing detective. In effect, pace Foucault’s and Barthes’ postulates of the death of the author, the personality and biography of the author once again tend to become objects of high intrinsic value


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Resendes ◽  
Daniel Obrycki ◽  
Derek Bergen ◽  
John Holt
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucie Courteau ◽  
Philip Gray ◽  
Jennifer L. Kao ◽  
Terry O'Keefe ◽  
Gordon D. Richardson
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurav K. Dutta ◽  
Dennis H. Caplan ◽  
David J. Marcinko

ABSTRACT On November 4, 2011, Groupon Inc. went public with an initial market capitalization of $13 billion. The business was formed a couple of years earlier as an offshoot of “The Point.” The business grew rapidly and increased its reported revenue from $14.5 million in 2009 to $1.6 billion in 2011. Soon after going public, prior to its announcement of its first-quarter results, the company's auditors required Groupon to disclose a material weakness in its internal controls over financial reporting that impacted its disclosures on revenue and its estimation of returns. This case uses Groupon to motivate discussion of financial reporting issues in e-commerce businesses. Specifically, the case focuses on (1) revenue recognition practices for “agency” type e-commerce businesses, (2) accounting for sales with a right of return for new products, and (3) use of alternative financial metrics to better convey the intrinsic value of a business. The case requires students to critically read, analyze, and apply authoritative accounting guidance, and to read and analyze communications between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the registrant.


Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

Opponents of Kant suppose he thinks that autonomy gives rational beings a special kind of intrinsic value. Since knowledge of intrinsic values would have to be a kind of metaphysical knowledge, this interpretation is contrary to Kant’s strictures on the limits of knowledge. Rather, Kant thinks that only rational beings can engage in reciprocal lawmaking, which is the source of moral laws. Animals cannot obligate us in the sense of participating in making laws for us. This, however, ignores a second sense in which we can have duties to animals: the laws we make for the treatment of people might also cover the treatment of animals. The chapter ends by explaining why it is hard to get this kind of conclusion using the universalization test.


Author(s):  
Kristján Kristjánsson

Chapter 6 proceeds via a critical review of recent writings about jealousy in philosophy and psychology. Although Aristotle himself did not explore this emotion, it is easily amenable to an Aristotle-style analysis. It turns out, however, that although Aristotelian conceptual and moral arguments about the necessary conceptual features of jealousy qua specific emotion, and the intrinsic value or disvalue of a stable trait of jealousy for eudaimonia, do carry philosophical mileage, they may fail to cut ice with psychologists who tend to focus on jealousy as a broad dimension of temperament. The chapter reveals a disconcerting lack of cross-disciplinary work on jealousy: the sort of work that has moved the discourse on various other emotions forward in recent years. It explains how the best way to ameliorate this lacuna is, precisely, through an Aristotelian analysis, where jealousy is (perhaps counter-intuitively) accorded a place as a potentially virtuous emotion.


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