Configuring the Enterprise Systems Portfolio: The Role of Information Risk

Information risk, the likelihood that corporate financial information is of poor quality, adversely impacts investor confidence regarding a firm’s financial health, making it an economically important problem. Viewing a firm’s enterprise systems (ES) portfolio as made up of operational modules (customer relationship management and supply chain management) and functional modules (accounting and finance, and human resource management), we examine how firms configure their ES portfolio by changing the balance in the implementation of two types of modules in response to information risk. We find internal controls to be an important contingency in determining how firms change their ES portfolio balance when information risk increases. When there is no weakness in internal controls, firms change their ES portfolio balance more toward operational modules. However, when internal controls are afflicted with material weakness, firms change their ES portfolio balance more toward functional modules instead. When evaluating the link between ES portfolio configuration and information processing requirements in the context of financial processes, managers should assess both information risk and internal controls to decide how to change the balance between operational and functional modules that are implemented.

Consequences of Weak Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting: Foreign versus U.S. Firms

For a sample of both foreign cross-listed firms and U.S. firms that report material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (MWICFR) from 2007- 2016, we utilize event studies and multivariate techniques to examine if there are differential consequences of reporting MWICFR across the two groups. Specifically, we examine the reactions of the equity and debt markets, external auditors, and the firm’s governance. We find that after receiving an audit report with material weakness issues, foreign firms face a significantly more negative stock market reaction and decrease in credit ratings. These firms are more likely to receive a going-concern audit opinion than U.S. firms and are also significantly less likely to change their CEOs or CFOs. Additionally, we find that the strength of the home market regulatory environment mitigates the negative equity and debt market reactions for foreign firms. Lastly, we also find that the presence of foreign auditors for foreign firms alleviates audit market consequences, resulting in a lower likelihood of auditor resignations and going-concern audit opinions. This paper extends and complements the existing literature on cross-listed firms by documenting differences in the consequences for firms reporting weaknesses in ICFR and exploring the traits driving these differences.

Managerial ability and stock price crash risk – the role of managerial overconfidence

Purpose This paper aims to examine the relation between managerial ability and stock price crash risk, conditional on managerial overconfidence. In addition, conditional on managerial overconfidence, the authors investigate the effect of managerial ability on firms’ choice of bad news hoarding channels, which result in a stock price crash. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 24,289 firm-years from companies listed on Compustat and CRSP from 1994 to 2018, the authors conduct panel regression analysis. Findings The authors find that managerial ability is positively associated with stock price crash risk only when managerial overconfidence is high. Furthermore, the authors find that managerial ability seems to exacerbate (attenuate) the bad news withholding by the overconfident managers using the earnings guidance (earnings management) channel. The authors find limited evidence that high-ability managers are likely to withhold bad news through the overinvestment channel and “other channels” when managers are overconfident. Finally, the authors find that the joint effect of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability on firms’ crash risk is more pronounced when there is a material weakness in firms’ internal controls, high investor belief heterogeneity and high information asymmetry. However, this effect appears to dissipate during the recent financial crisis in 2008. Originality/value This research reveals that managerial ability is costly to firms by engendering bad news hoardings and stock price crash risk when managers are overconfident. It also sheds light on how managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect managers’ choice of bad news withholding channels and stock price crash risk. Finally, the paper is of practical value to the board of directors in selecting the prospective executives.

On Characteristics of Ferritic Steel Determined during the Uniaxial Tensile Test

Tensile uniaxial test is typically used to determine the strength and plasticity of a material. Nominal (engineering) stress-strain relationship is suitable for determining properties when elastic strain dominates (e.g., yield strength, Young’s modulus). For loading conditions where plastic deformation is significant (in front of a crack tip or in a neck), the use of true stress and strain values and the relationship between them are required. Under these conditions, the dependence between the true values of stresses and strains should be treated as a characteristic—a constitutive relationship of the material. This article presents several methodologies to develop a constitutive relationship for S355 steel from tensile test data. The constitutive relationship developed was incorporated into a finite element analysis of the tension test and verified with the measured tensile test data. The method of the constitutive relationship defining takes into account the impact of high plastic strain, the triaxiality stress factor, Lode coefficient, and material weakness due to the formation of microvoids, which leads to obtained correctly results by FEM (finite elements method) calculation. The different variants of constitutive relationships were applied to the FEM loading simulation of the three-point bending SENB (single edge notched bend) specimen to evaluate their applicability to the calculation of mechanical fields in the presence of a crack.

Internal Control Quality and Bank Risk-Taking and Performance

Using a sample of bank-years from 2005 to 2017, we examine the effect of internal control quality on future risk-taking and performance. We find that banks that disclose a material weakness in internal controls have higher risk-taking and worse performance in the future, including having a higher (lower) likelihood of experiencing large losses (gains). These findings suggest that weak controls increase (reduce) downside (upside) risk-taking or conversely that strong controls increase (reduce) upside (downside) risk-taking. Path analyses suggest that 22.3 to 43.7 percent of the effect of internal control quality on future performance is through risk-taking. Additionally, material weaknesses are negatively associated with total asset, loan, interest income, and non-interest income growth, suggesting that internal control quality affects both core and non-core activities of banks. Overall, results suggest that strong internal controls improve bank risk-taking, in part through asymmetrically reducing downside risk-taking while facilitating upside risk-taking, ultimately improving bank performance.

Client negotiation strategy spillover to integrated audit judgments

Purpose This study aims to explore the effect of negotiating audit differences on auditors’ internal control deficiency (ICD) severity assessments, an ensuing, non-negotiated judgment, in an integrated audit. Design/methodology/approach The experiment manipulates the client’s concession timing strategy as either immediate or gradual, holding the outcome constant. A total of 34 auditors (primarily managers) resolve an audit difference with the client. Findings The client’s concession timing strategy during the negotiation of an audit difference spills over to affect auditors’ severity assessment of a related ICD. Auditors judged the ICD severity to be higher (lower) in the immediate (gradual) condition. Client retention risk inferences mediate this effect. Research limitations/implications The effect on auditors’ ICD severity assessments may not ultimately affect the audit report. Participants did not control their negotiation strategy, allowing the client’s negotiation strategy and the outcome to be held constant; it is possible that interactive effects between the client and auditor’s strategy might affect the study’s implications. Practical implications Features of the auditor–client negotiation process may influence auditors’ downstream, post-negotiation judgments and may therefore help to explain empirical evidence and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspection findings that show auditors often fail to identify an internal control material weakness after identifying a financial statement misstatement. Originality/value This paper expands current negotiation research by exploring the impact of inferences made based on counterparty concession strategy for downstream, non-negotiated judgments and current integrated audit research by identifying client retention perceptions as a driving factor of lower ICD severity assessments.