The Influence of CEO Compensation on Disclosure of Related Party Transactions with Corporate Governance as a Moderate Variable

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

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TATA KELOLA, KOMPENSASI CEO, KARAKTERISTIK CEO, ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES DAN TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

Jurnal Akuntansi Trisakti ◽

10.25105/jat.v6i2.5451 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 6 (2) ◽

pp. 285

Author(s):

Ririn Juliawaty ◽

Christina Dwi Astuti

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Stock Exchange ◽

Secondary Data ◽

Analysis Model ◽

Tax Aggressiveness ◽

Ceo Tenure ◽

Negative Effect ◽

Independent Variable ◽

Positive Effect

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance, CEO characteristic, CEO compensation, and accounting irregularities on tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable in this research is tax aggressiveness, while the independent variable in this research are corporate governance, characteristic CEO and CEO compensation.This study used secondary data with entire population manufacture companies listed at the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for 2015 -2017. The research sample are consists of 37 companies. The sampling method used to determine the sample is purposive sampling. The analysis model used in this research is multiple regression of panel data.Based on analytical results concluded that independent director have a significant and negative effect on tax aggressiveness while accounting irregularities has a significant and positive effect on tax aggressiveness. The board size, CEO compensation, age, and CEO tenure have no significant effect on tax aggressiveness.

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CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

Journal of Economics and Finance ◽

10.1007/bf02761556 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 29 (2) ◽

pp. 242-258 ◽

Cited By ~ 23

Author(s):

Pornsit Jiraporn ◽

Young Sang Kim ◽

Wallace N. Davidson

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Empirical Investigation ◽

Shareholder Rights

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A Literature Review of the Perspectives of CEO Pay: An Analysis of Issues and Controversies

Journal of Public Administration and Governance ◽

10.5296/jpag.v8i4.13817 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 44

Author(s):

Faitira Manuere ◽

Precious Hove

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Literature Review ◽

Executive Compensation ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Executive Pay ◽

The Core ◽

Good Corporate Governance ◽

Ceo Pay ◽

Conceptual Background

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on various theories that are used in organisations today to determine executive compensation. This paper analyses the relevance of the theories that are used to determine CEO compensation in modern corporations. The paper makes an attempt to review extensively the literature on CEO compensation. This paper looks at the concerns of sixteen theories of executive compensation. This paper further analyses the special features that are associated with CEO pay. These features help us to understand the problems that experts on executive pay experience when they try to define the exact CEO pay when compared to other rewards that are non financial. The drivers of executive pay are quantified and qualified in order to provide the conceptual background needed to understand the core factors that determine executive pay. Therefore the role of institutional investors in driving managerial salary is explored in detail. Finally, the effects of firm size and good corporate governance on executive pay are carefully analysed.

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