scholarly journals Two Kinds of Mental Conflict in Republic IV

Author(s):  
Galen Barry ◽  
Edith Gwendolyn Nally
Keyword(s):  

Abstract Plato’s partition argument infers that the soul has parts from the fact that the soul experiences mental conflict. Alasdair MacIntyre poses a dilemma for the argument that highlights an ambiguity in the concept of mental conflict. According to the first sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires whose satisfaction conditions are logically incompatible. According to the second sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires which are logically incompatible even when they are unsatisfied. The dilemma is therefore this: if the mental conflict is supposed to be the latter kind of conflict, then the partition argument is valid but is likely unsound; if it’s supposed to be the former kind, then the partition argument has true premises but is invalid. We explain this dilemma in detail and defend a dispositionalist solution to it.

Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Teubner

‘An Ethical Postlude’ returns to reflect directly on an understanding of tradition that frames how Boethius and Benedict relate to Augustine vis-à-vis the theme of prayer. This final chapter reflects on the kinematics of tradition, that is, on the actual motions qua motions of the act of tradition. This chapter engages the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Jeffrey Stout, both of whom have offered challenges to religious ethicists to broaden their historical horizons. Through critical engagement with MacIntyre and Stout, this chapter presents a case for an historical approach to Christian existence which can still give rise to meaningful moral and ethical reflection without having to accept (consciously or unconsciously) a Hegelian metaphysics of history.


1991 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-267
Author(s):  
Ian Markham

The problem at the heart of the faith/reason relationship can be set out as follows. Faith implies total commitment whilst reason requires a certain detachment. One cannot be totally committed yet rationally detached at the same time. Therefore faith and reason are two mutually exclusive approaches to religion. Alasdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? has offered a very interesting perspective on this problem. He has argued, albeit indirectly, that this faith/reason question is a modern problem generated by a certain set of liberal and relativist presuppositions. This paper will summarize Maclntyre's contribution to the discussion, and then point to some of the inadequacies of his account. I will be arguing that commitment to a tradition is largely justified by internal explanations for disagreement. Faith seems to need an intolerant explanation for different traditions. Therefore, MacIntyre is, in fact, handling liberalized forms of the traditions. By tackling MacIntyre's work from the faith/reason angle, I hope to show certain more fundamental problems with his work.


1990 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair MacIntyre was installed in 1989 as the first occupant of the McMahon/Hank Chair in Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. On April 18, 1990, he delivered his inaugural lecture, “The Privatization of Good,” before a large and appreciative audience in Notre Dame's Center for Continuing Education. He invited three Notre Dame colleagues to comment on his presentation: Donald P. Kommers, Professor of Law and Government, and Editor of The Review of Politics; William David Solomon, Associate Professor of Philosophy; and Richard McCormick, S.J., John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian Ethics. The following pages include the inaugural address, the remarks of two of the three commentators, and Professor Maclntyre's response. The editors wish to thank Professor MacIntyre for his cooperation in publishing his inaugural address.


Author(s):  
Julio Robledo Bordas

Este trabajo trata de ahondar en la noción de desacuerdo profundo propuesta por Robert Fogelin, comparando la idea de Fogelin de que los desacuerdos profundos emergen del choque entre dos marcos o trasfondos conceptuales (e incluso vitales) con el concepto kuhniano de inconmensurabilidad entre paradigmas. A su vez, argumento que ciertos elementos de dichos trasfondos no son enteramente revisables por medios puramente lógicos (dándole la razón a Fogelin) y dependen de una elección voluntaria fundamental entre distintos criterios sobre los que hacer pivotar la propia posición (siguiendo a Alasdair MacIntyre). Por último, contra Fogelin, propongo un método de resolución racional (parcial) de los desacuerdos profundos basado en la argumentación ad hominem en el sentido de Henry Johnstone y en la argumentación por analogía, que llamo «exigencia de coherencia».


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1906-1916 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus Robson

Background: The debate over the ethical implications of care robots has raised a range of concerns, including the possibility that such technologies could disrupt caregiving as a core human moral activity. At the same time, academics in information ethics have argued that we should extend our ideas of moral agency and rights to include intelligent machines. Research objectives: This article explores issues of the moral status and limitations of machines in the context of care. Design: A conceptual argument is developed, through a four-part scheme derived from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. No empirical data are used. Ethical consideration: No primary data were gathered for this study. Secondary sources and authorship have been acknowledged throughout. Findings / discussion: Certain kinds of social experience, including the narrative unity of a life, and the giving and receiving of care, are essential for moral development. Machines, no matter how advanced, cannot participate in such experiences in key respects, and thus cannot develop as practical reasoners. Conclusion: It follows that they cannot be moral agents and that they cannot care. There are, it seems, no such things as care robots. In view of the institutional power of tech companies and commissioning bodies, care practitioners need to take more of a lead in developing new assistive technologies which are appropriate to their practice.


Author(s):  
John R. Wallach

This essay discusses the contribution of Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981) to a generation of moral theory. Pitched as a critique of liberal individualism (e.g., Rawls), modernity (e.g., amoral bureaucracies), and the antagonism toward the history of moral theory evinced by analytical philosophers, MacIntyre’s book urges a return toward moral traditions embedded in local communities as the best route to avoid what he regards as the soullessness of modernity and the abyss of Nietzschean philosophy. But his failure to reflect on the political valence of traditions in general or the Aristotelian and Thomist ones he values, seriously compromises his complaints about modernity and his suggestions for ways out.


2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-650
Author(s):  
Christopher Stephen Lutz
Keyword(s):  

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