Crítica ao consenso racional de John Rawls segundo Alasdair MacIntyre

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo a apresentação da crítica moral de Alasdair MacIntyre à teoria proposta por John Rawls quanto à dificuldade de consenso racional para definir os critérios da posição original, a fim de elaborar a teoria básica da sociedade. Serão também caracterizados os elementos essenciais da teoria de MacIntyre como alternativa ao modelo de Rawls, usando conceitos como a unidade narrativa da vida humana, a prática e a tradição e como estas auxiliam na elaboração de um critério racional adequado aos modos de vidas particulares. Finalmente, serão expostas algumas críticas à teoria de MacIntyre, a fim de aperfeiçoamento teórico e para uma reatualização do tema.

Emotive Sources of Post-truth

The first part of this paper briefly presents the phenomenon of post-truth, which is then confronted with emotivism, a position of 20th-century ethics or metaethics that ascribes an emotive and evocative meaning to ethical judgements, rather than a descriptive one. The second part shows briefly the theories of two main representatives of this view, namely A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson. The third part focuses on the objections to emotivism, primarily presented by Alasdair MacIntyre. Finally, the influence of emotivism on post-truth is discussed.

Two Kinds of Mental Conflict in Republic IV

Plato’s partition argument infers that the soul has parts from the fact that the soul experiences mental conflict. Alasdair MacIntyre poses a dilemma for the argument that highlights an ambiguity in the concept of mental conflict. According to the first sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires whose satisfaction conditions are logically incompatible. According to the second sense of conflict, a soul is in conflict when it has desires which are logically incompatible even when they are unsatisfied. The dilemma is therefore this: if the mental conflict is supposed to be the latter kind of conflict, then the partition argument is valid but is likely unsound; if it’s supposed to be the former kind, then the partition argument has true premises but is invalid. We explain this dilemma in detail and defend a dispositionalist solution to it.

Thinking the Family. Some Lines in 20th-Century Philosophy

Współczesność pod wieloma względami nie jest początkiem, ale końcem. Podobnie jak w przypadku społeczności i rodziny. Dzisiejsze czasy nie są pierwotne, lecz wtórne. Dlatego, aby je zrozumieć, musimy najpierw zobaczyć ich pochodność. To zagadnienie zostało opracowane na podstawie wielu tekstów autorstwa Alasdair MacIntyre i Hansa Sedlmayra. Aby w dziwnym „dwudziestym wieku” odzyskać dawną siłę myślenia wspólnotowego i rodzinnego, należy skoncentrować się na solidnym rozumieniu instytucji. Arnold Gehlen, ze względu na swoją cenną pracę Urmensch und Spätkultur, w której m.in. w miejsce „bytu” wprowadza pojęcie instytucji, jest proponowany jako niezwykle pomocny w zrozumieniu wiążącej mocy instytucji. Ponadto wskazuje się punkty wyjścia do myślenia o rodzinie, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem książek i przemyśleń takich autorów, jak m.in. C.S. Lewisa, Roberta Spaemanna i Martina Heideggera.

Una conversación entre la filosofía analítica y el psicoanálisis: sobre The Unconscious, de Alasdair MacIntyre

En este artículo se analiza la obra de Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious. Se postula que este libro interroga la teoría psicoanalítica desde la perspectiva de la filosofía analítica de la mente y continúa así la conversación entre el psicoanálisis y la filosofía anglosajona. Se discuten las tesis de MacIntyre en el sentido de que el concepto de inconsciente no es necesario para formular leyes científicas que correlacionen experiencias de la infancia con la vida adulta, y se concluye que, al plantear esta tesis, MacIntyre ignoró lo que él mismo considera que es el mayor logro de la teoría psicoanalítica.

Antropo-etica della vulnerabilità al tempo del Covid-19

Concern for human vulnerability seems to be at the heart of the recent sanitary emergency. The aim of this article is to show why actual reflections on Covid-19 need an adequately theorized conception of vulnerability. We first review anthropological and ethical approaches to vulnerability in two of the main authors of the classical-medieval tradition: Aristoteles and Thomas Aquinas, proving that they include the vulnerability in their reflections. The thought of these authors is then combined with the ethical reflections of the contemporary philosophers Alasdair MacIntyre and Marta Nussbaum, identifying some of the challenges emerging from these authors. In particular, we wonder how to reconcile constitutive human vulnerability, which reappears manifestly after Covid-19, with the general tendency to be scared from or to avoid it. We then briefly propose theoretical concepts, such as humility, care and creativity, available within the philosophical literature, to address these challenges.