scholarly journals Bootstrapping Ordinal Thinking

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Wynn ◽  
Karenleigh A. Overmann ◽  
Frederick L. Coolidge ◽  
Klint Janulis

In this chapter, the authors apply cognitive neuroscience, gene–culture co-evolution, and extended cognition to account for the evolution of an unusual neurologically grounded trait—the ability to arrange items in ordered sequences. Cognitive neuroscience strongly suggests that the human ability to conceive of and use ordinal sequences such as alphabets and calendars relies on dedicated neural resources, yet ordinal sequences such as these do not exist in nature. There is thus the provocative possibility that ordinal thinking evolved as a specific response to cultural phenomena. But which, and how? Applying the perspectives of extended cognition and gene–culture co-evolution (neuronal recycling in particular), the authors explore the likelihood that ordinal cognition arose through the manipulation of material artifacts, with stringing beads for thousands of generations being one possible scenario.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Lizardo ◽  
Brandon Sepulvado ◽  
Dustin S. Stoltz ◽  
Marshall A. Taylor

Can cognitive neuroscience contribute to cultural sociology? We argue that it can, but to profit from such contributions requires developing coherent positions at the level of ontology and coherent epistemological views concerning interfield relations in science. In this paper, we carve out a coherent position that makes sense for cultural sociology based on Sperber’s “infra-individualist” and Clark’s “extended cognition” arguments. More substantively, we take on three canonical topics in cultural sociology: language, intersubjectivity, and associational links between elements, showing that the cognitive neurosciences can make conceptual and empirical contributions to the thinking of cultural sociologists in these areas. We conclude by outlining the opportunities for further development of work at the intersection of cultural sociology and the cognitive neurosciences.


2020 ◽  
pp. 113-144
Author(s):  
Hwan-sik Choi

This chapter proposes an information-theoretic perspective on the role of human ability in decision making. I define personality as a response system of a person that maps a situation to a behavior. The person-specific response system is characterized by various constraints. Based on the principle of maximum entropy, I treat these constraints as information since they reduce the entropy of the system. Physical laws and the human genome provide rudimentary constraints on the response system. Human ability constitutes an important set of advanced constraints. Therefore, human ability is entropy-reducing information. In particular, I define the information capacity of a person as the amount of entropy reduced by person-specific ability, which includes the ability to acquire information, to process information, and to discern incorrect information. I provide a heuristic discussion that relates information capacity with broad domains of noncognitive ability. I also highlight the connection between information capacity and three traits of noncognitive ability: Openness, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Mottron

Abstract Stepping away from a normocentric understanding of autism goes beyond questioning the supposed lack of social motivation of autistic people. It evokes subversion of the prevalence of intellectual disability even in non-verbal autism. It also challenges the perceived purposelessness of some restricted interests and repetitive behaviors, and instead interprets them as legitimate exploratory and learning-associated manifestations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gian Domenico Iannetti ◽  
Giorgio Vallortigara

Abstract Some of the foundations of Heyes’ radical reasoning seem to be based on a fractional selection of available evidence. Using an ethological perspective, we argue against Heyes’ rapid dismissal of innate cognitive instincts. Heyes’ use of fMRI studies of literacy to claim that culture assembles pieces of mental technology seems an example of incorrect reverse inferences and overlap theories pervasive in cognitive neuroscience.


1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (8) ◽  
pp. 642-643
Author(s):  
Howard C. Hughes

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Weldon

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