Address-space layout randomization using code islands

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haizhi Xu ◽  
Steve J. Chapin
Keyword(s):  
Address Space ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

scholarly journals Address Space Layout Randomization Comparative Analysis on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 18.04 LTS

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Raquel Vázquez Díaz ◽  
Martiño Rivera-Dourado ◽  
Rubén Pérez-Jove ◽  
Pilar Vila Avendaño ◽  
José M. Vázquez-Naya
Keyword(s):  
Operating System ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Operating Systems ◽  
Memory Management ◽  
Address Space ◽  
Memory Protection ◽  
Partial Correlations ◽  
Feature Memory ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

Memory management is one of the main tasks of an Operating System, where the data of each process running in the system is kept. In this context, there exist several types of attacks that exploit memory-related vulnerabilities, forcing Operating Systems to feature memory protection techniques that make difficult to exploit them. One of these techniques is ASLR, whose function is to introduce randomness into the virtual address space of a process. The goal of this work was to measure, analyze and compare the behavior of ASLR on the 64-bit versions of Windows 10 and Ubuntu 18.04 LTS. The results have shown that the implementation of ASLR has improved significantly on these two Operating Systems compared to previous versions. However, there are aspects, such as partial correlations or a frequency distribution that is not always uniform, so it can still be improved.

scholarly journals Fine-grained address space layout randomization on program load

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 163-182
Author(s):  
A.R. Nurmukhametov ◽  
E.A. Zhabotinskiy ◽  
Sh. F. Kurmangaleev ◽  
S.S. Gaissaryan ◽  
A.V. Vishnyakov
Keyword(s):  
Address Space ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Program Load ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

A Function Level Randomization Technique to Mitigate ROP Attacks

2013 ◽  
Vol 765-767 ◽  
pp. 871-878
Author(s):  
Liang Xiao ◽  
Xun Zhan ◽  
Tao Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Binary Code ◽  
Buffer Overflow ◽  
Target System ◽  
Limited Time ◽  
Brute Force ◽  
Address Space ◽  
Return Oriented Programming ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) is a kind of attack technique which makes use of the existing binary code of target systems. ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is widely used to protect systems from buffer-overflow attacks by introducing artificial diversity to software. With ASLR software can be immune from ROP attacks to some extent. Due to the fact that ASLR cant randomize base addresses of executables code segments and its utility on 32-bit architectures is limited by the number of bits available for address randomization, attackers can successfully exploit a target system by using brute force in limited time. Thus, we proposed FLR, a function level randomization technique to mitigate ROP attacks. FLR randomly permutes functions in executables, making attackers assumptions on executables incorrect. We implemented a prototype of FLR and randomized ten executables. ROP attacks succeeded without FLR and failed with FLR.

Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization on Program Load

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 363-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. R. Nurmukhametov ◽  
E. A. Zhabotinskiy ◽  
Sh. F. Kurmangaleev ◽  
S. S. Gaissaryan ◽  
A. V. Vishnyakov
Keyword(s):  
Address Space ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Program Load ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

scholarly journals A Review of Memory Errors Exploitation in x86-64

Computers ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Conor Pirry ◽  
Hector Marco-Gisbert ◽  
Carolyn Begg
Keyword(s):  
Operating System ◽  
New Record ◽  
Address Space ◽  
Memory Errors ◽  
Memory Error ◽  
Full View ◽  
Buffer Overflows ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

Memory errors are still a serious threat affecting millions of devices worldwide. Recently, bounty programs have reached a new record, paying up to USD 2.5 million for one single vulnerability in Android and up to USD 2 million for Apple’s operating system. In almost all cases, it is common to exploit memory errors in one or more stages to fully compromise those devices. In this paper, we review and discuss the importance of memory error vulnerabilities, and more specifically stack buffer overflows to provide a full view of how memory errors are exploited. We identify the root causes that make those attacks possible on modern x86-64 architecture in the presence of modern protection techniques. We have analyzed how unsafe library functions are prone to buffer overflows, revealing that although there are secure versions of those functions, they are not actually preventing buffer overflows from happening. Using secure functions does not result in software free from vulnerabilities and it requires developers to be security-aware. To overcome this problem, we discuss the three main security protection techniques present in all modern operating system; the non-eXecutable bit (NX), the Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) and the Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). After discussing their effectiveness, we conclude that although they provide a strong level of protection against classical exploitation techniques, modern attacks can bypass them.

scholarly journals Selfrando: Securing the Tor Browser against De-anonymization Exploits

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Conti ◽  
Stephen Crane ◽  
Tommaso Frassetto ◽  
Andrei Homescu ◽  
Georg Koppen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Field Testing ◽  
Free World ◽  
Address Space ◽  
Software Vulnerabilities ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Attack Surface ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
The One ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization

Abstract Tor is a well-known anonymous communication system used by millions of users, including journalists and civil rights activists all over the world. The Tor Browser gives non-technical users an easy way to access the Tor Network. However, many government organizations are actively trying to compromise Tor not only in regions with repressive regimes but also in the free world, as the recent FBI incidents clearly demonstrate. Exploiting software vulnerabilities in general, and browser vulnerabilities in particular, constitutes a clear and present threat to the Tor software. The Tor Browser shares a large part of its attack surface with the Firefox browser. Therefore, Firefox vulnerabilities (even patched ones) are highly valuable to attackers trying to monitor users of the Tor Browser. In this paper, we present selfrando-an enhanced and practical load-time randomization technique for the Tor Browser that defends against exploits, such as the one FBI allegedly used against Tor users. Our solution significantly improves security over standard address space layout randomization (ASLR) techniques currently used by Firefox and other mainstream browsers. Moreover, we collaborated closely with the Tor Project to ensure that selfrando is fully compatible with AddressSanitizer (ASan), a compiler feature to detect memory corruption. ASan is used in a hardened version of Tor Browser for test purposes. The Tor Project decided to include our solution in the hardened releases of the Tor Browser, which is currently undergoing field testing.

SGX-Shield: Enabling Address Space Layout Randomization for SGX Programs

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaebaek Seo ◽  
Byoungyoung Lee ◽  
Seongmin Kim ◽  
Ming-Wei Shih ◽  
Insik Shin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Address Space ◽  
Space Layout ◽  
Address Space Layout Randomization
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