scholarly journals The moral problem of vaccines

ANALES RANM ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 138 (138(03)) ◽  
pp. 199-200
Author(s):  
D. Gracia-Guillén
Keyword(s):  
Ethics ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Smith
Keyword(s):  

Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-52
Author(s):  
Michael Novak

During those ominous early hours and indecisive days of the war of Yom Kippur, many American Jews were surprised by the depth of their fears concerning the fate of Israel. Such Jews had thought of themselves as powerful, detached, integrated into the larger American society. Suddenly they could not be certain that their colleagues and friends shared the secret dread they began to feel: the nightmare of another possible holocaust.Christian leaders have sometimes seemed to treat Israel as though it presented an anguishing moral problem: “The question has two sides. There are complexities. Jewish military spirit seems a trifle pushy. Think of the poor, Third-World Arab refugees.” One anguishes about sorting out the truly moral thing to do.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Wisor
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-215
Author(s):  
Antonio Franceschet

The International Criminal Court (icc) faces a profound authority crisis. This article explores the underlying conditions and ethical implications of this crisis in light of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) political theory. The icc’s authority crisis is twofold: First, having been constructed as a purely legal actor, the Court’s inevitable role in politics has undermined perceptions of its legitimacy. Second, having been constructed as a supranational substitute for domestic legal authority, the icc has been subverted by other, political branches of the state, such as the executive. These problems have been particularly salient in Africa where states have vociferously challenged the Court’s investigations and prosecutions. Kantian political ethics show that the icc’s authority crisis is an intractable moral problem that must be addressed collectively and coercively by sovereign states acting upon a larger, cosmopolitan duty to enforce universal rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-72
Author(s):  
Margit Sutrop ◽  

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming increasingly autonomous and will soon be able to make decisions on their own about what to do, AI researchers have started to talk about the need to align AI with human values. The AI ‘value alignment problem’ faces two kinds of challenges—a technical and a normative one—which are interrelated. The technical challenge deals with the question of how to encode human values in artificial intelligence. The normative challenge is associated with two questions: “Which values or whose values should artificial intelligence align with?” My concern is that AI developers underestimate the difficulty of answering the normative question. They hope that we can easily identify the purposes we really desire and that they can focus on the design of those objectives. But how are we to decide which objectives or values to induce in AI, given that there is a plurality of values and moral principles and that our everyday life is full of moral disagreements? In my paper I will show that although it is not realistic to reach an agreement on what we, humans, really want as people value different things and seek different ends, it may be possible to agree on what we do not want to happen, considering the possibility that intelligence, equal to our own, or even exceeding it, can be created. I will argue for pluralism (and not for relativism!) which is compatible with objectivism. In spite of the fact that there is no uniquely best solution to every moral problem, it is still possible to identify which answers are wrong. And this is where we should begin the value alignment of AI.


Author(s):  
Rod Andrew

This chapter continues to cover Pickens’s efforts in Indian diplomacy, seeking treaties and in several instances acting to prevent war. In May 1788, Pickens is outraged at the treacherous slaughter of several Indians under a flag of truce, including his friend Corn Tassel, and he uses his influence to try to hold responsible the white militia officers involved. The chapter highlights the practical, constitutional, and political obstacles to establishing a lasting peace between white settlers and the Creeks and Cherokees, as well as what Pickens, influenced by Calvinist theology, saw as a moral problem—man’s inherent greed and penchant for violence.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document