scholarly journals The Logical Possibility of Halting Oracles

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
Eric Holloway
Keyword(s):  
Logical Possibility

Halting oracles are often used in discussions of computability.  This letter discusses whether or not such oracles are logically possible or if the idea itself contains internal contradictions.

Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William Ockham

Traditio ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 389-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilyn McCord Adams
Keyword(s):  
Logical Possibility ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
William Ockham ◽  
Etienne Gilson

Ockham's doctrine of intuitive cognition lies at the heart of his epistemology. As Philotheus Boehner and Sebastian Day have quite rightly observed, one of the central aims of this doctrine is to answer the question how the intellect can have certain knowledge of contingent states of affairs (including the existence or non-existence of material particulars). A number of scholars, including Etienne Gilson and Anton Pegis, have charged, however, that far from achieving this goal, Ockham's doctrine (and especially what he says about the logical possibility of intuitive cognition of non-existents) leads to scepticism. Coming to Ockham's defense, Boehner and Day have rejected these criticisms as resting on misinterpretations of Ockham. I believe Boehner and Day have done much to clarify what Ockham actually meant. I should like to reopen the discussion, however, because I believe not all the consequences of Oekham's doctrine have been accurately drawn.

scholarly journals G.E. Moore on logical possibility

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (0) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Czarnecki
Keyword(s):  
Logical Possibility

Noumenal Causality Reconsidered: Affection, Agency, and Meaning in Kant

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Positive Answer ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Metaphysical Question ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
Common Sense Knowledge

The lead question of Kant's first Critique, indeed his whole Critical Philosophy is ‘How is Metaphysics as a Science Possible?’ Neo-Kantian and recent Anglophone interpretations of Kant's epistemology have concentrated on the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ of the first Critique, and have taken Kant's positive and legitimate sense of metaphysics to concern the necessary conditions of our knowledge of mathematics, natural science, and of course, our common sense knowledge of a spatio-temporal world of objects and events. However, in the ‘Canon of Pure Reason’ in the first Critique Kant indicates quite clearly that, although two of the leading sub-questions of metaphysics — ‘What should I so?’ and ‘What may I hope?’ — cannot be answered on theoretical grounds, they may be answered on practical grounds (A804-05=B832-33). Those practical grounds are elaborated and supplemented (mainly) in the latter two Critiques and the Religion. In each case, however, a definite and positive answer to a metaphysical question involves giving ‘objective reality’ to a concept, e.g., the concepts of freedom or immortality. ‘Objective reality’ involves possible reference to an object, where ‘possible reference’ involves more than merely describing a logical possibility.

The Possibility of Error

2005 ◽  
pp. 321-354
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Investigation ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Actual Existence

This chapter considers the possibility of error, the actual existence of those conditions that make error possible. It elaborates the notion that the conditions that determine the logical possibility of error must themselves be absolute truth. However, readers are warned that the path to be travelled is very thorny and stony. It is a path of difficult philosophical investigation. Nobody ought to follow it who does not desire to. The reader is urged to skip the whole of this chapter unless he wants to find even more of dullness than the rest of this sleepy book has discovered to him. For the author, the arid way would seem hard, were it not for the precious prize at the end of it.

Uncertainty about the value of quantum probability for cognitive modeling

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Behme
Keyword(s):  
Probability Theory ◽  
Cognitive Modeling ◽  
Quantum Probability ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
Classical Probability Theory ◽  
Human Rationality

AbstractI argue that the overly simplistic scenarios discussed by Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) establish at best that quantum probability theory (QPT) is a logical possibility allowing distinct predictions from classical probability theory (CPT). The article fails, however, to provide convincing evidence for the proposal that QPT offers unique insights regarding cognition and the nature of human rationality.

Feinberg's Theory of “Preposthumous” Harm

Dialogue ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. J. Waluchow
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Strong Tendency ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Alternative Theory ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Joel Feinberg ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Dead Man

In his recent book, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg addresses the question whether a person can be harmed after his or her own death, that is, whether posthumous harm is a logical possibility. There is a very strong tendency to suppose that harm to the dead is simply inconceivable. After all, there cannot be harm without a subject to be harmed, but when death occurs it appears to obliterate the subject thus excluding the possibility of harm. On the other hand, there is an inclination to believe that harmful events can indeed occur posthumously. As Aristotle observed, “a dead man is popularly believed to be capable of having both good and ill fortune—honour and dishonour and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally—in exactly the same way as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening”. Feinberg sides with Aristotle on this issue and develops an intriguing theory purporting to show how posthumous harms are possible. My intention in this paper is to argue that Feinberg's account meets with such serious difficulties that we must either develop an alternative theory or agree with those who claim that death logically excludes the possibility of harm. I shall begin in §2 with a brief sketch of Feinberg's provocative theory. This will be followed in §3 by my comments and criticisms. Section 4 will close with suggestions about where Feinberg's account goes wrong and how it might be repaired.

LOGICAL POSSIBILITY

1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-24
Author(s):  
RICHARD V MASON
Keyword(s):  
Logical Possibility

A logical analysis of some value concepts

1963 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Logical Necessity ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
Strict Implication

The purpose of this paper is to provide a partial logical analysis of a few concepts that may be classified as value concepts or as concepts that are closely related to value concepts. Among the concepts that will be considered are striving for, doing, believing, knowing, desiring, ability to do, obligation to do, and value for. Familiarity will be assumed with the concepts of logical necessity, logical possibility, and strict implication as formalized in standard systems of modal logic (such as S4), and with the concepts of obligation and permission as formalized in systems of deontic logic. It will also be assumed that quantifiers over propositions have been included in extensions of these systems.

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