A semiotic analysis of multiple systems of logic: using tagmemic theory to assess the usefulness and limitations of formal logics, and to produce a mathematical lattice model including multiple systems of logic

Tagmemic theory as a semiotic theory can be used to analyze multiple systems of logic and to assess their strengths and weaknesses. This analysis constitutes an application of semiotics and also a contribution to understanding of the nature of logic within the context of human meaning. Each system of logic is best adapted to represent one portion of human rationality. Acknowledging this correlation between systems and their targets helps explain the usefulness of more than one system. Among these systems, the two-valued system of classical logic takes its place. All the systems of logic can be incorporated into a complex mathematical model that has a place for each system and that represents a larger whole in human reasoning. The model can represent why tight formal systems of logic can be applied in some contexts with great success, but in other contexts are not directly applicable. The result suggests that human reasoning is innately richer than any one formal system of logic.

Neo-Kantianisme dan Implikasinya untuk Penelitian Terhadap Agama

The elaboration of the theme done by the author aims at introducing the philosophical stream of Neo-Kantianism based on Kant’s epistemology and at pointing out the implication of Neo-Kantianism on the scientific research about religion. This purpose should be realized by describing the main philosophical concept of Neo-Kantianism within its two wellknown schools. Its implication on the religion can be explained. The critique on religion can be pointed out, the theology of pluralism can be compared with the catholic theology, and the divine revelation provided by Neo-Kantianism can be enlighted under the scrutiny of rationality. The outcome of the research is lying on the recognition and the acceptance of the adherents’ Neo Kantianism to the theology as a scientific discipline based on the divine revelation under the authority of the human rationality. The conclusion taken out from the research is that the philosophy of Neo-Kantianism has given strong impact on the scientific research about religion. The divine revelation should be enlightened by the various scientific approaches before it is reflected theologically.

Sensibility First

In the practical realm just as in the theoretical realm, everything comes down to human sensibility as an equally empirical and non-empirical primitive starting point that constitutively motivates, intentionally pervades, and intentionally structures our innately-specified yet also “human, all-too-human” capacities for theoretical and practical rationality, all the way up. Strong Kantian non-conceptualism says that according to Kant, the faculty of human intuition or Anschauung, that is, human inner and outer sense perception, together with the faculty of imagination or Einbildungskraft, jointly constitute this sensible starting point for objective cognition and theoretical reason; and Kantian non-intellectualism says that according to Kant, human affect, desire, and moral emotion—in a word, the human heart—jointly constitute this sensible starting point for free agency and practical reason. Conjoined, they provide what I call the Sensibility First approach, which, in a nutshell, says that human rationality flows from the groundedness of our discursive, intellectual, and embodiment-neutral powers in our sensible, non-intellectual, and essentially embodied powers, without in any way reducing the former to the latter. If I’m correct about all this, then the result is a sharply non-classical and unorthodox, hence “shocking,” nevertheless fully unified and textually defensible approach to Kant’s proto-Critical philosophy (i.e., from 1768 to 1772), Critical philosophy (i.e., from 1781 to 1787) and post-Critical philosophy (i.e., from the late 1780s to the late 1790s) that encompasses his theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy alike.

Evangelikalismen utfordret

The article analyses the implicit epistemology of James K.A. Smith in his book Who’s Afraid of Post- modernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to Church (2006). The analysis concentrates on Smith’s interpretation of three French postmodern philosophers: J. Derrida, J.F. Lyotard and M. Fou- cault, but includes also a yearlong discussion between Smith and D.A. Carson, rendered in the book and in Carson’s books Becoming Conversant with the Emerging Church (2005) and Christ & Culture Revisited (2008). Carson defends the evangelical movement which today is criticized and challenged by several post-evangelical writers, among them Smith, who claims that faith is the sole bridge be- tween reality and knowledge. He calls his view confessional realism. The aim is to present and con- structively evaluate Smith’s epistemology and its relation to issues like rationality, truth, objectivity and reality. The theoretical basis for the assessment of Smith’s presentation of Radical Orthodoxy andits epistemology is what M. Stenmark calls “The everyday life epistemology upgraded” (Vardagslivets kunskapsteori uppgraderat (VKU). Stenmark argues that we may know the truth, but nobody own the truth. Based on VKU, the article critiques Smith’s epistemology and his theology of incarnation, as partly built on a local language game, partly on his intrabiblical understanding of reality, and partly for the risk of ending up in fideism. VKU is also the basis for a critical assessment of the epistemology ofevangelicalism and Carson’s arguments for the biblical “non-negotiables”. The article defends a criti- cal realism which allows a view of revelation that the triune God is able to transcend the limitations of human sin and subjectivity, and that God the Creator is able to communicate his plan of salvation to rational men. Human rationality never replaces faith, but rationality is able to give good grounds for faith among people endorsing modernity or postmodernity.

Human rationality in Vito Mancuso’s liberal Catholic theology augmenting the notions of Van Huyssteen’s ‘postfoundational transversality’ and McGrath’s ‘rational consilience’

The cue for this article is human rationality being the cornerstone in Wentzel van Huyssteen’s thinking, and Alister McGrath’s scepsis about the feasibility of a postfoundational transversality in particular. This article does not intend to juxtapose Van Huyssteen’s postfoundational rationality to McGrath’s enterprise of a ‘rational consilience’ but contends that a transversal approach to rationality engages social ramifications as well. Subsequently, a liberal Catholic theologian’s take on rationality is presented here as such an offering from the social sciences contributes to a bricolage of unintegrated pieces of knowledge and discernments emerging from various disciplinary or social viewpoints on reality. Vito Mancuso continues to focus on human rationality which, in his view, provides humanity with the hope of eternal life or life from the perspective of eternity. Such a conviction is in line with his horizontal understanding of human rationality, in addition to the human being’s first challenge to understanding reality.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The reason d’être of this article is to call for a discussion partner to the notion of human rationality from the social sciences (indicated as one of the neglected fields in the theology and science discourse). Vito Mancuso, for one, brings the pragmatic and transformative (even revolutionary) dimension to the table. A transversal approach to rationality must integrate such social practices as well.

Thinking with Robert Sokolowski about phenomenology and personalism

Robert Sokolowski wishes to provide what he calls “glimpses” that provide essential philosophical clarifications regarding the nature of the human person, whom the author also calls “the agent of truth.” He claims that our rationality constitutes us as human persons and wishes to explain such rationality in action to reveal its existing manifestations. He calls for epistemic modesty, pointing out our inability to fully understand the mystery of human personhood. Our article reflects on the way Sokolowski approaches the study of what constitutes the human person, underlining his preference for basing his ideas on dissecting distinct human activities, which helps us identify how human rationality and personhood manifest themselves. We further reflect on what Sokolowski means by emphasizing that human rationality is “essentially a disclosure of things” as opposed to the ability to note, describe, evaluate and/or infer ideas in your brains. Finally, we argue that to understand what constitutes the human person, we must take into account the human essential relationality and openness to the other/Other

Financial Psychometrics as an Improved Paradigm in Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry

There are many types of financial transactions which are ubiquitous daily behaviors. These can be objectively quantified in a vast number of ways, making them uniquely efficacious for identifying patterns within the decisions made by individuals. Although financial dysfunction is a common trait of neurological diseases, and the field of behavioral economics already utilizes psychiatric methods to solve problems found within the previously-held assumption of human rationality, financial analysis has been overlooked as a tool of psychiatry and applied clinical neurology. The fields of medicine and economics are generally not seen as having much in common among practitioners of either discipline, and for those who have considered this possibility there are valid concerns regarding the ethics of patient confidentiality with the combined use of both medical and financial data. This is a reasonably simple hurdle to overcome, however, and as the medical community accepts clinically-trained economists among their ranks brand new sets of analytical tools used for diagnoses, treatments, and research becomes available by applying well-established methods in economics to existing frameworks in psychiatry and neurology. By reversing the paradigm of behavioral economics, therein is found the field of financial psychometrics.

Conclusion: An Outsider Looks In

For problems of foreign election interference, international law is an important vehicle for promoting cooperation and combating the worst forms of human (and other) behavior. Nevertheless, scholars of international law engage these problems from limited perspectives. For example, law (including international law) does not deal well with large-scale bad effects that may result from the commission of many unfriendly acts that are individually legally permissible. Nor does international law seem able to handle nonstate actors whose electoral impact crosses national borders. Put differently, what is the meaning of “foreign” election interference when domestic actors are often willing and able to do what a foreign adversary might wish them to do? One important class of domestic actor is the useful idiot—the citizen who is easily tricked into spreading a message that advantages the adversary. A second class of actor, especially relevant for U.S. elections, is the U.S.-based social media company whose free services foreign adversaries use to influence politically relevant messaging. Lastly, international law scholars would do well to question the fundamental psychological limitations on human “rationality” on which many of their putative solutions are based; collaboration with social and cognitive psychologists would help in this regard.

On Human Rationality and Government Control

In this paper we first address a long-standing criticism of human rationality and what that means for the role of government. We review and compare much of the literature on rationality and demonstrate that various authors within various fields often mean very different things by the word «rational.» While we make no claims as to whether or not humans always behave rationally, we point out the flawed logic for what is suggested for the role of government as a way of addressing the human irrationality problem. Building on the Mises-Rothbard-Huerta de Soto tradition, we argue that what is more important than perfect rationality is purposeful action. We explain the dynamic nature of the market in which time plays an important role, and humans act with expectations to accomplish goals, learn from past mistakes, discover new information and modify their plans accordingly. Using Hayek’s approach, we discuss the knowledge problem in which data is dispersed among millions of individuals (unknown in its entirety to any central authority) as well as the problems with applying the scientific method exactly as it is used in the natural sciences to the human behavioral sciences. These problems combined, we argue, make for a much more disastrous system than would be a system in which often-irrational individuals would be free to make mistakes for themselves, discover new information and take actions for their own betterment. Key words: Rationality, Government Intervention, Equilibrium, Human Action, Purposeful Behaviour. JEL Classification: B53, D80, D84, H10, H30. Resumen: En este artículo abordamos en primer lugar una vieja crítica de la racionalidad humana y lo que ello implica para el papel que desempeña el gobierno. Revisamos y comparamos gran parte de la literatura sobre ra-cionalidad, y demostramos que distintos autores dentro de diversos campos atribuyen cosas muy diferentes a la palabra «racional». Si bien no hacemos ningún tipo de reivindicación respecto a si o no los seres humanos se com-portan siempre racionalmente, subrayamos la defectuosa lógica por la que se sugiere el papel del gobierno como una forma de abordar el problema de la irracionalidad humana. Siguiendo la tradición Mises-Rothbard-Huerta de Soto, sostenemos que más importante que la racionalidad perfecta es la acción intencionada. Explicamos la naturaleza dinámica del mercado en la que el tiempo juega un papel importante, y los seres humanos actúan con ex-pectativas para lograr sus metas, aprenden de los errores del pasado, des-cubren nueva información y modifican sus planes en consecuencia. Utilizando el enfoque de Hayek, se discute el problema del conocimiento en el que los datos están dispersos entre millones de individuos (desconocidos en su to-talidad para cualquier autoridad central), así como los problemas con la aplicación del método científico tal y como se utiliza en las ciencias de la naturaleza a las ciencias del comportamiento humano. Estos problemas combinados, sostenemos, generan un sistema mucho más desastroso de lo que sería un sistema en el que los individuos con frecuencia irracionales fuesen libres para cometer errores por sí mismos, descubrir nueva información y tomar acciones para su propia mejora. Palabras clave: Racionalidad, Intervención del Gobierno, Equilibrio, Acción Humana, Comportamiento Intencionado. Clasificación JEL: B53, D80, D84, H10, H30.

Physicality as a possible key to understanding human nature

The statement about human nature is the subject of numerous discussions, which, however, does not negate the presence of the substrate of its origin, manifestations, specificity, and real dynamics in space and time. In the process of analysis, we find a lot of arguments that confirm this fact, as well as a decent number of counterarguments. In this article, a priori, we proceed from the validity of the existence of the term "human nature", recognizing its ambiguity. Of course, our stated physicality as an aspect of human nature does not exhaust the idea of his nature. The nominal division into soul, spirit, etc. gives us some methodological tools. No more than that. Physicality, in its turn, requires problematization. "Physicality "is a category that denotes what a given human body naturally becomes in the course of its social modifications, so this category can certainly not be considered outside of conjunction with another very important category - "spirituality". These concepts, as well as the phenomena they denote, are interrelated (MORGAN 2006). In our review, there are three main ways to interpret "Physicality". Firstly, it is the only factuality that initially claims the ontological status. Secondly, it is part of a harmonious whole that includes all non-corporeal things. I would like to focus on the third aspect, which includes at least three principles. Thirdly, physicality changes its seemingly simple "fate" dramatically, turning into a problem as a way of human existence. This can be interpreted "as a creative act of overcoming oneself". Only this overcoming of the present self presupposes a reliance on its relevance and reality. This ontologically conditioned event is always self-based. In this sense, the body as a creative phenomenon " never appears just by its own. Yet it is precisely overcoming that is the constitutive feature of human existence. A man is bigger than himself. We can say that the problem is a way of human existence. The problem in the most primitive form can be expressed as "I already want to, but I can't yet". Where does the desire come from if the object of desire (the desired situation) is not yet available? How can you want something that doesn't exist yet and never has? The man himself is a few steps ahead (BUBLIK, 2006). Human rationality is based not only on reflectivity, but also on the ability of a person to operate with ideas that do not have objective visibility (for example, the ultimate category of being). Thus, man proves his metaphysicality: "man's metaphysics expresses not only the presence of the supernatural dimension in man but also his ability to determine himself, to be his own creation". The main methods used in writing the article: the unity of historical and logical, the method of reflection.