scholarly journals OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-253
Author(s):  
Wlamir Xavier ◽  
Silvio Parodi Camilo ◽  
Rosilene Marcon ◽  
Frederick Greene
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Organizational Structures ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Trade Perspective ◽  
The Relationship

This study seeks to analyze the relationship between the ownership structure of Family Business Groups and the institutional environment. Family Business Groups prevail in emerging countries as diverse organizational structures that aggregate various companies under the control of a family or a reduced number of people. This economically relevant structure is responsible for a significant share of countries' Gross Domestic Product and frequently congregates the largest private companies in their respective countries. Institutional reforms have been implemented in emerging economies in order to support the integration of other nations from a trade perspective. This paper contributes to the literature by developing propositions on the effect of institutional reforms on the ownership structure of Family Business Groups.

Auditor Appointment Strategy and Intragroup Value Transfers: Evidence From Family Business Groups

2021 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2199265
Author(s):  
Yan-Leung Cheung ◽  
In-Mu Haw ◽  
Weiqiang Tan ◽  
Wenming Wang
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Divide And Conquer ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Audit Effectiveness ◽  
Financial Reporting Comparability

Family business groups (FBGs) typically control several member firms and can hire a single auditor or multiple auditors to audit their member firms. This article examines what type of auditor appointment strategy constrains intragroup value transfers within FBGs. Analyzing related-party transactions (RPTs) within FBGs in Hong Kong, this study provides evidence that FBGs with multiple auditors undertake more intragroup value transfers than FBGs with a single auditor. However, the adverse effect of multiple-auditor appointments is mitigated by a stronger board and higher financial reporting comparability among member firms. Using an alternative measure of intragroup value transfers, we also find that the market perceives multiple-auditor appointments as impairing audit effectiveness. Overall, our findings offer the new insight that controlling families can exploit the appointment of multiple auditors as a “divide and conquer” strategy which undermines the monitoring role of auditors against intragroup value transfers, but stronger corporate governance of member firms can mitigate the adverse effect.

scholarly journals The Dynamics and Complexity of Family Business Groups

2018 ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kajari Mukherjee ◽  
Marita Rautiainen ◽  
Timo Pihkala ◽  
Peter Rosa
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Family Business Groups
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