Je Pense à Vous and La Promesse: From Describing to Performing

Author(s):  
Edward Lamberti

This chapter looks at two early Dardenne films, Je Pense à Vous (1992) and La Promesse (1996). The gap between these two films proved momentous in the Dardennes’ career, as they were able, after the critical, commercial and, in their eyes, personal failure of Je Pense à Vous, to rethink their approach to film style, which led to La Promesse, the true ‘beginning’ of their career as it is commonly known and their first explicit engagement with Levinas’s ethical philosophy. The chapter considers this radical change in film style to be akin to the distinction that J. L. Austin, in his lectures on performativity, makes between constative and performative uses of language, the first being description and the second being performance. The chapter begins by positing a parallel between the shifts in Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy from the descriptions of Totality and Infinity to the literary performance of Otherwise than Being and the Dardennes’ reconfiguration of their style between Je Pense à Vous and La Promesse. This will show how, just as Levinas sought to clarify his ethics by deploying a more overtly performative style, so the Dardennes achieve a similar, Levinasian style in their filmmaking in La Promesse.

Author(s):  
Edward Lamberti

Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy has had a significant influence on film theory in recent years. This book proposes a relationship between Levinasian ethics and film style. It argues that films can convey Levinasian ethics not just through their subject matter but also through their use of style. The book brings this relationship between ethics and style into a productive dialogue with theories of performativity, such as J. L. Austin’s speech-act theory, Jacques Derrida’s notion of originary performativity and Judith Butler’s reconfiguration of performativity within the socio-political sphere. It explores Levinas’s influence on film through the study of three directorial bodies of work: those of the Dardenne brothers, Barbet Schroeder and Paul Schrader. The book focuses on a range of films, including the Dardennes’ Je Pense à Vous (1992), La Promesse (1996), Le Fils (2002) and The Kid with a Bike (2011), Schroeder’s Maîtresse (1975), Reversal of Fortune (1990), Terror’s Advocate (2007) and Our Lady of the Assassins (2000) and Schrader’s American Gigolo (1980), Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters (1985), The Comfort of Strangers (1990), Dominion: Prequel to the Exorcist (2005) and Adam Resurrected (2008). In doing so, it demonstrates how films can perform a Levinasian ethics through different styles.


Author(s):  
Edward Lamberti

The introduction begins by exploring how Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical philosophy has been taken up by film theorists to date. Much of this scholarship centres on Levinas’s theories of the Other as found in Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961), particularly the ‘face’ of the Other, which theorists have discussed in relation to visualre presentation. Levinas developed his ethics, in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974), into a performative account of what it feels like to be responsible for the Other. Accordingly, Performing Ethics through Film Style takes a similar approach with film, linking the performativity of Levinas’s writing style with the capacity of films to perform a Levinasian ethics of responsibility for the Other through their styles. The introduction brings in performativity theory – including J. L. Austin’s speech acts, Jacques Derrida’s originary performativity and Judith Butler’s theories of language in the socio-political sphere – to enhance this study of performativity in Levinas and film. And it sets up the subjects of the chapters to follow: the films of the Dardenne brothers, Barbet Schroeder and Paul Schrader. Studying these directors in relation to Levinas shows how films can perform ethics through a wide variety of styles.


Author(s):  
Susan EVANS

This case study explores the strategic business opportunities, for Lane Crawford, an iconic luxury department store, to transition in a circular economy towards sustainability. A new experimentation framework was developed and conducted among cross departmental employees, during a Design Lab, with intention to co-create novel Circular Economy business concepts towards a new vision: the later was a reframe of the old system based on the principles of sustainability; to move beyond a linear operational model towards a circular economy that can contribute to a regenerative society. This work draws on both academic and professional experience and was conducted through professional practice. It was found that innovative co-created concepts, output from the Design Lab, can create radical change in a circular economy that is holistically beneficial and financially viable; looking forward to extract greater value a)Internal organization requires remodeling to transform towards a circular economy; b)Requirement for more horizonal teams across departments vs solely vertical; c)New language and relationships are required to be able to transition towards a circular economy; d)Some form of physical and virtual space requirements, for cross-disciplinary teams to come together to co-create; e)Ability to iterate, learn and evolve requires agency across the business


1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-58
Author(s):  
Ernest Callenbach
Keyword(s):  

1999 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-57
Author(s):  
John Belton
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Galen Strawson

This chapter examines the difference between John Locke's definition of a person [P], considered as a kind of thing, and his definition of a subject of experience of a certain sophisticated sort [S]. It first discusses the equation [P] = [S], where [S] is assumed to be a continuing thing that is able to survive radical change of substantial realization, as well as Locke's position about consciousness in relation to [P]'s identity or existence over time as [S]. It argues that Locke is not guilty of circularity because he is not proposing consciousness as the determinant of [S]'s identity over time, but only of [S]'s moral and legal responsibility over time. Finally, it suggests that the terms “Person” and “Personal identity” pull apart, in Locke's scheme of things, but in a perfectly coherent way.


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