scholarly journals Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Caplin ◽  
Mark Dean
2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (7) ◽  
pp. 2183-2203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Caplin ◽  
Mark Dean

Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opposed to a rational trade-off between the costs of information acquisition and the expected benefits of learning? We develop a revealed preference test that characterizes all patterns of choice “mistakes” consistent with a general model of optimal costly information acquisition and identify the extent to which information costs can be recovered from choice data. (JEL D11, D81, D83)


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-423
Author(s):  
Qi Fu ◽  
Yongquan Li ◽  
Kaijie Zhu

2021 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 554-559
Author(s):  
Zach Y. Brown ◽  
Jihye Jeon

In markets with complicated products such as insurance, why do firms offer many products even when consumers appear to receive little benefit? We show that when consumers face information acquisition costs, firms may have an incentive to introduce many undifferentiated products. This allows firms to gain market share and increase markups. We document initial evidence consistent with the model using data from Medicare prescription drug insurance. Insurers that offer more duplicate or similar plans have higher-cost plans. These results suggest a role for policymakers to restrict product proliferation in markets with complicated products.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 1975-2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HALIM ◽  
YOHANES E. RIYANTO ◽  
NILANJAN ROY

Author(s):  
Onur Atan ◽  
Saeed Ghoorchian ◽  
Setareh Maghsudi ◽  
Mihaela van der Schaar Schaar

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