GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIP, LOCAL MARKET COMPETITION, AND SUPPLIERS’ INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

This article examines how suppliers’ innovation in developing countries is affected by the interaction of vertical global supply chain relationships and horizontal market competition structure. We devised a bidirectional dynamic game model consisting of competing suppliers in a developing economy and an overseas buyer in a developed economy for innovation decision process in a suppliers cluster. Our research shows that global supply chain relationship is the primary factor to influence local cluster innovation and profit. Total innovation of the cluster is proved to be greater in global supply relationship with a powerful buyer than a non-powerful buyer. However, suppliers in a powerful buyer chain are not able to capture the value they created from innovation. Local competition structure plays its secondary role on cluster innovation through interaction with vertical chain relationship. Based on prior innovation research on either vertical supply chain power dynamics or horizontal competition intenseness, our study contributes as the first to employ a theoretical suppliers’ innovation model for an integrative analysis encompassing both global and local power dynamics.

Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.

Global Value Chain Participation, Competition, and Markups: Evidence from Ethiopian Manufacturing Firms

This study uses detailed manufacturing census panel data for 2000 to 2014 to explore the relationship between Ethiopian firms’ global value chain (GVC) participation and markups. We find that GVC firms, defined as firms involved in both exporting and importing intermediate inputs, tend to have lower markups relative to non-trading firms and firms that are involved only in material imports. Moreover, the more intensely a firm is integrated into a GVC (measured by the share of export value added and imported inputs in total sales), the lower its markup is. Finally, we explore competition effects at the industry level and find that firms operating in industries with a relatively high GVC presence and suppliers selling inputs to such industries tend to have lower markups owing to horizontal competition and backward linkages, respectively. All of these findings suggest that GVC participation is associated with greater competition for Ethiopian firms.

Woman in the security and defense sector: harmony of professional and personal life

The author has outlined the main violations of women's rights in Ukraine, including in the security and defense sector. The author emphasizes that the process of introducing gender equality in the security sector of Ukraine has certain specifics. The author has identified the impact of armed conflicts on men and women and the main problematic issues that arise in the work of women law enforcement officers and affect her "self-concept". The main problems that occur in the professional environment of law enforcement include the following: service relationships in the "vertical" and "horizontal", competition between women and men, identity crisis. The main international documents that enshrine the equal rights of women and men, and areas for strengthening the role of women in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are analyzed. The main problems that cause gender imbalance in military service include: the presence of gender and corporate stereotypes, insufficient regulation of administrative and living conditions, restrictions on women's social rights in compliance with current legislation on motherhood and childhood, the prohibitionof certain military professions for women , the lack of equal rights when entering military service at the stage of choosing education, the limited list of military positions to which women servicemen may be appointed, the difference in the status positions of servicemen-men and women during the change of service military service, different order of execution of punishments assigned to female servicemen and male servicemen. In order to achieve the principle of work-life balance, the author has recommended to consider five important aspects of life: health, relationships, career, self-improvement, leisure.

Trade credit or vertical merger strategy for financial constrained retailer in a supply chain with asymmetric competing retailers

Motivated by the practices that many small and middle-sized enterprises (SME) retailers have financial constraints due to their limited budget and financing access, this paper studies the manufacturer's financial strategy (i.e., trade credit versus vertical merger with a capital-constrained retailer) in a supply chain with two financial asymmetric retailers. We first compare the equilibrium profits under different financing modes and find that if manufacturer's capital cost under trade credit or administrative cost under vertical merger is below a certain threshold, the manufacturer should finance instead of deselect the capital-constrained retailer even though the competition is intensified. Furthermore, manufacturer can choose a financing strategy based on the tradeoff between financing value and cost from trade credit or vertical merger. Under trade credit, the increased horizontal competition intensity is against the capital-constrained retailer while with vertical merger the competition intensity is harmful to the capital-abundant retailer. In addition, through investigating the impact of different financial modes on the equilibrium profits of the supply chain players, we find that whether trade credit can outperform vertical merger for both the manufacturer and the capital-constrained retailer depends on horizontal competition intensity, profit-sharing proportion and administrative cost of vertical merger. Moreover, the capital-abundant retailer will get the lowest profit when other participators act like an alliance. Our study provides a roadmap for the manufacturer to make a financing policy for capital-constrained retailer who competes with a funded retailer.

What Motivates Local Sustainability Policy Action in China? The Case of Low-Carbon City Pilot Program

An increasing volume of literature has sought to identify factors that motivate cities to pursue sustainability and adopt climate policies. However, most empirical studies were done in Western countries, where relatively high local autonomy and low pressure on industrial growth create conditions for spontaneous policy innovations in sustainability. This paper uses China’s Low-Carbon City Pilot Program as a case to investigate motivations for local sustainability actions in an authoritarian context. Our event history analyses confirm the effects of multi-level governance on local sustainability initiatives in China, particularly horizontal competition across jurisdictions, priorities and preferences of upper-level authorities, as well as local determinants including leadership, capacity, politics, and environmental stress. The findings contribute to the comparative urban governance scholarship by highlighting the unique feature of “experimentation under hierarchy” in shaping urban sustainability policymaking in China.

Vertical And Horizontal Competition And Cooperation In Supply Chain System

Seven various variants of vertical and horizontal competition and cooperation of supply chain system participants are investigated. Best variants from the point of view of the participants themselves (their profit) ‒ integration of the whole system ‒ and consumers (volumes of products on the market) ‒ full vertically integrated supply chains ‒ by comparison of the characteristics of the optimal and equilibrium states of this system are determined. Moreover, it is easier to resist the competition than to be included in the optimal plan. The worst results ‒ not only in terms of output but also in aggregate profits ‒ are the horizontal integration of transport companies that can negotiate tariffs. At the same time, the corresponding horizontal integration of producers does not save the situation, but on the contrary, makes it stable worst of all possible.