This paper studies the effect of introducing a new vertical differentiation strategy, paying for an upgrade to a premium product after purchasing the base product, on the price dispersion of the base product arising from existing price discrimination strategies. In particular, we examine how a major U.S. airline’s price dispersion in the coach cabin changes after introducing the option to upgrade to a new type of premium economy seating within the coach cabin. We first provide a theoretical analysis that highlights two competing pressures that the new premium economy seating upgrades created on coach class prices. On the one hand, the airline benefits from lowering its prices because by allowing more customers to purchase in the first place, it increases the probability of selling upgrades (admission effect). On the other hand, for some customers, the value of flying with the airline increases because of the upgrade availability, therefore the airline may find it optimal to increase its prices (valuation effect). In the second part of the paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of the impact of upgrade introduction on coach class prices, based on a proprietary transaction-level data set from a major U.S. airline company. The empirical analysis tests the main predictions of our theoretical model and examines further nuances. The results show that the introduction of the premium economy seating upgrades is associated with an increase in the price dispersion and revenues in the coach class, the admission effect is stronger than the valuation effect on the low end of the price distribution, and the opposite is true on the high end of the price distribution. Finally, we discuss implications of our results for firm revenues and consumer welfare. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry