scholarly journals Perceptual Awareness Negativity—Does It Reflect Awareness or Attention?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Bola ◽  
Łucja Doradzińska
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Mark Textor

Brentano never investigated whether the ‘peculiar feature’ of inner perception—that it can never become inner observation—that distinguishes our awareness of the mental from other forms of perceptual awareness could serve as the mark of the mental. However, his students Stumpf and Husserl developed marks of the mental that are inspired by this idea. The chapter clarifies Husserl’s Thesis that mental phenomena have no appearances, argues that it is superior to Brentano’s Thesis, and defends it against objections from Reinach and Husserl himself. Husserl himself threw out the baby with the bathwater when he later rejected Husserl’s Thesis. A precisified form of this idea can still unify our intuitions about the mental.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari ◽  
Peter Carruthers

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valia Rodríguez ◽  
Russell Thompson ◽  
Mark Stokes ◽  
Matthew Brett ◽  
Indira Alvarez ◽  
...  

In this study, we explored the neural correlates of perceptual awareness during a masked face detection task. To assess awareness more precisely than in previous studies, participants employed a 4-point scale to rate subjective visibility. An event-related fMRI and a high-density ERP study were carried out. Imaging data showed that conscious face detection was linked to activation of fusiform and occipital face areas. Frontal and parietal regions, including the pre-SMA, inferior frontal sulcus, anterior insula/frontal operculum, and intraparietal sulcus, also responded strongly when faces were consciously perceived. In contrast, no brain area showed face-selective activity when participants reported no impression of a face. ERP results showed that conscious face detection was associated with enhanced N170 and also with the presence of a second negativity around 300 msec and a slow positivity around 415 msec. Again, face-related activity was absent when faces were not consciously perceived. We suggest that, under conditions of backward masking, ventral stream and fronto-parietal regions show similar, strong links of face-related activity to conscious perception and stress the importance of a detailed assessment of awareness to examine activity related to unseen stimulus events.


Perception ◽  
10.1068/p3066 ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 675-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beena Khurana ◽  
Katsumi Watanabe ◽  
Romi Nijhawan

Objects flashed in alignment with moving objects appear to lag behind [Nijhawan, 1994 Nature (London) 370 256–257], Could this ‘flash-lag’ effect be due to attentional delays in bringing flashed items to perceptual awareness [Titchener, 1908/1973 Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention first published 1908 (New York: Macmillan); reprinted 1973 (New York: Arno Press)]? We overtly manipulated attentional allocation in three experiments to address the following questions: Is the flash-lag effect affected when attention is (a) focused on a single event in the presence of multiple events, (b) distributed over multiple events, and (c) diverted from the flashed object? To address the first two questions, five rings, moving along a circular path, were presented while observers attentively tracked one or multiple rings under four conditions: the ring in which the disk was flashed was (i) known or (ii) unknown (randomly selected from the set of five); location of the flashed disk was (i) known or (ii) unknown (randomly selected from ten locations), The third question was investigated by using two moving objects in a cost – benefit cueing paradigm, An arrow cued, with 70% or 80% validity, the position of the flashed object, Observers performed two tasks: (a) reacted as quickly as possible to flash onset; (b) reported the flash-lag effect, We obtained a significant and unaltered flash-lag effect under all the attentional conditions we employed, Furthermore, though reaction times were significantly shorter for validly cued flashes, the flash-lag effect remained uninfluenced by cue validity, indicating that quicker responses to validly cued locations may be due to the shortening of post-perceptual delays in motor responses rather than the perceptual facilitation, We conclude that the computations that give rise to the flash-lag effect are independent of attentional deployment.


1970 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Gochman

A series of 11 pictures was developed to provide a method of measuring health ideation and adaptive health behavior. Responses were obtained from 31 Cub Scouts aged 8 to 10 yr. Coding procedures established for 3 dimensions, general perceptual awareness, health ideation and adaptive health behavior, proved to be highly reliable, and the pictures were found to provide internally consistent measures within each dimension.


Author(s):  
Maria Del Vecchio

The neural correlates of perceptual awareness are usually investigated by comparing experimental conditions in which subjects are aware or not aware of the delivered stimulus. This, however implies that subjects report their experience, possibly biasing the neural responses with the post-perceptual processes involved. This Neuro Forum article reviews evidence from an electroencephalography (EEG) study by Cohen and colleagues (Cohen M. et al. Journal of Neuroscience 40 (25) 4925-4935) addressing the importance of no-report paradigms in the neuroscience of consciousness. In particular, authors shows of P3b, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of the conscious processing, is strongly elicited only when subjects have to report their experience, proposing a reconsideration in the approach to the neuroscience of consciousness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 155-164
Author(s):  
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti ◽  

One approaching a thing from a distance may perceive it as existent, then as a substance, then as a tree and, finally, as a fig tree. Thus, the same fig tree can be the object of all these different perceptions. This shows, Udayana argues, that difference in cognitive states does not necessarily prove that their objects are different. This argument is in response to the Buddhist claim that since perceptual cognitive states and non-perceptual cognitive states are different, their respective objects are also different; unique particulars (svalakSaNa) that alone are real, are grasped in perception; general features (saamaanyalakSaNa) that are not real are grasped in non-perceptual cognitive states. The Buddhist objects: when the same thing appears to be the object of different cognitive states, only that cognitive state which leads to useful result is reliable. Udayana replies: More than one cognitive state in the above situation may lead to useful result; it is not justified to accept only one of them as reliable and reject the others. The Buddhist objects again: perceptual awareness is direct but non-perceptual awareness is indirect: hence their objects are different. Udayana replies: The same thing may be perceived when there is sensory connection with it and then inferred from an invariably connected sign when there is no sensory connection. Thus, the same thing may be the object of both direct and indirect cognitive states depending on different causal conditions.


Cognition ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 184 ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Jie Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Jian Chen ◽  
Galen V. Bodenhausen ◽  
Shimin Fu

PLoS ONE ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (7) ◽  
pp. e22614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim C. Kietzmann ◽  
Stephan Geuter ◽  
Peter König

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