scholarly journals Mix and Match: An Investigation into Whether Episodic Future Thinking Cues Need to Match Discounting Delays in Order to Be Effective

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara O’Donnell ◽  
Kelseanna Hollis-Hansen ◽  
Leonard Epstein

Episodic future thinking (EFT), or prospectively imagining yourself in the future, has been developed into an intervention tool to reduce delay discounting (DD), or the preference for smaller immediate over larger future rewards, and to make healthier choices that promote long-term health rather than short-term enjoyment. Most EFT interventions use EFT cues whose future events match the time delays of the DD task, which may limit the utility of EFT. The current study (N = 160, Mage = 35.25, 47.5% female) used a 2 × 2 factorial design with type of episodic thinking (matched, unmatched) and temporal perspective (EFT, episodic recent thinking (ERT)) as between-subject factors to investigate whether there were differences in DD for groups that had EFT cues matched to the time delays of the DD task in comparison to cues with unmatched temporal delays. The results showed EFT reduced DD compared to ERT controls, and no differences emerged between matched and unmatched EFT groups. Our findings suggest that either the process of generating EFT cues or the use of any positive and vivid future event, regardless of whether it is matched to the DD task, can reduce DD.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rebecca Olsen

<p>Delay discounting refers to the fact that rewards lose their value if they are delayed. Excessive delay discounting is associated with various health-related problems such as over-eating and substance abuse. One phenomenon shown to reduce delay discounting is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT; imagining personal future events). Across multiple experiments and a meta-analysis, the current thesis examined the reliability of the effect of EFT on delay discounting and also sought to clarify the components of EFT that are necessary to reduce delay discounting.  Experiment 1 replicated the EFT effect using a common titrating-amount procedure, and the meta-analysis based on 40 independent studies confirmed that EFT has a reliable, medium-sized effect on delay discounting. The meta-analysis also assessed the robustness of the EFT effect across various methodological features and participant characteristics. A multiple meta-regression revealed that the between-study variability in the size of the EFT effect was accounted for by study design and type of discounting measure. Within-subjects design studies had significantly smaller effect sizes than between-subjects design studies. Studies that used k as a discounting rate measure had significantly smaller effect sizes than studies that used area under the discounting curve or other atheoretical discounting measures. The size of the EFT effect was robust across different participant characteristics and ages, suggesting that EFT may be utilized as an effective intervention for a variety of age groups and impulsive behaviors.  Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C assessed the suitability of an alternative and briefer delay discounting procedure (in which participants simply report their indifference points) for subsequent EFT experiments. The report indifference points procedure produced a high percentage of invalid data, a finding that was replicated across all three experiments. We therefore continued to use the well-established titrating-amount procedure in subsequent studies.  Experiment 3A found that episodic past thinking (imagining personal past events) and semantic future thinking (estimating what a person could buy with the larger, delayed amount) had no effect on discounting, indicating that both episodic thinking and future thinking are necessary components of the EFT effect. Experiment 3A results also indicated that financial relevance alone is not sufficient to reducing discounting. Experiment 3B found that the future events also need to be personally relevant to reduce discounting, and that participants perceived EFT to reduce their discounting by primarily making the larger, delayed reward more valuable. We also showed that demand characteristics, where participants change their behavior to conform to the researcher’s expectations, are an unlikely explanation for the EFT effects found in Experiments 3A and 3B. Further research is warranted to form a better understanding of the mechanism(s) through which EFT reduces delay discounting.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Rebecca Olsen

<p>Delay discounting refers to the fact that rewards lose their value if they are delayed. Excessive delay discounting is associated with various health-related problems such as over-eating and substance abuse. One phenomenon shown to reduce delay discounting is Episodic Future Thinking (EFT; imagining personal future events). Across multiple experiments and a meta-analysis, the current thesis examined the reliability of the effect of EFT on delay discounting and also sought to clarify the components of EFT that are necessary to reduce delay discounting.  Experiment 1 replicated the EFT effect using a common titrating-amount procedure, and the meta-analysis based on 40 independent studies confirmed that EFT has a reliable, medium-sized effect on delay discounting. The meta-analysis also assessed the robustness of the EFT effect across various methodological features and participant characteristics. A multiple meta-regression revealed that the between-study variability in the size of the EFT effect was accounted for by study design and type of discounting measure. Within-subjects design studies had significantly smaller effect sizes than between-subjects design studies. Studies that used k as a discounting rate measure had significantly smaller effect sizes than studies that used area under the discounting curve or other atheoretical discounting measures. The size of the EFT effect was robust across different participant characteristics and ages, suggesting that EFT may be utilized as an effective intervention for a variety of age groups and impulsive behaviors.  Experiments 2A, 2B and 2C assessed the suitability of an alternative and briefer delay discounting procedure (in which participants simply report their indifference points) for subsequent EFT experiments. The report indifference points procedure produced a high percentage of invalid data, a finding that was replicated across all three experiments. We therefore continued to use the well-established titrating-amount procedure in subsequent studies.  Experiment 3A found that episodic past thinking (imagining personal past events) and semantic future thinking (estimating what a person could buy with the larger, delayed amount) had no effect on discounting, indicating that both episodic thinking and future thinking are necessary components of the EFT effect. Experiment 3A results also indicated that financial relevance alone is not sufficient to reducing discounting. Experiment 3B found that the future events also need to be personally relevant to reduce discounting, and that participants perceived EFT to reduce their discounting by primarily making the larger, delayed reward more valuable. We also showed that demand characteristics, where participants change their behavior to conform to the researcher’s expectations, are an unlikely explanation for the EFT effects found in Experiments 3A and 3B. Further research is warranted to form a better understanding of the mechanism(s) through which EFT reduces delay discounting.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Palombo ◽  
Christopher R Madan

How does imagining future events – whether positive or negative – influence our choices in the present? Prior work has shown the simulation of hypothetical future events, dubbed episodic future thinking, can alter the propensity to engage in delay discounting (the tendency to devalue future rewards) and does so in a valence specific manner. Some research shows that positive episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting, whereas negative future thinking augments it. However, more recent research indicates that both positive and negative episodic future thinking reduce delay discounting, suggesting an effect of episodic future thinking that is independent of valence (Bulley et al., 2019). In the present study, we sought to replicate and extend these latter findings. Here, participants (N = 604) completed an online study. In the baseline task, participants completed a delay discounting task. In the experimental task, they engaged in episodic future thinking before completing a second delay discounting task. Participants were randomly assigned to engage in either positive, neutral, or negative episodic future thinking. In accordance with Bulley et al., we found that episodic future thinking, regardless of valence, reduced delay discounting. Although episodic future thinking shifted decision-making in all conditions, the effect was stronger when participants engaged in positive episodic future thinking, even after accounting for personal relevance and vividness of imagined events. These findings suggest that episodic future thinking may promote future-oriented choices by contextualizing the future, and this effect is further strengthened when the future is tied to positive emotion.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Palombo ◽  
Christopher R Madan

How does imagining future events – whether positive or negative – influence our choices in the present? Prior work has shown the simulation of hypothetical future events, dubbed episodic future thinking, can alter the propensity to engage in delay discounting (the tendency to devalue future rewards) and does so in a valence specific manner. Some research shows that positive episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting, whereas negative future thinking augments it. However, more recent research indicates that both positive and negative episodic future thinking reduce delay discounting, suggesting an effect of episodic future thinking that is independent of valence (Bulley et al., 2019). In the present study, we sought to replicate and extend these latter findings. Here, participants (N = 604) completed an online study. In the baseline task, participants completed a delay discounting task. In the experimental task, they engaged in episodic future thinking before completing a second delay discounting task. Participants were randomly assigned to engage in either positive, neutral, or negative episodic future thinking. In accordance with Bulley et al., we found that episodic future thinking, regardless of valence, reduced delay discounting. Although episodic future thinking shifted decision-making in all conditions, the effect was stronger when participants engaged in positive episodic future thinking, even after accounting for personal relevance and vividness of imagined events. These findings suggest that episodic future thinking may promote future-oriented choices by contextualizing the future, and this effect is further strengthened when the future is tied to positive emotion.


Author(s):  
Leonard H. Epstein ◽  
Rocco A. Paluch ◽  
Mathew J. Biondolillo ◽  
Jeff S. Stein ◽  
Teresa Quattrin ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411990034
Author(s):  
Janie Busby Grant ◽  
Neil Wilson

Imagining personal future events is associated with well-being, but the nature and direction of this relationship are unclear. This study investigated whether imagining episodic future scenarios, experimentally manipulated for valence, have an immediate impact on affect. University students ( N =  197) completed a 2 × 3 between-subject online study in which they imagined four personal events likely to occur in the future. Participants were directed to imagine positive or negative events or were undirected as to valence to additionally assess the valence and effect of self-directed imagined scenarios. Participants in all three conditions reported a change in positive affect immediately after the task, with both positive and nondirected thinking improving positive affect and negative future thoughts reducing it. However, negative affect only shifted in response to negative future thinking but not the other conditions. These findings demonstrate that there is an immediate causal effect of episodic future thinking on affect but only in specific directions and that this differs from the patterns shown in longer term measurements. The findings also suggest when self-directed that imagined future thoughts tend to mirror the valence and causal effect of positively induced thoughts. This study has implications for the ongoing debate around future thinking and well-being.


1982 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 180-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph LaPalombara

Political scientists are only now, and dimly, beginning to recognize that something called “political risk analysis” (PRA) is very much in vogue in the corporate and banking communities of this country. Any attempt to assess this uncommon development should begin with this question: Why would any banker or corporate manager wish to spend hard cash on anything political scientists might have to say about places overseas where banks and multinational corporations lend or invest their capital? After all, the profession is not exactly distinguished by its ability to make accurate forecasts. Indeed, Sartori has argued that political scientists ought to eschew forecasting entirely in that they are best able to explain what happened as opposed to what may come to pass.Sartori's assertion of course would make historians of us all—and burden us with the historian's smug claim that, if the history examined is too recent, the immediacy of events will distort our vision and bias our judgments. Thus, rather than try to foretell where, say, Germany will move politically next year we should expend (more!) of our resources to establish once and for all what really caused Weimar to collapse and Hitler to come to power.This is not the stuff of political risk analysis. Growing interest in this activity is little based on broad analyses of the past or on long-term forecasts of future events. The potential consumers of political assessments are intelligent, harried bankers and corporate managers who are pressed to make relatively short-term decisions that affect the viability of enterprise and investment-and, equally important, careers-in professions where tenure is unknown.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 256-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin A Conway ◽  
Catherine Loveday ◽  
Scott N Cole

Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering–imagining system. The remembering–imagining system renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic imagined near-future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the remembering–imagining system is compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated by dysfunctional images of the future.


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