scholarly journals Imitation and Local Interactions: Long Run Equilibrium Selection

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Eugenio Vicario

In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct. Necessary and sufficient conditions for both the actions to be the unique long run equilibrium are provided. The result is obtained through the application of the radius and modified coradius technique.

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (04) ◽  
pp. 709-737 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. BARBÉ ◽  
F. VON HAESELER

We generalize the concept of one-dimensional decimation invariant sequences, i.e. sequences which are invariant under a specific rescaling, to dimension N. After discussing the elementary properties of decimation-invariant sequences, we focus our interest on their periodicity. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of periodic decimation invariant sequences are presented.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 963-969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vadim Arkin ◽  
Alexander Slastnikov

Abstract We study a problem when the optimal stopping for a one-dimensional diffusion process is generated by a threshold strategy. Namely, we give necessary and sufficient conditions (on the diffusion process and the payoff function) under which a stopping set has a threshold structure.


1977 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. S. Bonderson

The system properties of passivity, losslessness, and reciprocity are defined and their necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a class of linear one-dimensional multipower distributed systems. The utilization of power product pairs as state variables and the representation of the dynamics in first-order form allows results completely analogous to those for lumped-element systems.


2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Chi Chen ◽  
Yunshyong Chow

In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.


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