scholarly journals The Sovereignty of Humanity and Social Responsibility for Evil Prevention

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 418
Author(s):  
Janusz Salamon
Keyword(s):  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
Great Good ◽  
Russian Orthodox ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Greater Good ◽  
Orthodox View

In this paper, I suggest that James Sterba’s recent restatement of the logical problem of evil overlooks a plausible theistic interpretation of the divine–human relation, which allows for a theodicy impervious to his atheological argument, which boils down to God’s failure to meet Sterba’s “Evil Prevention Requirements”. I argue that such requirements need not apply to God in a world under full human sovereignty, which presupposes that God never intervenes to change the natural course of events to prevent evils, as God has a decisive “greater good justification” for not intervening, namely respecting human sovereignty. This non-interventionist view of divine providence can be made tenable by the great good and dignity of the God-granted human God-like self-creativity implied by human sovereignty (a concept inspired by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola). The Mirandolian theodicy can both accommodate and complement Dostoyevsky’s Russian Orthodox view of “beneficial suffering”, predicated against the background of the conception of “collective selfhood”, overlooked by Sterba despite “featuring” on the cover of his book, no doubt due to his libertarian–individualistic assumptions about human agency and human flourishing, which a proponent of a theistic theodicy may do well to resist.

scholarly journals Getting off the Omnibus: Rejecting Free Will and Soul-Making Responses to the Problem of Evil

Open Theology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Brian C. Macallan
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
John Hick ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Greater Good ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Powerful Process

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.

scholarly journals Doing Theology in the Context of the Gift and the Promise of Nostra Aetate

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Interreligious Dialogue ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Gift ◽  
The Way

This article addresses three problems and suggests ways to address these problems. First, Christian theology has often been supersessionist, especially in Christology and Mariology. Claims about Jesus and Mary being exceptional (in different ways) often involve forms of supersessionism. I report on two theological works that attempt to be orthodoxly Catholic and to avoid supersessionism. Second, I address the conflict between affirming the irrevocable covenant God made with Israel and the universality of salvation God wrought in Jesus. I argue herein that the key problem is logical, not theological. Hence, we should not seek to resolve this problem theoretically, but to dissolve it logically in a manner analogous to the way philosophers of religion have dissolved the logical problem of evil. Third, some have suggested that a commitment to true interreligious dialogue should weaken our commitment to our own tradition. I disagree and show that interreligious dialogue can, in practice, strengthen, not weaken, our commitments to our home tradition. 

scholarly journals Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus on the Problem of Evil: Insights from their Commentaries on the Book of Job

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-42
Author(s):  
Franklin T. Harkins
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Divine Providence ◽  
Compelling Evidence ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Book Of Job ◽  
Albert The Great ◽  
The Problem Of Evil

Abstract This article broadly considers the commentaries on Job of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great as offering a helpful theological alternative to some modern philosophical approaches to the ‘problem of evil’. We seek to show that whereas some modern philosophers understand evil as a problem for the very existence of God, whether and how God can coexist with evil was never a question that evil seriously raised in the minds of Aquinas and Albert. In fact, although the suffering of the just in particular led our medieval Dominicans to wonder about divine providence and our ability to know God in this life, they understood the reality of evil as compelling evidence for the existence of God.

The Logical Problem of Evil

God and Evil ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 17-32
Author(s):  
Michael L. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Logical Problem

Divine intentions and the problem of evil

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (02) ◽  
pp. 215-234
Author(s):  
JUSTIN MOONEY
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Greater Good

AbstractI develop a model of providence on which God brings about good states of affairs by means of evil states of affairs, but without intending the latter. The model's key ingredient is a backward-looking counterpart of the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action: namely, a distinction between intended and merely foreseen means to an end. The model enables greater-good theodicies to avoid worries about whether a perfect being could intend evil.

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