scholarly journals Related-Party Transactions, Chaebol Affiliations, and the Value of Cash Holdings

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 699
Author(s):  
Hyunjung Choi ◽  
Jungeun Cho
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Cash Holdings ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Management Decisions ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Extant Literature ◽  
Value Of Cash

This study examines whether related-party transactions (RPTs) impact the value of firms’ cash holdings. Using a 2011–2018 sample of Korean public firms, we find that greater RPTs lead to lower cash holdings value. In particular, this decline is more pronounced in Korean chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms. Our findings suggest that a unique and complex corporate governance structure of chaebol firms makes it difficult for outside investors to monitor firms’ internal cash management decisions, resulting in a negative valuation of cash holdings. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing additional evidence that RPTs in chaebol firms with severe agency problems may lower the value of cash holdings.

scholarly journals Corporatisation of China’s state-owned enterprises and corporate governance

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Jinghan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Critical Issue ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Soft Budget Constraints ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
Liberal Approach

This paper reviews the notable Chinese State-Owned Enterprises’ (SOEs) low efficiency and shows that the agency problems with SOEs constitutes the characteristics of corporate governance - insiders’ control, soft budget constraints, managerial slack and lack of competent managers. It is this corporate governance structure that results in SOEs’ inefficiency. The paper further argues that the current corporatisation of SOEs in China through share issue does not improve corporatised SOEs’ performance because it has not effectively dealt with the agency problems associated with public ownership, and, therefore, falls short in addressing the critical issue of corporate governance. The creation of an effective corporate governance mechanism requires the development of the country’s market-oriented institutions. It is difficult to prescribe what type of governance structure China should adopt, although it is argued that for former SOEs a neo-corporatist approach with a two-tier board structure may have advantage over a neo-liberal approach with a single board. For China, the most important issue is not to find a fixed set of governance models from which to copy, but to develop institutions that are conducive to effective corporate governance.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 19TH CENTURY: EVIDENCE FROM THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary John Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Theoretical Structure ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The U.S

Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review committee to review the annual report of the president and directors. The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure as espoused by Hart [1995].

THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY, 1828–1857: EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russ ◽  
Gary J. Previts ◽  
Edward N. Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Review Committee ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Form ◽  
The 19Th Century

Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a 19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate governance structure to monitor and improve financial management and operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the political control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th century. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this responsibility.

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