scholarly journals Incentive Contracts for Sustainable Growth of Small or Medium-Sized Enterprise

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 4964
Author(s):  
Daehyeon Park ◽  
Jinhyeong Jo ◽  
Doojin Ryu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Large Enterprise ◽  
Improvement Effect ◽  
Game Theoretic

This study analyzes incentive contracts in public procurement supply chains using a game-theoretic approach. Specifically, we compare a structure in which the host company is a large enterprise and the partner company is a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) to a structure in which the host is an SME and the partner is a large enterprise. For each structure, we examine whether an incentive contract improves supply chain performance and confirm that the performance improvement effect is greater when the host company is an SME. Our analysis has several policy implications. SMEs are less likely to be selected as host companies for large-scale procurement projects, limiting their growth opportunities. Thus, to enable SMEs’ sustainable growth through large-scale procurement projects, the governments can allocate a portion of public procurement to SMEs. The introduction of incentive contracts elicits sustainable cooperation from large companies when an SME is the host company in a public procurement supply chain.

A game theoretic approach to optimal pricing of flights and passengers at congested airports

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 434-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ata Allah Taleizadeh ◽  
Moeen Sammak Jalali ◽  
Shib Sankar Sana
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Congestion Pricing ◽  
Influential Factors ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic

Purpose This paper aims to embark a mathematical model based on investigation and comparison of airport pricing policies under various types of competition, considering both per-passenger and per-flight charges at congested airports. Design/methodology/approach In this model, four-game theoretic strategies are assessed and closed-form formulas have been proved for each of the mentioned strategies. Numerical examples and graphical representations of the optimal solutions are provided to illustrate the models. Findings The rectitude of the presented formulas is evaluated with sensitivity analysis and numerical examples have been put forward. Finally, managerial implications are suggested by means of the proposed analysis. Research limitations/implications The represented model is inherently limited to investigate all the available and influential factors in the field of congestion pricing. With this regard, several studies can be implemented as the future research of this study. The applications of other game theoretic approaches such as Cartel games and its combination with the four mentioned games seem to be worthwhile. Moreover, it is recommended to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed model and formulations with a large-scale database. Originality/value The authors formulate a novel strategy that put forwards a four-game theoretic strategy, which helps managers to select the best suitable ones for their specific airline and/or air traveling companies. The authors find that by means of the proposed model, the application of Stackelberg–Bertrand behavior in the field of airport congestion pricing will rebound to a more profitable strategy in contrast with the other three represented methods.

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