scholarly journals Green Logistics Service Supply Chain Games Considering Risk Preference in Fuzzy Environments

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 8024
Author(s):  
Shuna Wang ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu

The increasing pressures from environmental crises are responsible for the green and sustainable choices made in supply chain management. Green logistics service supply chain (LSSC) operations play a significant role in reducing the environmental burden of the supply chain, and the risk preferences of logistics enterprises lead to more uncertainties in the green management of LSSC. Much research has been limited to case studies of green LSSC, and the different combinations of risk preferences among LSSC participants have generally been ignored. This paper investigates the impact of the risk preference on the equilibrium behavior of an LSSC composed of one logistics service integrator (LSI) and one logistics service provider (LSP) under fuzzy decision environments. Considering the fact that the greening innovation cost and the parameters of the demand function are all characterized as fuzzy variables, the games between the LSI and LSP with different risk preferences were comprehensively proposed under three scenarios. Then, the optimal decisions of the LSP and LSI were drawn, and numerical examples are presented. The results show that an optimistic risk attitude can appropriately improve the greening level, price, and green innovation cost of logistics services, while both risk appetite and risk aversion can lead to an increase in the outsourcing price. Moreover, when the decision maker is risk neutral, the partner’s risk attitude has a significant effect on the value of the decision variables and the cost. Finally, the optimal profits of different risk preference behaviors between the LSI and LSP vary among the game models under fuzzy environments. Subsequently, we obtained three management insights. Total involvement and cooperation among participants were vital factors for an improvement in green management in the LSSC. Additionally, risk preference plays a key role in how LSSC participants make decisions under fuzzy environments. Additionally, a dominant position in the LSSC plays a crucial role in generating profit.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjie Ju ◽  
Yue Wang ◽  
Ye Cheng ◽  
Jun Jia

The overall scale of China’s logistics industry is growing rapidly, and the environment and conditions for its development are constantly improving, which lays a solid foundation for further accelerating the development of the logistics industry. However, logistics services are characterized by subordination, immediacy, demand volatility, and substitutability. Low-level integrated management of logistics services seriously hinders the development of the logistics service supply chain (LSSC) for sustainable performance. Many studies have been limited to the performance evaluation of LSSCs, and the factors affecting LSSC performance have generally been ignored. This study focuses on integrated LSSCs by using an integrator’s opportunistic behavior as the entry point of research and investigates the factors that affect the sustainability of LSSC performance. On the basis of relevant theories, a model for a hypothesis is constructed and eight hypotheses are subsequently proposed. Moreover, 271 survey responses from functional logistics service providers (research object) are utilized to develop a structural equation model for empirical research. Findings show that integrators with opportunistic behavior inhibit the information-sharing behavior of supply chain members. Consequently, the integration capability and agility of LSSCs are reduced, which affects the overall performance of LSSCs. The findings of this study can provide management insights into the behaviors of supply chain members and governments.



2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ningning Wang ◽  
Zhi-Ping Fan ◽  
Xiaohuan Wang

Logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is a new type of service supply chain. This paper investigates the channel coordination issue in a two-echelon LSSC composed of one logistics service integrator (LSI) and one functional logistics service provider (FLSP) under fairness concerns. The models for a reservation price-only contract under disadvantageous inequality and advantageous inequality are established, respectively, in which the procurement cost, the potential shortage cost, and the operation cost are considered under stochastic market demand. Based on this model, the LSI’s optimal reservation quantity can be determined. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of fairness concerns and the related costs on channel performance and channel coordination. The results are presented in four aspects:(1)channel coordination of the LSSC can be achieved under certain conditions when the LSI experiences advantageous inequality;(2)the spiteful behavior of the LSI leads to the reduction of the channel profit, and channel coordination cannot be achieved when the LSI suffers from disadvantageous inequality;(3)the LSI’s reservation quantity and the channel profit are affected by the LSI’s fairness concerns;(4)motivated by the concerns of fairness, the LSI’s reservation quantity is related not only to his procurement cost and shortage cost but also to the FLSP’s operation cost.



ICLEM 2012 ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meiling He ◽  
Xiaohui Wu ◽  
Nengye Mou




2021 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 121-129
Author(s):  
Shuiwang Zhang ◽  
Cancan Bi ◽  
Min Zhang








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