scholarly journals A Type of Time-Symmetric Stochastic System and Related Games

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Qingfeng Zhu ◽  
Yufeng Shi ◽  
Jiaqiang Wen ◽  
Hui Zhang

This paper is concerned with a type of time-symmetric stochastic system, namely the so-called forward–backward doubly stochastic differential equations (FBDSDEs), in which the forward equations are delayed doubly stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and the backward equations are anticipated backward doubly SDEs. Under some monotonicity assumptions, the existence and uniqueness of measurable solutions to FBDSDEs are obtained. The future development of many processes depends on both their current state and historical state, and these processes can usually be represented by stochastic differential systems with time delay. Therefore, a class of nonzero sum differential game for doubly stochastic systems with time delay is studied in this paper. A necessary condition for the open-loop Nash equilibrium point of the Pontriagin-type maximum principle are established, and a sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Furthermore, the above results are applied to the study of nonzero sum differential games for linear quadratic backward doubly stochastic systems with delay. Based on the solution of FBDSDEs, an explicit expression of Nash equilibrium points for such game problems is established.

1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 696-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teruhisa Nakai

We consider a non-zero-sum game in which two searchers (player I and II) compete with each other for quicker detection of an object hidden in one of n boxes. Let p (q) be the prior location distribution of the object for player I (II). Exponential detection functions are assumed for both players. Each player wishes to maximize the probability that he detects the object before the opponent detects it. In the general case, a Nash equilibrium point is obtained in the form of a solution of simultaneous differential equations. In the case of p = q, we obtain an explicit solution showing the surprising result that both players have the same equilibrium strategy even though the detection rates are different.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Qiguang An ◽  
Qingfeng Zhu

A class of partially observed nonzero-sum differential games for backward stochastic differential equations with time delays is studied, in which both game system and cost functional involve the time delays of state variables and control variables under each participant with different observation equations. A necessary condition (maximum principle) for the Nash equilibrium point to this kind of partially observed game is established, and a sufficient condition (verification theorem) for the Nash equilibrium point is given. A partially observed linear quadratic game is taken as an example to illustrate the application of the maximum principle.


1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 696-707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teruhisa Nakai

We consider a non-zero-sum game in which two searchers (player I and II) compete with each other for quicker detection of an object hidden in one of n boxes. Let p (q) be the prior location distribution of the object for player I (II). Exponential detection functions are assumed for both players. Each player wishes to maximize the probability that he detects the object before the opponent detects it. In the general case, a Nash equilibrium point is obtained in the form of a solution of simultaneous differential equations. In the case of p = q, we obtain an explicit solution showing the surprising result that both players have the same equilibrium strategy even though the detection rates are different.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xiaolan Chen ◽  
Qingfeng Zhu

This paper is concerned with a kind of nonzero sum differential game of mean-field backward stochastic differential equations with jump (MF-BSDEJ), in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution. Moreover, the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a subfiltration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motion and Poisson random measure. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle with Pontryagin’s type for open-loop Nash equilibrium point of this type of partial information game and then give a verification theorem which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. The theoretical results are applied to study a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Rui Zhang ◽  
Yinjing Guo ◽  
Xiangrong Wang ◽  
Xueqing Zhang

This paper extends the stochastic stability criteria of two measures to the mean stability and proves the stability criteria for a kind of stochastic Itô’s systems. Moreover, by applying optimal control approaches, the mean stability criteria in terms of two measures are also obtained for the stochastic systems with coefficient’s uncertainty.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Zhu ◽  
Baoyan Han

A class of backward doubly stochastic differential equations (BDSDEs) are studied. We obtain a comparison theorem of these multidimensional BDSDEs. As its applications, we derive the existence of solutions for this multidimensional BDSDEs with continuous coefficients. We can also prove that this solution is the minimal solution of the BDSDE.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Jie Xu ◽  
Ruiqiang Lin

In this paper, we study a kind of near optimal control problem which is described by linear quadratic doubly stochastic differential equations with time delay. We consider the near optimality for the linear delayed doubly stochastic system with convex control domain. We discuss the case that all the time delay variables are different. We give the maximum principle of near optimal control for this kind of time delay system. The necessary condition for the control to be near optimal control is deduced by Ekeland’s variational principle and some estimates on the state and the adjoint processes corresponding to the system.


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