The euro zone’s major economic equilibria

2001 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Fabrice Pansard
Keyword(s):  
1976 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 305
Author(s):  
T. Postelnicu ◽  
Herbert Scarf ◽  
Terje Hansen
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1759-1777 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Chang

We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed. (JEL D72, F34, O17, O19)


2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 1211-1221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hippolyte d’Albis ◽  
Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron ◽  
Katheline Schubert
Keyword(s):  

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