The Educational implication of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-97
Author(s):  
Chihyung Lee
Keyword(s):  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Educational Implication

scholarly journals FINDING THE LIMIT OF INCOMPLETENESS I

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 268-286
Author(s):  
YONG CHENG
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Recursion Theory ◽  
Minimal Degree ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Turing Degree ◽  
Turing Reducibility ◽  
Inseparable Pair

AbstractIn this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem ($\textsf {G1}$ for short). We first define the notion “$\textsf {G1}$ holds for the theory $T$”. This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory T such that Robinson’s $\mathbf {R}$ interprets T but T does not interpret $\mathbf {R}$ (i.e., T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation) and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Jeřábek’s work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle $, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf {0}< \mathbf {d}<\mathbf {0}^{\prime }$, there is a theory T with Turing degree $\mathbf {d}$ such that $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T and T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds.

INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM AND ITS FRONTIER

2005 ◽  
pp. 434-439
Author(s):  
GAISI TAKEUTI
Keyword(s):  
Incompleteness Theorem

scholarly journals Relevant Arithmetic and Mathematical Pluralism

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 569-596
Author(s):  
Zach Weber
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Worked Examples ◽  
Incompleteness Theorem ◽  
Classical Counterpart ◽  
The One ◽  
Mathematical Pluralism

In The Consistency of Arithmetic and elsewhere, Meyer claims to “repeal” Goedel’s second incompleteness theorem. In this paper, I review his argument, and then consider two ways of understanding it: from the perspective of mathematical pluralism and monism, respectively. Is relevant arithmetic just another legitimate practice among many, or is it a rival of its classical counterpart—a corrective to Goedel, setting us back on the path to the (One) True Arithmetic? To help answer, I sketch a few worked examples from relevant mathematics, to see what a non-classical (re)formulation of mathematics might look like in practice. I conclude that, while it is unlikely that relevant arithmetic describes past and present mathematical practice, and so might be most acceptable as a pluralist enterprise, it may yet prescribe a more monistic future venture.

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