scholarly journals Selection from perceptual and conceptual representations

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. P. KAN ◽  
S. L. THOMPSON-SCHILL
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Representations

Obraz nauki i naukowca w aspekcie kulturowo-cywilizacyjnym: Polska – Ukraina – Rosja

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Oleg Leszczak
Keyword(s):  
Critical Discourse ◽  
Conceptual Representations

The purpose of the article is to show the dependence of the image on the cultural and civilizational factors determining it, i.e. from the system of stereotypes and conceptual representations that dominate in a particular society. As an example of such causation in the formation of a socially significant image, were chosen the science and the scientist, and Russia, Ukraine and Poland – as an example of cultural and civilizational space. In various cultural and civilization types science can be treated as secret or utilitarian knowledge, as sanctioned knowledge, as inspired knowledge, as a critical discourse or as a product and commodity.

Use of Conceptual Representations Based on Conceptual Spaces Theory Applied to BDI Agents

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joao Mario Lopes Brezolin ◽  
Sandro Rama Fiorini ◽  
Marcia De Borba Campos ◽  
Rafael H. Bordini
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Spaces ◽  
Bdi Agents ◽  
Conceptual Representations

scholarly journals Characterizing Variability in Shared Meaning through Millions of Sketches

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Lewis ◽  
Anjali Balamurugan ◽  
Bin Zheng ◽  
Gary Lupyan
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Shared Meaning ◽  
Conceptual Representations ◽  
Average Person ◽  
Specific Concept ◽  
Valence And Arousal

The study of mental representations of concepts has historically focused on the representations of the “average” person. Here, we shift away from this aggregate view and examine the principles of variability across people in conceptual representations. Using a database of millions of sketches by people worldwide, we ask what predicts whether people converge or diverge in their representations of a specific concept, and which kinds of concepts tend to be more or less variable.We find that larger and more dense populations tend to have less variable representations, and concepts high in valence and arousal tend to be less variable across people. Further, two countries tend to have people with more similar conceptual representations when they are linguistically, geographically, and culturally similar. Our work provides the first characterization of the principles of variability in shared meaning across a large, diverse sample of participants.

scholarly journals Syntactic and cognitive issues in investigating gendered coreference

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauren Marie Ackerman
Keyword(s):  
Additional Data ◽  
Personal Names ◽  
Conceptual Representations ◽  
Linguistic Patterns ◽  
Biological Aspects ◽  
Future Work ◽  
Insight Into

This paper presents a framework for how the multifaceted nature of "gender" (human and linguistic) interacts with grammatical operations such as coreference dependency formation. It frames the question through the lens of English, in which it focuses on how personal names and referents who identify as nonbinary can provide insight into the conceptual representations of gender. Additional data from a variety of modern languages supports a model of how gender might be cognitively represented such that the observed linguistic patterns are available. A three-tiered model of gender is proposed that unites grammatical, cognitive, social, and biological aspects and describes how implications of this model might be tested in future work.

Conceptual representations of actions for autonomous robots

2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 251-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Chella ◽  
S. Gaglio ◽  
R. Pirrone
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Robots ◽  
Conceptual Representations

From conceptual representations to explanatory relations

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 218-219
Author(s):  
Tania Lombrozo
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Representations ◽  
Recent Advances

AbstractMachery emphasizes the centrality of explanation for theory-based approaches to concepts. I endorse Machery's emphasis on explanation and consider recent advances in psychology that point to the “heterogeneity” of explanation, with consequences for Machery's heterogeneity hypothesis about concepts.

scholarly journals A neuroscientific grasp of concepts: from control to representation

2003 ◽  
Vol 358 (1435) ◽  
pp. 1231-1240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Gallese
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Outer Space ◽  
Cognitive Activity ◽  
Semantic Content ◽  
Macaque Monkey ◽  
Conceptual Representations ◽  
Neurophysiological Data ◽  
Neural Underpinnings ◽  
Crucial Part ◽  
The Brain

Abstraction denotes the cognitive process by means of which general concepts are formed. The dominant view of abstraction considers it not only as a complex and sophisticated cognitive activity, but also as a distinctive hallmark of mankind. The distinctiveness of abstract thought has indeed been closely related to another feature peculiar to our species: language. Following this perspective, the possibility to entertain conceptual representations is thus precluded to animals devoid of full–blown language. I challenge this view and propose that the representational dynamic of the brain is conceivable as a type of self–organization, in which action plays a crucial part. My aim will be to investigate whether, and to what extent, conceptual knowledge can be attributed to non–linguistic animal species, with particular emphasis on nonhuman primates. I therefore introduce the notion of semantic content as a type of ‘relational specification’. A review of recent neurophysiological data on the neural underpinnings of action end–states in the macaque monkey brain is presented. On the basis of this evidence, I propose that conceptual representations can be conceived as the expression of a coherent internal world model. This model decomposes the ‘outer’ space inhabited by things in a meaningful way only to the extent that it accords to biologically constrained, embodied invariance. Finally, I discuss how the ‘comparative’ neuroscientific approach to abstraction proposed here may shed some light on its nature and its evolutionary origin.

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