scholarly journals Ignorance, Introspection, and Epistemic Modals

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 645
Author(s):  
Luka Crnic ◽  
Tue Trinh
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Modals ◽  
Belief State

Embedded epistemic modals are infelicitous under desire predicates when they are anchored to the belief state of the attitude holder (see, esp., Anand & Hacquard 2013). We present two ways of deriving this observation from an inde- pendently motivated property of desire predicates (Heim 1992; von Fintel 1999).

Epistemic Teleology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Belief State ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Belief States ◽  
Epistemic Teleology

Wedgwood focuses his discussion around two evaluative concepts: correctness and rationality. Wedgwood proposes that these two concepts are related in the following way: one belief state is more rational than another if and only if the first has less expected inaccuracy than the former. He argues, however, that this view should not be understood as a form of consequentialism since it is not the total consequences of a belief state that determine its rationality. The view is rather a version of epistemic teleology. Wedgwood deploys this view to illuminate the difference between synchronic and diachronic evaluation of belief states as well as to disarm objections that have been leveled against epistemic consequentialism.

Hedged Assertion

2019 ◽  
pp. 243-263
Author(s):  
Matthew A. Benton ◽  
Peter van Elswyk
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Epistemic Modals ◽  
Epistemic Position ◽  
Normative Issues

Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but they pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This article considers the linguistic and normative issues side by side. It aims to bring some order and clarity to thinking about hedging, so as to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers. In particular, it considers three broad questions. (1) The structural question: when one hedges, what is the speaker’s commitment weakened from? (2) The functional question: what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? And (3) the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions, another speech act, or what?

The Fragmented Mind

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Implicit Attitudes ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Belief System ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states—fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s. Recently, it has attracted great attention again. This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible Introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation’s role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.

(DIS)BELIEF CHANGE AND ARGUED FEED-BACK DIALOG

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (05) ◽  
pp. 511-538
Author(s):  
LAURENT PERRUSSEL ◽  
JEAN-MARC THÉVENIN
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Preference Relation ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Temporal Aspects ◽  
Incoming Information ◽  
Multi Agent

This paper focuses on the features of belief change in a multi-agent context where agents consider beliefs and disbeliefs. Disbeliefs represent explicit ignorance and are useful to prevent agents to entail conclusions due to their ignorance. Agents receive messages holding information from other agents and change their belief state accordingly. An agent may refuse to adopt incoming information if it prefers its own (dis)beliefs. For this, each agent maintains a preference relation over its own beliefs and disbeliefs in order to decide if it accepts or rejects incoming information whenever inconsistencies occur. This preference relation may be built by considering several criteria such as the reliability of the sender of statements or temporal aspects. This process leads to non-prioritized belief revision. In this context we first present the * and − operators which allow an agent to revise, respectively contract, its belief state in a non-prioritized way when it receives an incoming belief, respectively disbelief. We show that these operators behave properly. Based on this we then illustrate how the receiver and the sender may argue when the incoming (dis)belief is refused. We describe pieces of dialog where (i) the sender tries to convince the receiver by sending arguments in favor of the original (dis)belief and (ii) the receiver justifies its refusal by sending arguments against the original (dis)belief. We show that the notion of acceptability of these arguments can be represented in a simple way by using the non-prioritized change operators * and −. The advantage of argumentation dialogs is twofold. First whenever arguments are acceptable the sender or the receiver reconsider its belief state; the main result is an improvement of the reconsidered belief state. Second the sender may not be aware of some sets of rules which act as constraints to reach a specific conclusion and discover them through argumentation dialogs.

scholarly journals New Horizons for a Theory of Epistemic Modals

2018 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-324
Author(s):  
Justin Khoo ◽  
Jonathan Phillips
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Modals ◽  
New Horizons

scholarly journals Epistemic stance without epistemic modals: the case of the presumptive future

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Michela Ippolito ◽  
Donka F. Farkas
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Modals ◽  
Epistemic Stance ◽  
Semantic Account ◽  
The Future

This paper deals with the non-temporal use of the future in Italian knownas ‘epistemic’ or ‘presumptive’ (PF) in declaratives and interrogatives. We firstdistinguish PF from epistemic necessity and possibility, as well as from weaknecessity modals, providing in the process the main empirical challenges PF raises.We then propose and justify a semantic account that treats PF as a special normalitymodal that involves a subjective likelihood component. Since in our account theprejacent (the proposition in the scope of the modal) is at issue, the use of PF triggersthe implicature that the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows inorder to support her commitment to the prejacent. This, we claim, is the source ofthe intuition that PF is often used to offer a “guess” relative to the question underdiscussion (QUD).

Simple Contextualism about Epistemic Modals Is Incorrect

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 252-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Lennertz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Modals

On Scope Relations between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 529-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Swanson
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Modals
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