Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges und der Grundsatz »Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege«. Hrsg., mit Anmerkungen und einem Nachwort versehen von Helmut Quaritsch.

Author(s):  
Carl Schmitt
1937 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome Hall

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-66
Author(s):  
Keilin Anderson ◽  
Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore

Abstract The outcome of an icc trial – be it a conviction or acquittal – receives significant attention. However, what happens to a defendant in the aftermath of the proceeding garners little discussion. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature by analysing how the ne bis in idem and nulla poena sine lege principles, enshrined in Articles 20(2) and 23 of the Rome Statute, protect defendants from subsequent prosecutions and punishments by states and regional courts following their trials at the icc. We argue that these provisions do not provide adequate protection. Further, we argue that given the icc’s limited power to enforce compliance with these provisions as well as the primary role that states enjoy in the enforcement of international criminal law, the most appropriate way to address this issue is through the inclusion of robust protections in domestic legislation and the constituent instruments of regional courts.


Teisė ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-45
Author(s):  
Kristina Chlebinskaitė

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos subendrintos bausmės skyrimo taisyklių taikymo problemos, susijusios su tin­kamu nulla poena sine lege principo įgyvendinimu. Some problems of aggregate punishment are covered in this article in order to implement nulla poena sine lege principle correctly.


Teisė ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 66 (66) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina Chlebinskaitė

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos subendrintos bausmės skyrimo taisyklių taikymo problemos, susijusios su tin­kamu nulla poena sine lege principo įgyvendinimu. Some problems of aggregate punishment are covered in this article in order to implement nulla poena sine lege principle correctly.


Lex Russica ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 95-107
Author(s):  
I. A. Klepitskiy

The question of the legal nature and the binding nature of explanations of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation remains debatable in the literature. When considering criminal cases, the courts do not always follow the decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court. It seems that the explanations of the Supreme Court, while not being a source of criminal law, are nevertheless binding on courts and officials applying the norms of criminal law. This is a general rule, to which there are exceptions. First, there are erroneous explanations of the Supreme Court, which are not based on the established judicial practice and are not supported by it. Second, there are outdated explanations of the Supreme Court that do not meet modern legal realities. Third, there are explanations of the Supreme Court, which, in relation to a particular situation, require an expansive or restrictive interpretation. In these three situations, the Supreme Court’s explanations do not bind the law enforcement officer. The binding nature of the Supreme Court’s explanations is determined by the value of the law as such. Questions of law require a uniform resolution. An alternative to a uniform interpretation of the law is arbitrary administration. Arbitrary administration is not within the competence of the judge. There is no case law in Russia. The works of legal scholars in modern Russia also cannot satisfy the need for a uniform interpretation of the law. The significance of the explanations of the Supreme Court determines the high requirements for their quality. The Supreme Court’s explanations should not directly contradict the law. The Supreme Court’s explanations should not change unless there is an urgent need to do so. The rule nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, being an achievement of legal culture, binds the Supreme Court. By clarifying the practice of applying the law, the Supreme Court forms and preserves judicial doctrine, thereby providing legal certainty.


2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-487
Author(s):  
Valentin Jeutner

The article critically appraises Carl Schmitt’s 1945 expert opinion on The International Crime of the War of Aggression and the Principle ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’. Each element of Carl Schmitt’s expert opinion is subjected to close scrutiny and contextualised with references, where appropriate, to the icc’s recently acquired jurisdiction to try crimes of aggression. It is shown that Schmitt’s legal arguments are on the whole tenable but that the expert opinion’s assumptions about the position of the ability of ‘ordinary’ citizens to assess their own actions are very problematic.


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