scholarly journals How Puzzles of Petitionary Prayer Solve Themselves: Divine Omnirationality, Interest-Relative Explanation, and Answered Prayer

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-157
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Johnson

Some have seen in the divine attribute of omnirationality, identified by Alexander R. Pruss, the promise of a dissolution of the usual puzzles of petitionary prayer. Scott Davison has challenged this line of thought with a series of example cases. I will argue that Davison is only partially correct, and that the reasons for this reveal an important new way to approach the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Because explanations are typically interest-relative, there is not one correct account of “answered prayer” but many, corresponding to a variety of reasons to care whether God might answer our prayers. It follows from this that the omnirationality solution can be vindicated and that puzzles of petitionary prayer that are not dissolved thereby will typically contain within themselves the seeds of their own solutions.

Author(s):  
Tyron Goldschmidt

This chapter considers Plantinga’s argument from numbers for the existence of God. Plantinga sees divine psychologism as having advantages over both human psychologism and Platonism. The chapter begins with Plantinga’s description of the argument, including the relation of numbers to any divine attribute. It then argues that human psychologism can be ruled out completely. However, what rules it out might rule out divine psychologism too. It also argues that the main problem with Platonism might also be a problem with divine psychologism. However, it will, at the least, be less of a problem. In any case, there are alternative, possibly viable views about the nature of numbers that have not been touched by Plantinga’s argument. In addition, the chapter touches on the argument from properties, and its relation to the argument from numbers.


Author(s):  
Helen Frowe

AbstractAn agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness of her actions, and/or her accountability for any harms that result from her actions (where accountability includes liability to defensive harm, punishment, blame and compensation). This paper does not provide an account of the wrongness of moral coercion. Rather, I argue that, whatever the correct account of its wrongness, the mere fact of being coerced has no bearing on what the agent may do, on the voluntariness of her action, or her accountability for any resultant harm, compared to otherwise identical cases arising from duress and happenstance.


1997 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 83-97
Author(s):  
Jerome I. Gellman ◽  
Keyword(s):  


2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-542
Author(s):  
PATRICK TODD

AbstractThere are various argumentative strategies for advancing the claim that God does not exist. One such strategy is this. First, one notes that God is meant to have a certain divine attribute (such as omniscience). One then argues that having the relevant attribute is impossible. One concludes that God doesn't exist. For instance, Dennis Whitcomb's recent paper, ‘Grounding and omniscience’, proceeds in exactly this way. As Whitcomb says, ‘I'm going to argue that omniscience is impossible and that therefore there is no God.’ This is not, I hope to show, a very promising way to start a paper. If having a given property is impossible, the greatest possible being need not have that property. Accordingly, the argumentative strategy in question is doomed to failure. The upshot of this article is a quite general one concerning how arguments against the existence of God in fact must proceed.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rannu Sanderan

Until the mid of 20 century, a holistic understanding of reality was merely expressed in the language of theology dan religion. In this article, I shall present some reflections, structured around the theme of wisdom, on the classical, biblical, and patristical vision of education. The pursuit of wisdom is not just an intellectual exercise but also requires a good deal of ascetic effort: philosophy is not worthy of the name if it is not supported by ascetic endeavor. The Biblical depiction of wisdom pointed to something more than just human attainment or divine attribute. It was, rather, a way of expressing the nature of the relationship between God and man in terms of ‘paideia’


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