A Correct Account of the Explosion of the Blast Pipe

1853 ◽  
Vol 8 (31) ◽  
pp. 242-242
Keyword(s):  
Correct Account

‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe
Keyword(s):  
Correct Account ◽  
Defensive Harm

AbstractAn agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness of her actions, and/or her accountability for any harms that result from her actions (where accountability includes liability to defensive harm, punishment, blame and compensation). This paper does not provide an account of the wrongness of moral coercion. Rather, I argue that, whatever the correct account of its wrongness, the mere fact of being coerced has no bearing on what the agent may do, on the voluntariness of her action, or her accountability for any resultant harm, compared to otherwise identical cases arising from duress and happenstance.

Indicative conditionals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Actual Situation ◽  
Indicative Conditionals ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
As If

Examples of indicative conditionals are ‘If it rained, then the match was cancelled’ and ‘If Alex plays, Carlton will win’. The contrast is with subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, such as ‘If it had rained, then the match would have been cancelled’, and categoricals, such as ‘It will rain’. Despite the ease with which we use and understand indicative conditionals, the correct account of them has proved to be very difficult. Some say that ‘If it rained, the match was cancelled’ is equivalent to ‘Either it did not rain, or the match was cancelled’. Some say that the sentence asserts that the result of ‘adding’ the supposition that it rained to the actual situation is to give a situation in which the match was cancelled. Some say that to assert that if it rained then the match was cancelled is to make a commitment to inferring that the match was cancelled should one learn that it rained. This last view is often combined with the view that indicative conditionals are not, strictly speaking, true or false; rather, they are more or less assertible or acceptable.

Electron Microscope Image Contrast for Thin Crystal

1972 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Cowley ◽  
Sumio Iijima
Keyword(s):  
Electron Microscope ◽  
Phase Contrast ◽  
Complex Oxide ◽  
Phase Shifts ◽  
Image Contrast ◽  
Crystal Thickness ◽  
Contrast Imaging ◽  
Resolution Electron ◽  
Unit Cells ◽  
Correct Account

AbstractHigh resolution electron microscope images showing the detailed distribution of metal atoms within the unit cells of complex oxide structures have been recorded recently and as a first approximation may be interpreted as amplitude-object images if obtained with the degree of defocus corresponding to the "optimum-defocus condition" for the phase-contrast imaging of thin phase objects. Detailed observations of images of Ti2Nb10O29 crystals having thicknesses of the order of 100 Å reveal that the thin phase-object approximation, which assumes that only small phase-shifts are involved, is inadequate to explain some features of the image intensities including the variation of contrast with crystal thickness. A very aproximate treatment of the phase contrast due to defocussing of phase objects having large phase shifts is evolved and shown to give a qualitativity correct account of the observations. The variation of image contrast with tilt away from a principle orientation is discussed. From the symmetry of the image contrast it is deduced that the symmetry of the crystal structure as derived from X-ray diffraction studies can not be correct.

scholarly journals Aristotle and Crossing the Boundaries between the Sciences

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-204
Author(s):  
Lindsay Judson
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Boundary Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Posterior Analytics ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Impermeable Boundary

Abstract On the basis of what Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics about how sciences are differentiated and about the impermissibility (save in some exceptional cases) of ‘kind-crossing’, many commentators suppose that when it comes to his scientific practice, Aristotle treats the boundaries of the sciences as impermeable, so that if subject-matter X is the business of one science, it simply cannot (save for the exceptional cases) be the business of another. I call this the impermeable boundary theory of the sciences: knowledge is divided into watertight compartments, determined by their distinct genera, and what goes on in one compartment cannot turn up in another. I argue that, even if this is a correct account of Aristotle’s position in the Analytics, the view that he accepts the impermeable boundary theory when it comes to his scientific and philosophical work outside the Analytics is simply untenable.

The Role of Misfit Dislocation During Epitaxial Growth

1987 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Cherns
Keyword(s):  
Misfit Dislocation ◽  
Lattice Spacing ◽  
Minimum Energy ◽  
Energy Criterion ◽  
Misfit Dislocations ◽  
Metal Metal ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Pseudomorphic Growth ◽  
Dislocation Sources

ABSTRACTThe theory of Frank and van der Merwe (FM) in 1949 showed that a minimum energy criterion could explain the pseudomorphic growth of a deposit on a substrate of different lattice spacing and the subsequent relief of strain by misfit dislocations as the deposit thickness increases. Although the “equilibrium” theory is qualitatively correct, account must be taken of actual dislocation sources, which may be complex, and which may be more or less efficient for misfit relief than predicted by the FM model. Moreover, misfit dislocation sources may determine the morphology of the growing film, the interface topology and even the atomic structure of the deposit/substrate interface. These various roles of misfit dislocations are reviewed here with examples from work on metal/metal, semiconductor/semiconductor and metal/semiconductor systems.

The Logic of Religious Language

1968 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
N. H. G. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Linguistic Analysis ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Recurrent Theme

By ‘the logic of religious language’ I understand both a problem: What is the correct account of the logic of religious language? and a theme, a recurrent theme in the modern philosophical discussion of religion, which raises a related but distinguishable question: Is the approach to religion of linguistic analysis an adequate approach? Can we do justice to the logic of religious language by attending to the recognition and analysis of different linguistic forms?

The correct account of nonzero differential conductance in the saturation regime in the MOSFET compact model

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 863-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Turin ◽  
Gennady Zebrev ◽  
Sergey Makarov ◽  
Benjamin Iñiguez ◽  
Michael Shur
Keyword(s):  
Compact Model ◽  
Differential Conductance ◽  
Saturation Regime ◽  
Correct Account

scholarly journals On being wronged and being wrong

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Slavny
Keyword(s):  
False Beliefs ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Objective View ◽  
Subjective View ◽  
Mixed View

If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I argue that we should accept The Mixed View.

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