THE ANALYSIS ON THE POLICY OF ACCESS TO ECONOMICALLY AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CHINA: AN AREA CALCULATION MODEL BASED ON THE INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN / GALIMYBIŲ GAUTI ĮPERKAMĄ BŪSTĄ KINIJOJE POLITIKOS ANALIZĖ: PLOTO SKAIČIAVIMO MODELIS, PAGRĮSTAS SKATINAMO

Currently, the subject of housing in China is of great interest to many researchers, since improvements in living conditions for the largest population in the world have not kept pace with the territory's economic growth. This paper describes basic social housing situations in China, and assesses the inequality in housing reform since 1990s as a result of overall economic improvement. In order to reduce the degree of inequality in China's social housing, this paper is focusing on the policy management of access to economically affordable housing because housing affordability in China is a pressing social and economic issue, particularly for low-income families due to an unreasonable mechanism. The related policies are analyzed in is paper by using incentive mechanism design, which reveals that supervision and announcement system, the restriction in current mechanism, and the area of economically affordable house are critical for the effectiveness of present polices. Furthermore, a housing area calculation model based on the incentive mechanism design is presented and an illustrated case of Beijing City is also conducted, which can maximize the utility of government considering incentive compatibility. Finally, some policy suggestions are explored including enhancing external environment and establishing internal mechanism. Santrauka Būsto tema Kinijoje šiuo metu itin domina daug mokslininkų, nes šalyje, kuri turi daugiausia gyventojų pasaulyje, gyvenimo sąlygų gerėjimas atsiliko nuo šalies ekonominio augimo. Šiame darbe nusakoma bazinio socialinio būsto padėtis Kinijoje ir vertinamas XX a. 10-ajame dešimtmetyje dėl bendros ūkio padėties gerėjimo prasidėjusios būsto reformos netolygumas. Siekiant mažinti Kinijos socialinio būsto skirtumų lygį, šiame darbe daugiausia dėmesio skiriama politinėms priemonėms, kurias pasitelkus valdoma prieiga prie įperkamo būsto, nes dėl neracionalaus mechanizmo būsto įperkamumas Kinijoje yra neatidėliotina socialinė ir ekonominė problema, o ypač mažas pajamas gaunančioms šeimoms. Atitinkamos politikos kryptys šiame darbe nagrinėjamos pasitelkus skatinamojo mechanizmo projektavimą, kuris rodo, kad priežiūros ir praneši-mų sistema, dabartinio mechanizmo suvaržymas ir įperkamo būsto plotas turi lemiamą reikšmę dabartinių politikos krypčių veiksmingumui. Be to, pateikiamas skatinamojo mechanizmo projektavimu pagristas būsto ploto skaičiavimo modelis ir atliekamas Pekino atvejo tyrimas, kuris, atsižvelgiant į skatinamųjų priemonių suderinamumą, gali maksimaliai padidinti vyriausybės naudingumą. Pabaigoje nagrinėjami keli politiniai siūlymai, įskaitant išorinės aplinkos gerinimą ir vidinio mechanizmo sukūrimą.

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Efficient Path Planning and Truthful Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsensing

Sensors ◽

10.3390/s18124408 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 18 (12) ◽

pp. 4408 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Xi Tao ◽

Wei Song

Keyword(s):

Path Planning ◽

Mechanism Design ◽

Heuristic Algorithm ◽

Incentive Mechanism ◽

Optimal Solution ◽

Planning Problem ◽

Vcg Mechanism ◽

The Incentive Mechanism ◽

Incentive Mechanism Design ◽

Path Planning Problem

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a promising paradigm for large-scale sensing. A group of users are recruited as workers to accomplish various sensing tasks and provide data to the platform and requesters. A key problem in MCS is to design the incentive mechanism, which can attract enough workers to participate in sensing activities and maintain the truthfulness. As the main advantage of MCS, user mobility is a factor that must be considered. We make an attempt to build a technical framework for MCS, which is associated with a truthful incentive mechanism taking the movements of numerous workers into account. Our proposed framework contains two challenging problems: path planning and incentive mechanism design. In the path planning problem, every worker independently plans a tour to carry out the posted tasks according to its own strategy. A heuristic algorithm is proposed for the path planning problem, which is compared with two baseline algorithms and the optimal solution. In the incentive mechanism design, the platform develops a truthful mechanism to select the winners and determine their payments. The proposed mechanism is proved to be computationally efficient, individually rational, and truthful. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanism, the well-known Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism is considered as a baseline. Simulations are conducted to evaluate the performance of our proposed framework. The results show that the proposed heuristic algorithm for the path planning problem outperforms the baseline algorithms and approaches the optimal solution. Meanwhile, the proposed mechanism holds a smaller total payment compared with the VCG mechanism when both mechanisms achieve the same performance. Finally, the utility of a selected winner shows the truthfulness of proposed mechanism by changing its bid.

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