Bayesian Learning, Smooth Approximate Optimal Behavior, and Convergence toε-Nash Equilibrium

Econometrica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichi Noguchi

Mathematics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (9) ◽  
pp. 156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Rettieva

The approaches to construct optimal behavior in dynamic multicriteria games with finite horizon are presented. To obtain a multicriteria Nash equilibrium, the bargaining construction (Nash product) is adopted. To construct a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a Nash bargaining scheme is applied. Dynamic multicriteria bioresource management problem with finite harvesting times is considered. The players’ strategies and the payoffs are obtained under cooperative and noncooperative behavior.



1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Serfes ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis

We generalize results of earlier work on learning in Bayesian games by allowing players to make decisions in a nonmyopic fashion. In particular, we address the issue of nonmyopic Bayesian learning with an arbitrary number of bounded rational players, i.e., players who choose approximate best-response strategies for the entire horizon (rather than the current period). We show that, by repetition, nonmyopic bounded rational players can reach a limit full-information nonmyopic Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NBNE) strategy. The converse is also proved: Given a limit full-information NBNE strategy, one can find a sequence of nonmyopic bounded rational plays that converges to that strategy.



2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-61
Author(s):  
Анна Реттиева ◽  
Anna Rettieva

In this paper new approaches to obtain optimal behavior in dynamic multicriteria games are constructed. The multicriteria Nash equilibrium is obtained via the Nash bargaining design (Nash products), and the cooperative equilibrium is determined by the Nash bargaining procedure for the entire planning horizon. Coalition formation process in dynamic multicriteria games is investegated. To construct the characteristic function the Nash bargaining scheme is applied where the multicriteria Nash equilibrium plays the role of the status-quo points. Two variants of characteristic function's determination that take into account information structure of the game are presented (models without information and with informed players). Dynamic multicriteria bioresorce management problem is considered. The players' strategies and the size of the resource are compared under cooperative and noncooperative behavior and for different variants of characteristic function determination.



2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Cox ◽  
Jason Shachat ◽  
Mark Walker


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shinichi Nakajima ◽  
Kazuho Watanabe ◽  
Masashi Sugiyama




2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.



2016 ◽  
Vol E99.B (12) ◽  
pp. 2614-2622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai ZHANG ◽  
Hongyi YU ◽  
Yunpeng HU ◽  
Zhixiang SHEN ◽  
Siyu TAO


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