scholarly journals The sense of agency does not evidence regulative control

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-77
Author(s):  
Beatriz Sorrentino Marques

Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the first place, and the investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist explanation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with control mechanisms.Keywords: Sense of agency, Regulative control, Incompatibilism, Comparator model, Guidance control.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias K. Franken ◽  
Robert Hartsuiker ◽  
Petter Johansson ◽  
Lars Hall ◽  
Andreas Lind

Speakers monitor auditory feedback during speech production in order to correct for speech errors. The comparator model proposes that this process is supported by comparing sensory feedback to internal predictions of the sensory consequences of articulation. Additionally, this comparison process is proposed to support the sense of agency over vocal output. The current study tests this hypothesis by asking whether mismatching auditory feedback leads to a decrease in the sense of agency as measured by speakers’ responses to pitch-shifted feedback. Participants vocalized while auditory feedback was unexpectedly and briefly pitch-shifted. In addition, in one block, the entire vocalization’s pitch was baseline-shifted (‘alien voice’), while it was not in the other block (‘normal voice’). Participants compensated for the pitch shifts even in the alien voice condition, suggesting that agency was flexible. This is problematic for the classic comparator model, where a mismatching feedback would lead to a loss of agency. Alternative models are discussed in light of these findings, including an adapted comparator model and the inferential account, which suggests that agency is inferred from the joint contribution of several multisensory sources of evidence. Together, these findings suggest that internal representations of one’s own voice are more flexible than often assumed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62
Author(s):  
Marko Peric

Libertarianist concept of free will is based on the principle of alternate possibilities - standpoint which presupposes that an agent has moral responsibility only if, in the given circumstances, he could have done otherwise. The author of this paper tries to review this key principle of libertarianism, and to determine whether the access to alternate possibilities represents necessary or sufficient cause for the assessment of moral responsibility, or neither of that. Finally, based on the consideration of famous Frankfurt?s and Austin-style examples, in this paper is defended a sort of compatibilism, and the main advantages of that kind of free will concept over libertarianism are emphasized.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Vikram Thakur ◽  
◽  
Steven Smithies

The sense of agency is known to be disrupted in Schizophrenia. This article explores the transition from the comparator model to the two-step model of agency, in order to review the paper ‘In and out of control: brain mechanisms linking fluency of action selection to self-agency in patients with Schizophrenia’1. A sense of agency involves using retrospective cues to make causal inferences, but this paper also introduces a new, prospective aspect. This paper shows that subliminal priming, a prospective cue, increases the reported sense of agency over a subsequent action outcome. It also shows that in schizophrenic patients, retrospective cues had more of an influence on their reported sense of agency, while conversely, prospective cues had less influence. This may reflect a greater reliance on retrospective cues in schizophrenia, which could be one of the underlying factors for some of the delusions seen in schizophrenia. Using fMRI measurements during the task, results suggest that angular gyrus activation reflects the experience of non-agency. In healthy controls, they saw altered connectivity between frontal areas and the angular gyrus associated with priming. In schizophrenic patients, there was no effect of priming on activation of the angular gyrus, or frontoparietal connectivity. In our review, we have introduced a putative schema that suggests that the action selection signals from the frontal lobes into the angular gyrus represent the prospective aspect of agency. This connection is disrupted In schizophrenia, and that may be why prospective agency is impaired.


Studia Humana ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-78
Author(s):  
Paweł Balcerak
Keyword(s):  

Abstract In this paper, I will analyse the relation between a sense of agency and free will. It is often proposed that by investigating the former, we can find a way of judging when an action is voluntary. Haggard seems to be one of the authors believing so. To answer if this assumption is correct, I will: 1) analyse the categories of free will and agency; 2) define the sense of agency; 3) describe ways of investigating the sense of agency; 4) describe models of emergence of the sense of agency; 5) analyse the relation between agency and responsibility. I will end by discussing the actual possibility of using the sense of agency measurements (as described in experimental sciences) as markers of free will.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.


1994 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Sappington
Keyword(s):  

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