Advocacy of Illegal Drug Use

This chapter examines the Morse v. Frederick (2007) case – the most recent United States Supreme Court decision about students' right to free speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining the extent of school-censorship authority over student speech. This test, known as the Morse test, allows schools to censor student speech if the speech advocates illegal drug use. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Morse v. Frederick case in order to determine if it gives schools any authority to censor students' off-campus speech.

This chapter focuses on the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) case – the first United States Supreme Court decision about student speech under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the two tests established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District for determining the scope of school authority over student speech. These tests are the “material and substantial disruption” test and the “infringement-of-rights” test. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District case in order to determine if it authorizes schools to censor off-campus student speech.


This chapter examines the Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) case – the United States Supreme Court's third review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for analyzing when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Hazelwood test (also known as the Kuhlmeier test) authorizes schools to censor school-sponsored student speech. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court's approach to student speech in the Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) case. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the case in order to determine if it authorizes schools to censor students' speech while they are outside the schoolhouse gate.


This chapter focuses on the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) case – the United States Supreme Court's second review of students' speech rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It discusses the test created in the case for determining when schools can regulate students' speech. This test, referred to as the Bethel test or the Fraser test authorizes schools to censor students' speech if the speech is vulgar, lewd, plainly offensive or obscene. The chapter also discusses the Supreme Court's decision on the scope of students' free speech rights. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to analyze the Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser case in order to determine if it empowers schools to censor off-campus student speech.


This chapter discusses child pornography speech which the United States Supreme Court first categorically excluded from First Amendment protection in New York v. Ferber (1982). The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the child-pornography jurisprudence. The chapter also highlights a case applying the Supreme Court precedent on child pornography to student speech. The chapter concludes that, due to its unprotected nature, students censored for child pornography speech have no First Amendment recourse.


Author(s):  
Julie Van Camp

Reno v. ACLU, the 1997 landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court providing sweeping protection to speech on the Internet, is usually discussed in terms of familiar First Amendment issues. Little noticed in the decision is the significance of the ontological assumptions of the justices in their first visit to cyberspace. I analyze the apparent awareness of the Supreme Court of ontological issues and problems with their approaches. I also argue that their current ontological assumptions have left open the door to future suppression of free speech as the technology progresses. Ontology is significant because zoning in the physical world has long been recognized as a way to segregate "adult" entertainment from minors. So far, at least, the justices seem to agree that such zoning is not possible in cyberspace, and therefore that adult zones for certain forms of expression are not possible. But this conclusion is far from settled. The degree of free speech on the Internet in the future will depend on whether or not our ontological understanding of cyberspace supports such zoning or renders it incoherent or impossible.


This chapter discusses obscene speech – a category of speech that the United States Supreme Court has excluded from First Amendment protection. The lack of constitutional protection for obscene speech provides an avenue for school officials to censor such student speech off-campus. The goal of the chapter is to provide an overview of the obscenity jurisprudence. The chapter also discusses examples of cases applying Supreme Court precedent on obscenity to censorship of off-campus student speech.


2010 ◽  
Vol 132 (06) ◽  
pp. 47-47
Author(s):  
Kirk Teska

This article demonstrates through several examples of misplaced technology and clash between intellectual property laws and freedom of speech. The first example stated in the article is that of an Apple engineer leaving his prototype next-generation iPhone in a bar and it ended up at gizmodo.com—a website devoted to technology. The folks at Gizmodo tore into the iPhone, confirmed its authenticity, and then put photographs of the phone along with a list of its new features on the gizmodo.com site. Apple, rather than suing, at least so far, simply asked for the prototype phone back and Gizmodo complied. Could Apple sue Gizmodo or would First Amendment protect Gizmodo, only depending upon certain different factors and to an extent on the particular court hearing the case. The ultimate authority on the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court, generally loathes limiting free speech for any reason.


1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-240
Author(s):  
Richard Rogers ◽  
James L. Cavanaugh

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