Changing the Approach to Deterrence in Cyberspace While Protecting Civilians From Cyber Conflict

2019 ◽  
pp. 304-330
Author(s):  
Metodi Hadji-Janev

Many incidents in cyberspace and the response to those incidents by victim states prove that the cyber conflict is a reality. This new conflict is complex and poses serious challenges to national and international security. One way to protect the civilian populace is by deterring potential malicious actors (state and non-state) from exploiting cyberspace in a negative way. Given the changed reality and complexity that gravitates over the cyber conflict classical deterrence that have worked during the Cold War is not promising. The article argues that if the states are about to protect their civilians from the future cyber conflict by deterring potential attacker they need to change the approach to deterrence.

Author(s):  
Metodi Hadji-Janev

Many incidents in cyberspace and the response to those incidents by victim states prove that the cyber conflict is a reality. This new conflict is complex and poses serious challenges to national and international security. One way to protect the civilian populace is by deterring potential malicious actors (state and non-state) from exploiting cyberspace in a negative way. Given the changed reality and complexity that gravitates over the cyber conflict classical deterrence that have worked during the Cold War is not promising. The article argues that if the states are about to protect their civilians from the future cyber conflict by deterring potential attacker they need to change the approach to deterrence.


Author(s):  
Metodi Hadji-Janev

Many incidents in cyberspace and the response to those incidents by victim states prove that the cyber conflict is a reality. This new conflict is complex and poses serious challenges to national and international security. One way to protect the civilian populace is by deterring potential malicious actors (state and non-state) from exploiting cyberspace in a negative way. Given the changed reality and complexity that gravitates over the cyber conflict classical deterrence that have worked during the Cold War is not promising. The article argues that if the states are about to protect their civilians from the future cyber conflict by deterring potential attacker they need to change the approach to deterrence.


Author(s):  
Jenny Andersson

Alvin Toffler’s writings encapsulated many of the tensions of futurism: the way that futurology and futures studies oscillated between forms of utopianism and technocracy with global ambitions, and between new forms of activism, on the one hand, and emerging forms of consultancy and paid advice on the other. Paradoxically, in their desire to create new images of the future capable of providing exits from the status quo of the Cold War world, futurists reinvented the technologies of prediction that they had initially rejected, and put them at the basis of a new activity of futures advice. Consultancy was central to the field of futures studies from its inception. For futurists, consultancy was a form of militancy—a potentially world altering expertise that could bypass politics and also escaped the boring halls of academia.


Author(s):  
Jenny Andersson

The book proposes that the Cold War period saw a key debate about the future as singular or plural. Forms of Cold War science depicted the future as a closed sphere defined by delimited probabilities, but were challenged by alternative notions of the future as a potentially open realm with limits set only by human creativity. The Cold War was a struggle for temporality between the two different future visions of the two blocs, each armed with its set of predictive technologies, but these were rivaled, from the 1960s on, by future visions emerging from decolonization and the emergence of a set of alternative world futures. Futures research has reflected and enacted this debate. In so doing, it offers a window to the post-war history of the social sciences and of contemporary political ideologies of liberalism and neoliberalism, Marxism and revisionist Marxism, critical-systems thinking, ecologism, and postcolonialism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31
Author(s):  
SANDRA VAN LOCHEM-VAN DER WEL ◽  
HENK VAN LOCHEM

Secretly watching the Russians. Cold War aircraft observation posts on existing buildings During the 1950s a network of aircraft observation post was built in The Netherlands, as a detection/observation system against low-flying hostile aircraft during the Cold War. Preferably, these were placed on highrise buildings. 134 of these 276 observation posts were built on existing buildings, on factories, mills, water towers, monasteries, government buildings and bunkers. Since their decommissioning in 1964-1968, many posts have been demolished. Approximately 37 posts on existing buildings remain, but mostly go unnoticed and many risk demolition in the future. These remaining aircraft observation posts are remarkable relics of our military heritage from the Cold War.


2021 ◽  
pp. 272-294
Author(s):  
Paul Cornish

For all its apparent complexity, deterrence is built upon a relatively straightforward premise: that fear of adverse consequences can serve to prevent unacceptable behaviour. In traditional deterrence theory, particularly that which matured during the Cold War, prevention could be achieved both by fear of punishment and by fear of failure: by punitive measures that would be undertaken in response to a transgression and intended to inflict some pain, damage, or loss upon the transgressor; or by a denial posture intended to impress upon an adversary that the complexities of the defences will be technologically insurmountable and/or the costs of doing so unbearably high. Fresh thinking is required to make deterrence relevant to the cyber era. The challenges of cyber warfare are described here as the ‘four zeros’: ‘zero day’ vulnerability to novel malware; ‘zero source’ or non-attribution of an attack; ‘zero effect’ or covert, non-detectable attack; and ‘zero intent’ or lack of clarity as to an adversary’s intentions. These challenges can be met by allowing deterrence to function in different ways as circumstances allow or require: punitive, constructive, and protective deterrence.


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