Accountability and cyber conflict: examining institutional constraints on the use of cyber proxies

As state-sponsored cyber operations have proliferated, some states are outsourcing these operations to non-state cyber proxies. However, given the relative ease of outsourcing cyber operations, it is puzzling why more states are not engaged in this practice. I examine how domestic accountability institutions potentially explain this restraint in the use of cyber proxies. I argue that in cases where the incumbent is likely to be held to account for cyber operations, there is restraint in the use of proxies. Moreover, I distinguish vertical from horizontal accountability and argue that because vertical accountability mechanisms directly threaten the tenure of the incumbent if outsourced cyber operations go wrong, it has a greater constraining effect relative to horizontal accountability. I test these propositions with new data on the activities of several hacker groups and robustly confirm that accountability institutions do place significant constraints on the use of cyber proxies.

The Deterrence and Prevention of Cyber Conflict

For all its apparent complexity, deterrence is built upon a relatively straightforward premise: that fear of adverse consequences can serve to prevent unacceptable behaviour. In traditional deterrence theory, particularly that which matured during the Cold War, prevention could be achieved both by fear of punishment and by fear of failure: by punitive measures that would be undertaken in response to a transgression and intended to inflict some pain, damage, or loss upon the transgressor; or by a denial posture intended to impress upon an adversary that the complexities of the defences will be technologically insurmountable and/or the costs of doing so unbearably high. Fresh thinking is required to make deterrence relevant to the cyber era. The challenges of cyber warfare are described here as the ‘four zeros’: ‘zero day’ vulnerability to novel malware; ‘zero source’ or non-attribution of an attack; ‘zero effect’ or covert, non-detectable attack; and ‘zero intent’ or lack of clarity as to an adversary’s intentions. These challenges can be met by allowing deterrence to function in different ways as circumstances allow or require: punitive, constructive, and protective deterrence.

Cyber Espionage

The ubiquity of information technology augurs a new golden age of espionage. Intelligence is the use of deceptive means for strategic ends. It encompasses the collection of secrets, analysis and decision support, covert action and influence, and counterintelligence. Modern computational networks expand the opportunities for all these types of intelligence, for new types of actors to engage in intelligence activities, and for almost anyone or anything to become intelligence targets. Yet large-scale information systems also amplify the classic ethical, operational, and strategic challenges associated with intelligence. Many of the policy controversies associated with cybersecurity, for instance, are not simply novelties of the Internet age, but rather are symptomatic of the uneasy relationship between counterintelligence and democracy. Understanding the technology used for cyber intrusion may be necessary for understanding cyber conflict, but it is not sufficient for comprehending its strategic ends and limits: it is further necessary to understand the political logic of intelligence.

Cyber conflict and Islam Ethics on the Ustadz Harassment cases in the YouTube Community

The number of Indonesia user YouTube Access increases significantly. The content of YouTube also diverse including Islam da'wah in many channels in YouTube both national and international. The comment fixture in YouTube not only simplify users to comment but also create a conflict between users including the Ustadz Abdul Somad Rejection broadcasting. This aim of the research is to figure out how the meaning of YouTube comment and how the application of comment Islam ethics according to Quran and Hadis in the Ustadz Abdul Somad cases on YouTube. This research also using cyber conflict and Quran verse and Hadis related to communication Islam ethics. The method of this research using Netnography where researcher focus to comment columns who indicated have a conflict between users. The data of this research is the comment columns on three video who indicated have an Ustadz Abdul Somad Rejection topic. The result of this research that Pro UAS trying to mobilize opinion to drive out Banser while anti-UAS framing UAS as a radicalism orator and involve in prohibit organization. Both pro-UAS and anti-UAS always mocking each other when creating a conflict. They also think this is the best way to win the debate.

The United States Motivation in Having Cyber Security Cooperation With China

The United States and China had conducted cyber cooperation since 2011. But in 2013, both states were involved in the cyber conflict that made the previous cyber collaboration had been ineffective. After that, in 2015, both states agreed to re-form cyber cooperation. This study aims to analyse the United States' motivation in conducting cyber partnerships with China using the cybersecurity concept. This research has discovered at the national level, the United States tried to achieve its information assurance through cyber defence strategy by strengthening collaboration. On the other hand, at the international level, norm construction through bilateral collaboration has made the United States become an impactful actor in international cybersecurity.

Ontological (In)visibility and Cyber Conflict: The Problem of Sight and Vision in Establishing Threat

This paper builds on the work of scholars working on ontological security, cyber security, and computer science to understand the problem of threat assessment and vision before, during, and after cyber-attacks. The previous use of ontological security theory (OST) has been limited because it has relied upon an overly simplistic vision of threat assessment at the international, state, and individual level. While previous scholars have examined the background, latent, or assumed visions of security threats as interpreted by agents and how their conditions do or do not effectively capture the anxieties of populations and practitioners this piece seeks to put these issues in conversation. In conceiving of ‘the state’ and ‘threat’ this piece examines the notion of vision, because as states conceive of threats in terms of terrorism (overt and theatrical) and cyber (covert and private) a mismatch of responses is noted. This piece reads the current cyber security landscape (2009-2019) in the United States through a lens of repeated and rambunctious cyber-threats and attacks and a largely passive response by the US citizenry through OST alongside: (1) the literature on computer science dealing with the concept of ontology, (2) the traditional threat framework found in the terrorism literature around response to threat with a comparison to the cyber-conflict literature, an (3) examination of the interplay between the public and government around the visibility and salience of cyberthreats.

Covering the Cyberwars

Daniel Ellsberg’s release of the top-secret Pentagon Papers established the precedent that the US government cannot impose prior restraint on the publication of sensitive national security information—even when it is classified. Over the ensuing fifty years, an uneasy, informal arrangement between government officials and news organizations has evolved to manage the challenges of publishing this material. The age of persistent cyber conflict is testing this arrangement. While the US government frequently reveals cyberattacks on its institutions, corporations, and the power grid, it surrounds its own offensive cyber operations with intense secrecy. This essay argues that if the United States is serious about creating “norms of behavior” in cyberspace and deterring cyberattacks on American citizens, the public must be able to debate how and why the U.S. employs cyberweapons against other countries—an objective threatened by the aggressive policies of the Obama and Trump administrations aimed at criminalizing leaking.