Classical deterrence theory revisited: An empirical analysis of Police Force Areas in England and Wales

The severity, certainty and celerity (swiftness) of punishment are theorised to influence offending through deterrence. Yet celerity is rarely included in empirical studies of criminal activity and the three deterrence factors have never been analysed in one empirical model. We address this gap with an analysis using unique panel data of recorded theft, burglary and violence against the person for 41 Police Force Areas in England and Wales using variables that capture these three theorised factors of deterrence. We find that the three factors affect crime in different ways. Increased detection by the police (certainty) is associated with reduced theft and burglary but not violence. We find that variation in the celerity of sanction has a significant impact on theft offences but not on burglary or violence offences. Increased average prison sentences (severity) reduce burglary only. We account for these results in terms of data challenges and the likely different motivations underlying violent and acquisitive crime.

A study on the development and implications of low-yield nuclear weapons, focusing on deterrence theory

This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.

Examining the impact of both legal and nonlegal factors on following a vehicle too closely utilizing three deterrence-based theories

Following a vehicle too closely (otherwise known as tailgating) is a high-risk behavior and major contributor to motor-vehicle collisions and injuries. Both legal and nonlegal countermeasures are currently in place in an attempt to prevent this behavior, yet there has been limited research that has examined the effectiveness of both legal and nonlegal factors on engagement in the behavior. Therefore, this research utilized a combination of the three most salient deterrence-based theories used in road safety to understand the impact of both legal and nonlegal sanctions on following a vehicle too closely. A survey was completed by 887 Queensland drivers aged 17–84 years ( Mage = 49 years; 55% males). Variables from Classical Deterrence Theory, the reconceptualized deterrence theory and the extended deterrence-based model (that includes perceived internal loss, physical loss, and social sanctions), as well as measures of following a vehicle too closely were used. The majority of the sample (98%) reported following a vehicle too closely at some point, with the average frequency ranging from rarely to sometimes. Significant predictors of more frequent unsafe following distances included: being male, younger in age, and avoiding punishment for the behavior. Meanwhile, significant predictors of less frequent unsafe following distances included knowing others who have been punished for the behavior, as well as fearing the physical and internal losses resulting from unsafe following distances. Notably, the severity of the punishment was also a significant deterrent, while the perceived certainty of being apprehended for the offence was low and did not impact engagement in behavior. These results have a number of important implications on how to maximize both legal and nonlegal countermeasures to further prevent following a vehicle too closely.

Internal and external drivers for compliance with the COVID-19 preventive measures in Slovenia: The view from general deterrence and protection motivation

The emergence of a pandemic is usually accompanied by different measures–economic, social, preventive, and (self)protective. In the case of the COVID-19, several preventive measures were formally enforced by state authorities in the majority of countries worldwide. Thus, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the intertwining of formal and informal social control could be observed. Hence, in this study a cross-sectional design was chosen to explore the issue in Slovenia. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first in the current literature to empirically test the general deterrence theory in pandemic circumstances (as external factors predicting individuals’ compliance with the COVID-19 preventive measures). The results suggest an important role of informal punishment, with perceived informal severity being the only statistically significant factor from the general deterrence theory. In contrast to external factors, internal factors play a significantly greater role in promoting people’s self-protective behavior in pandemic circumstances. During the unknown, the uncertain and delicate situations with which people have no previous experience, both personal beliefs about the effectiveness of measures and perceived self-efficacy are more important than fear of formal sanctions.

The Deterrence and Prevention of Cyber Conflict

For all its apparent complexity, deterrence is built upon a relatively straightforward premise: that fear of adverse consequences can serve to prevent unacceptable behaviour. In traditional deterrence theory, particularly that which matured during the Cold War, prevention could be achieved both by fear of punishment and by fear of failure: by punitive measures that would be undertaken in response to a transgression and intended to inflict some pain, damage, or loss upon the transgressor; or by a denial posture intended to impress upon an adversary that the complexities of the defences will be technologically insurmountable and/or the costs of doing so unbearably high. Fresh thinking is required to make deterrence relevant to the cyber era. The challenges of cyber warfare are described here as the ‘four zeros’: ‘zero day’ vulnerability to novel malware; ‘zero source’ or non-attribution of an attack; ‘zero effect’ or covert, non-detectable attack; and ‘zero intent’ or lack of clarity as to an adversary’s intentions. These challenges can be met by allowing deterrence to function in different ways as circumstances allow or require: punitive, constructive, and protective deterrence.

Deterrence of Punitive Measures on Collusive Bidding in the Construction Sector

Collusive bidding has been a deep-seated issue in the construction market for a long time. The strategies implemented by bid riggers are deliberate, interactive, and complex, suggesting that antitrust authorities have difficulty preventing collusive behaviors. Based on game payoff matrixes, this study proposes a system dynamics (SD) model to present the deterrence of punitive measures, namely the certainty of punishment (CoP) and the severity of punishment (SoP), on regular bidders’ to-collude decision-making. Data were collected from the Chinese construction industry to test the proposed SD model. While the model was supported, the results indicate that the CoP has a greater impact than the SoP on deterring regular bidders from making to-collude decisions. Furthermore, these two punitive measures cannot be replaced by each other, given the same deterrence effects. Thus, the study demonstrates the usefulness of deterrence theory to inhibit collusive bidding in the construction sector. It also sheds some light on the formulation of competition policy from the perspective of deterrence.

Does the Law Change Preferences?

“I would prefer not” HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences.

Between Strategic Autonomy and International Norm-setting

According to the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), today's world is characterized by an increased strategic competition and rising threats to multilateralism and a rules-based order. In this fast-evolving environment, the EU has shifted from its traditional Þ-U+201C-Þvalues-basedÞ-U+201D-Þ approach in foreign policy to a Þ-U+201C-Þprincipled pragmatismÞ-U+201D-Þ. This holds that the EU should solidify relations with countries with shared values, while also engaging strategically with rivals. The EU's goal is to protect its strategic interests in the world marked by the US-China rivalry, a confrontational relationship with the Trump administration, and Russia's growing ambitions in their shared neighborhood. The present chapter examines some aspects of the EU's efforts to secure its autonomy in an emergent terrain for international competition: cyberspace. The analysis will begin with an explanation of the broader context for the EU's approach to cybersecurity, which should be understood as part of the Union's longstanding pursuit of Þ-U+201C-Þstrategic autonomyÞ-U+201D-Þ in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. It then offers a description of deterrence theory and its application to cyberspace, before turning to the development of the EU Cyber Diplomacy toolbox and targeted restrictive measures in response to cyberattacks. It will then seek to assess the deterrence potential of restrictive measures on the basis of some generic attributes of the concept of deterrence identified in rich theoretic contributions on deterrence theory and cyberspace. It concludes that while sanctions might appear to be ineffective and non-aligned with the operational characteristics of the cyber domain, their potential for establishing good practices should not be discarded. They should instead be used as a vehicle for promoting and informing the international discourse on the norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.