scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and the Digital Divide

2011 ◽  
pp. 29-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Digital Divide ◽  
Knowledge Work ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Social Disadvantage ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Principal Value ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory

The digital divide refers to inequalities in access to information technology. Those people who do not have access to information technology are at a significant economic and social disadvantage. As with any other policy decision, in order to evaluate policies for dealing with the digital divide, we need to know exactly what our goal should be. Since the principal value of access to information technology is that it leads to knowledge, work in epistemology can help us to clarify our goal in the context of the digital divide. In this paper, I argue that epistemic value theory can help us to determine which distribution of knowledge to aim for. Epistemic value theory cannot specify a particular distribution to aim for, but it can significantly narrow down the range of possibilities. Additionally, I indicate how the exercise of applying epistemic value theory to the case of the digital divide furthers work in epistemology.

scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and the Digital Divide

2008 ◽  
pp. 3105-3118
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Digital Divide ◽  
Knowledge Work ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Social Disadvantage ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Principal Value ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory

The digital divide refers to inequalities in access to information technology. Those people who do not have access to information technology are at a significant economic and social disadvantage. As with any other policy decision, in order to evaluate policies for dealing with the digital divide, we need to know exactly what our goal should be. Since the principal value of access to information technology is that it leads to knowledge, work in epistemology can help us to clarify our goal in the context of the digital divide. In this paper, I argue that epistemic value theory can help us to determine which distribution of knowledge to aim for. Epistemic value theory cannot specify a particular distribution to aim for, but it can significantly narrow down the range of possibilities. Additionally, I indicate how the exercise of applying epistemic value theory to the case of the digital divide furthers work in epistemology.

Rethinking the Digital Divide

2001 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Light
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Digital Divide ◽  
Social Problem ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Technical Issue ◽  
Robust Solutions ◽  
Access To Technology ◽  
Unequal Access ◽  
The Relationship

The term digital divide entered the American vocabulary in the mid-1990s to refer to unequal access to information technology. However, public debate has addressed the digital divide as a technical issue rather than as a reflection of broader social problems. In this article, Jennifer Light critically analyzes how access to technology is constructed as a social problem and examines the particular assumptions about technology and inequality that frame the debate. Drawing on historical examples, Light examines why hopes that technology would improve society have often not been fulfilled. The author examines the striking asymmetries between the current and earlier debates about the relationship between technology and society. She invites us to consider the different ways in which the problem of access to technology has been constructed, and suggests that these differences may generate ways to enrich the current debate and begin a conversation about more robust solutions. (pp. 710–734)

Solving the Paradoxes of the Information Technology Revolution

2013 ◽  
pp. 1440-1455
Author(s):  
Francesco D. Sandulli
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Digital Divide ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Skilled Workers ◽  
Skilled Labour ◽  
Technology Revolution ◽  
Homogeneous Set

The research on the digital divide usually analyzes the differences between those who have access to information technology and those who have not. This approach typically considers information technology a homogeneous set of technologies. In this chapter, we will break this assumption establishing different subsets of information technologies according to their impact on the task productivity and the firm’s demand for high skilled labour. This new focus reveals that depending on the information technology used by the firm to perform a given task, the demand for high skilled and low skilled workers may vary and consequently their wages and income, producing in some cases a new and till now unobserved digital divide.

Solving the Paradoxes of the Information Technology Revolution

2010 ◽  
pp. 423-438
Author(s):  
Francesco D. Sandulli
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Digital Divide ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Skilled Workers ◽  
Skilled Labour ◽  
Technology Revolution ◽  
Homogeneous Set

The research on the digital divide usually analyzes the differences between those who have access to information technology and those who have not. This approach typically considers information technology a homogeneous set of technologies. In this chapter, we will break this assumption establishing different subsets of information technologies according to their impact on the task productivity and the firm’s demand for high skilled labour. This new focus reveals that depending on the information technology used by the firm to perform a given task, the demand for high skilled and low skilled workers may vary and consequently their wages and income, producing in some cases a new and till now unobserved digital divide

scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation

Episteme ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Value Theory ◽  
Judgment Aggregation ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
The World ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory

We frequently make judgments about the world. Juries make judgments about whether defendants are guilty. Umpires make judgments about whether pitches are strikes. Tenure committees make judgments about whether professors deserve tenure. We typically want these judgments about the world to have good epistemic properties. We would like our judgments to be true rather than false, for example. We would also like our judgments to be consistent with each other; and we would like to have good reasons for our judgments. This paper will be concerned with how we can make judgments that have such good epistemic properties.

scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Social World ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Real People ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACTIn order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldman's theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldman's theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.

Epistemic Environmentalism

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 97-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Ryan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Applied Epistemology ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory

I motivate and develop a normative framework for undertaking work in applied epistemology. I set out the framework, which I call epistemic environmentalism, explaining the role of social epistemology and epistemic value theory in the framework. Next, I explain the environmentalist terminology that is employed and its usefulness. In the second part of the paper, I make the case for a specific epistemic environmentalist proposal. I argue that dishonest testimony by experts and certain institutional testifiers should be liable to the sanction of inclusion on a register of epistemic polluters. In doing so, I explain the special role that experts and the relevant institutional testifiers play in the epistemic environment and how the proposal is justified on the basis of that special role.

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