Optimal Bidding Decision of Bidders in Homogeneous Goods Procurement

2013 ◽  
Vol 415 ◽  
pp. 726-729
Author(s):  
Zhong Wen Chen
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Bidding Strategy ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Nonlinear Equilibrium ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Optimal Bidding ◽  
Equilibrium Bidding ◽  
Divisible Goods ◽  
Optimal Decision Making

In this paper, a uniform price auction mechanism for procuring homogeneous divisible goods is studied, and both nonlinear bidding strategy and linear bidding strategy of symmetric bidders are analyzed. And then the dominant relationship is discussed deeply between the two kinds of equilibrium bids. The results show that the nonlinear equilibrium bidding strategy dominates linear ones. Based on this analysis, several suggestions are given on how to make optimal decision making on bidding strategy choice for bidders.

scholarly journals UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS BASED ON MULTIPLE ROUNDS LINEAR BIDDING AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

2014 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congjun RAO ◽  
Yong ZHAO ◽  
Yang CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Local Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Continuous Linear ◽  
Forming Process ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Goods

In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.

MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS

2010 ◽  
Vol 09 (05) ◽  
pp. 831-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
CONGJUN RAO ◽  
YONG ZHAO
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Discharge Capacity ◽  
Environmental Planning ◽  
Design Method ◽  
Wuhan City ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Optimal Auction ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Goods

In this paper, the auction of divisible goods is investigated and a mechanism design method for optimal auction of divisible goods is presented. First, the definitions of feasible allocations and divisible goods auctions are given based on several important assumptions of divisible goods auction. Second, an optimal auction mechanism of divisible goods is designed, and a method of how to use the uniform price auction to implement the optimal auctions is discussed under the background of allocating the total permitted pollution discharge capacity (TPPDC). Lastly, this method is applied to the environmental planning of Wuhan City Circle in Hubei Province, China.

scholarly journals Alternative Auction Institutions for Electric Power Markets

1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Bernard ◽  
Timothy Mount ◽  
William Schulze
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Electric Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
Power Markets ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Electric Power Markets ◽  
Price Auction

Restructuring of electric power markets is proceeding across the United States and in many other nations around the world. The performance of these markets will influence everything from the prices faced by consumers to the reliability of the systems. The challenges of these changes present many important areas for research. For much of the northeastern United States, restructuring proposals include, at least for the short term, the formation of a single-sided auction mechanism for the wholesale market. This research uses experimental methods to analyze how these markets may function. In the experiments, the two basic uniform price auction rules are tested under three different market sizes. Early experimental results suggest the commonly proposed last-accepted-offer auction works well, but market power could be a real concern.

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