6*. The Liberal Paradox

2017 ◽  
pp. 139-141
Keyword(s):  
1995 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert P. Berrens ◽  
Stephen Polasky

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Prasanta K. Pattanaik

AbstractThe paper seeks to interpret the liberal paradox in a framework where individual rights are represented as game forms. Several close counterparts, in this framework, of Sen’s theorem are considered, and their intuitive significance is discussed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 1162-1185
Author(s):  
Livia Johannesson

Courts are influential actors during the implementation of immigration policies in liberal democracies. The “liberal paradox” thesis stipulates that courts are driven by logics that hamper restrictionist immigration policies. This study contributes to this theory by exploring the norm construction of impartiality among judicial workers in Swedish migration courts when deciding asylum appeals. Its findings contradict the liberal paradox assumption that courts act according to inner logics that benefit immigrants’ rights. At Sweden’s migration courts, judicial workers show impartiality by using a skeptical approach to asylum applicants and do so to distance themselves from the political discourse of generosity that has dominated Swedish political debate for decades. The broader implications of these findings are that immigration policy theories can benefit from qualitative research exploring informal norm constructions in courts, as such work can offer new insights about the role of courts in the implementation of immigration policies.


1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis C. Mueller

AbstractAmartya Sen has demonstrated a possible inconsistency between a (liberal) right and Pareto optimality. Neither Sen nor the subsequent literature have discussed the origin of the rights that lead to the liberal paradox. In this article I examine one possible origin of rights definitions-a constitutional contract agreed to by all members of the community. Constitutional rights are show to be vulnerable to a similar paradox as with liberal rights, but if the writers of the constitution were correct in their choice of actions to protect, such paradoxes will be unlikely and involve small welfare losses when they do occur. The article demonstrates that both the origin of rights and their potential role in advancing the interests of citizens can be explained using a utilitarian/welfarist methodology.


Polity ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 360-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur L. Kalleberg ◽  
Larry M. Preston

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