Hiring and Firing Is a Blood Sport

Trump @ Work ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-69
Author(s):  
Richard A. Moran
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
pp. 126-140
Author(s):  
O. Mironenko

Employers incur costs while fulfilling the requirements of employment protection legislation. The article contains a review of the core theoretical models and empirical results concerning the impact of these costs on firms’ practices in hiring, firing, training and remuneration. Overall, if wages are flexible or enforcement is weak, employment protection does not significantly influence employers’ behavior. Otherwise, stringent employment protection results in the reduction of hiring and firing rates, changes in personnel selection criteria, types of labour contracts and dismissal procedures, and, in some cases, it may lead to the growth of wages and firms’ investments to human capital.


2014 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 43-55
Author(s):  
Scott Pittman

The story of anti-communism in California schools is a tale well and often told. But few scholars have appreciated the important role played by private surveillance networks. This article examines how privately funded and run investigations shaped the state government’s pursuit of leftist educators. The previously-secret papers of Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, which were opened to researchers at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., only a few years ago, show that the general operated a private spy network out of San Diego and fed information to military, federal, and state government agencies. Moreover, he taught the state government’s chief anti-communist bureaucrat, Richard E. Combs, how to recruit informants and monitor and control subversives. The case of the suspicious death of one University of California, Los Angeles student – a student that the anti-communists claimed had been “scared to death” by the Reds – shows the extent of the collaboration between Combs and Van Deman. It further illustrates how they conspired to promote fear of communism, influence hiring and firing of University of California faculty, and punish those educators who did not support their project. Although it was rarely successful, Combs’ and Van Deman’s coordinated campaign reveals a story of public-private anticommunist collaboration in California that has been largely forgotten. Because Van Deman’s files are now finally open to researchers, Californians can gain a much more complete understanding of their state bureaucracy’s role in the Red Scare purges of California educators.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Sebastian Jäckle

This paper explores the determinants of ministerial duration within the German Länder between 1990 and 2010. In arguing that different terminal events ceasing ministerial tenures should be analyzed separately, it distinguishes four exit types: voluntary, forced, collective (ministers leaving office because their whole party does so) and exits that are neither volitional acts of the minister nor politically induced. Depending on the exit type, competing-risks Cox-models show different effects for one and the same variable on the hazard for ministerial turnover. Seniority in high-level politics for example helps not to be forced out of office while it has no effect on voluntary or collective exits. Heading an important ministry on the other hand increases the chances to rise to other positions in high politics or private business, but does not impact the other two hazards. The analysis furthermore shows that the principal-agent-logic known from Westminster systems with the prime minister being largely sovereign in hiring and firing cabinet members must be adapted to the German context of frequent coalition governments. In coalition governments, only ministers from the same party as the prime minister exhibit higher hazards for forced exits, while ministers from other coalition partners are much safer in that regard.


1999 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 86-91
Author(s):  
Mindy R. Toran

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison L. Booth ◽  
Yu‐Fu Chen ◽  
Gylfi Zoega
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Tricia Chapman

The Tomorrow’s Schools reforms created confusion as to exactly who is the employer of teachers. In terms of the 1989 Education Act, it is the Board of Trustees. In practice, hiring and firing is likely to be done by the principal, and the Ministry of Education represents the employer party in collective employment contract negotiations. Drawing on the author’s personal experience of managing Ministry of Education contracts in performance management, this article: 1. considers whether the imposed requirements for the performance management 2. of teachers are consistent with the self-managing school framework; and 3. evaluates the effectiveness of the regulations in enhancing teacher performance.


1994 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 40-50
Author(s):  
George E. Stevens

The newspaper can be vulnerable to age discrimination suits if there are indications of preference for younger employees in the way hiring and firing are handled.


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