Some Often Neglected Aspects of the Political Economy of European Monetary Integration

2019 ◽  
pp. 205-218
Author(s):  
Thomas D. Willett



2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-367

Benjamin J. Cohen of University of California, Santa Barbara reviews “Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy”, by Jeffry A. Frieden. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Analyzes the politics surrounding exchange rates, including the influence of industries on the political process. Discusses the political economy of currency choice; a theory of currency policy preferences; the United States─from greenbacks to gold, 1862-79; the United States─silver threats among the gold, 1880-96; European monetary integration─from Bretton Woods to the euro and beyond; Latin American currency policy, 1970-2010; the political economy of Latin American currency crises; and the politics of exchange rates─implications and extensions.” Frieden is Professor of Government at Harvard University.



1993 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Sandholtz

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.





2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 673-690
Author(s):  
JESSE RUSSELL

AbstractHow do states attempt to mitigate the pressures of financial globalisation? This article suggests that options can be understood in terms ofmonetary regimechoice. These are best understood with their international component included – whether states integrate unilaterally, integrate multilaterally, or go it alone monetarily. But to understand the international side of monetary relations, one must look to domestic political structures, histories and politics. It is important that to understand that within the pressures of the international system, domestic politics is afons et origodetermining the health and stability of international economic relations.



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