Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments at Common Law

2018 ◽  
pp. 353-388
Author(s):  
Abla Mayss ◽  
Alan Reed
2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kenny

AbstractThe common law rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments were radically reformulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Beals v Saldanha. Few other common law jurisdictions have considered whether or not to follow Canada in this development in private International Law. In 2012, the Irish Supreme Court definitively rejected the Canadian approach. This note examines the judgment in that case, and assesses the reasoning of the Irish Court.


Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines private international law rules that govern orders concerning children, including orders determining with whom a child shall live or with whom he may have contact. It first considers the rules governing the jurisdiction of the English courts as regards parental responsibility matters, the choice of law rules applied, and the different provisions for the recognition and enforcement of parental responsibility and related orders made elsewhere. In particular, it discusses orders granted in another European Union Member State, except Denmark; orders granted in another Contracting State to the 1996 Hague Protection Convention; and orders granted in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It also analyses the relevant provisions of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and common law rules before concluding with an overview of other important developments including the 1996 Hague Convention and the Council of Europe Convention on Contact concerning Children.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Huang

The Australian common law does not require reciprocity for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments. Therefore, although Chinese courts have never recognized and enforced an Australian monetary judgment, Australian courts have recognized and enforced Chinese judgments. Thus far, there have been two Chinese judgments recognized and enforced in Australia (both in the State of Victoria). In both cases, the Australian judges considered whether the Chinese courts had international jurisdiction based on the defendants’ citizenship/nationality. This article seeks to discuss the two cases.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hill

This chapter deals with the recognition of enforcement of foreign judgments by English courts. The crucial question is not whether foreign judgments should be recognised and enforced in England but which judgments should be recognised and enforced. There are, broadly speaking, two theories. The first is the theory of obligation, which is premised on the notion that if the original court assumed jurisdiction on a proper basis the court's judgment should prima facie be regarded as creating an obligation between the parties to the foreign proceedings which the English court ought to recognise and, where appropriate, enforce. The alternative theory is based on the idea of reciprocity: the courts of country X should recognise and enforce the judgments of country Y if, mutatis mutandis, the courts of country Y recognise and enforce the judgments of country X. Whichever theory is adopted, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is limited by a range of defences which may be invoked by the party wishing to resist the judgment in question. It would be unrealistic to expect the English court to give effect to a foreign judgment which conflicts with fundamental notions of justice and fairness. So, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is a two-stage process: Are the basic conditions for recognition or enforcement satisfied? If so, is there a defence by reason of which the foreign judgment should nevertheless not be recognised or enforced? The remainder of the chapter discusses the recognition and enforcement at common law; statutory regimes based on the common law; recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I Recast; and United Kingdom judgments.


Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.


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