Free Speech and Hate Speech in the United States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Demaske
Author(s):  
Cherian George

The United States has exceptionally strong Constitutional protections for free speech, but also for religious freedom. This chapter considers how this unique legal framework affects hate spin in the country. It finds that although hate speech can be expressed with a high degree of impunity, strong anti-discrimination laws limit the harms caused by such speech. Hate spin can, nonetheless, succeed in fostering fear and cultivating prejudice against minorities. The chapter examines how a network of anti-Muslim activists have used hate spin to campaign against mosque building, to oppose multi-cultural textbooks, and to introduce legislation protecting states from the fabricated threat of encroaching Muslim law. Beyond their stated goals, which may be frustrated by courts, these campaigns often have the symbolic purpose of spreading Islamophobia.


Author(s):  
Jan Hoffman French

Reports on violence against journalists in Brazil have captured the concern of international human rights organizations. This article discusses a case involving another such concern: the use of criminal defamation laws in Brazil to punish journalists for criticizing public officials. At the same time, Brazilian media sources regularly report on crimes of racism, which most often involve derogatory name-calling and hate speech. By examining the intersection of these apparently contradictory concerns, this article sheds new light on speech rights in Brazil and the United States and argues that a comparative perspective is crucial to contextualizing and harmonizing free speech and its limitations under modern democratic constitutions. By considering the infusion of traditional notions of honor and status with post-World War II views of dignity, this article argues for a comparative consideration of how best to combat racism and whether hate speech regulation in the U.S. should be reconsidered. As such, the type of law often used to protect the powerful in Brazil could come to be used to protect the vulnerable in the United States and opens the possibility that the irony of free speech could become more than just a scholarly debate.


Author(s):  
Diana L. Ascher ◽  
Safiya Umoja Noble

Notions of free speech and expectations of speaker anonymity are instrumental aspects of online information practice in the United States, which manifest in greater protections for speakers of hate, while making targets of trolling and hate speech more vulnerable. In this chapter, we argue that corporate digital media platforms moderate and manage “free speech” in ways that disproportionately harm vulnerable populations. After being targets of racist and misogynist trolling ourselves, we investigated whether new modes of analysis could identify and strengthen the ties between the online personas of anonymous speakers of hate and their identities in real life, which may present opportunities for intervention to arrest online hate speech, or at least make speakers known to those who are targets or recipients of their speech.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tara Schoeller-Burke

<p>This paper assesses the United States position on the protection of hate speech under the First Amendment and questions whether, in light of the harm hate speech causes and the inconsistencies with free speech rationales, the position is justified. The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue is Snyder v Phelps which this paper utilizes as an exemplar of the state’s aversion to regulating speech on the basis of content. The ultimate thesis of this paper is that while hate speech is a complex issue, especially given the United States constitutional climate, complete lack of regulation leaves an appreciable harm without a remedy. The approach in the United States can no longer be justified in reliance on oft cited free speech rationales. Though international experiences in hate speech regulation have not been without their difficulties, it serves to illustrate the point that regulating some forms of speech on the basis of content does not necessarily result in the “chilling effect” that heavily concerns First Amendment scholars.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Tara Schoeller-Burke

<p>This paper assesses the United States position on the protection of hate speech under the First Amendment and questions whether, in light of the harm hate speech causes and the inconsistencies with free speech rationales, the position is justified. The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue is Snyder v Phelps which this paper utilizes as an exemplar of the state’s aversion to regulating speech on the basis of content. The ultimate thesis of this paper is that while hate speech is a complex issue, especially given the United States constitutional climate, complete lack of regulation leaves an appreciable harm without a remedy. The approach in the United States can no longer be justified in reliance on oft cited free speech rationales. Though international experiences in hate speech regulation have not been without their difficulties, it serves to illustrate the point that regulating some forms of speech on the basis of content does not necessarily result in the “chilling effect” that heavily concerns First Amendment scholars.</p>


1989 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Jacobsohn

Constitutional transplantation, the process by which the constitutional practice of one society becomes an important source for the legal development of another, has figured importantly in the institutional evolution of new politics. In this article, I examine the constitutional experience of Israel and the United States, two societies that share a language of jurisprudential discourse while differing significantly in a number of polically relevant ways. In particular, the fact that both societies can be described as pluralistic only conceals the fact that they represent alternative models of pluralism that may render problematic the the transferablity of constitutional outcomes from one place to another. Thus, the literature of modern constitutionalism, which has tended to emphasize the rights-based liberal ethic of individualism, is arguably more compatible with an American model in which the principles of the “procedural republic” are more unproblematically embraced. To pursue this question, I look at two issues—the advisability of adopting a bill of rights and the appropriate stance of the regime on the question of free speech—that allow us to reflect upon the limits and possibilities of constitutional transplantation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Karolina Palka

This article is about the limits of the right to free speech. The first section provides a brief introduction to this topic, primarily in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second section describes the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which was fundamental to the topic of this paper because the United States Supreme Court created the so-called "fighting words" doctrine based on it. In the next two sections, two court cases are presented that perfectly demonstrate the limits of the right to free speech in the United States: Snyder v. Phelps and Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America. The fifth part shows the right to freedom of speech in the context of Polish civil, criminal, and constitutional law, as well as acts of international law binding on Poland. The last part is a short summary.


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