Is “Constitutional Veneration” an Obstacle to Constitutional Amendment?

Some constitutional scholars suggest that the US Constitution stands as one of the oldest yet least changed national constitutions in part because Americans’ tendency to “revere” the Constitution has left them unwilling to consider significant changes to the document. Several recent studies support aspects of this claim, but no study establishes a direct link between individuals’ respect for the Constitution and their reluctance to amend it. To address this, we replicate and extend the research design of Zink and Dawes (2016) across two survey experiments. The key difference in our experiments is we include measures of respondents’ propensity to revere the Constitution, which in turn allows us to more directly test whether constitutional veneration translates into resistance to amendment. Our results build on Zink and Dawes’s findings and show that, in addition to institutional factors, citizens’ veneration of the Constitution can act as a psychological obstacle to constitutional amendment.

US Supreme Court hears carefully chosen gun case

Significance The case, which concerns the power of a state to prohibit the carrying of concealed handguns, involves the Second Amendment to the US Constitution, which protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. The outcome may see the Court restrict state regulatory power in unprecedented ways. Impacts This case could continue a trend begun in 2008 that has broadened the scope and applicability of the Second Amendment protections. The Court could adopt an ends-and-means evaluation that would permit greater variability for state restrictions on guns. Other interest groups will pursue well-chosen cases before the newly conservative court.

Judicial Review

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.

Local Governments

The US Constitution never mentions “city,” “county,” or “township,” not even “local” or “municipal” governments. It concerns itself only with sovereign entities. Because local governments “cannot claim to be sovereigns” and because whatever power a local government has tends to flow from its state, that sounds like the end of the matter. But local governments still exercise sovereign powers, including law enforcement, eminent domain, education, taxing, zoning, and other indispensable “attributes of sovereignty.” Even if the US Constitution does not mention cities by name and even if cities cannot claim sovereign status, the federal charter still has ample consequences for municipal governments. This chapter takes vertical separation of powers one step further, to federalism within federalism. It explains the division of powers between state and local governments and chronicles disputes that have arisen between them. If, in modern America, like-minded people increasingly gravitate to similar states, the same is true within states, whether in cities, suburbs, or rural areas. Home rule and other local allocations of power sometimes allow people in these communities to express their distinct political preferences and live under them, too.

State Legislatures and Distrust

This chapter explains the myriad restrictions that state constitutions place on state legislatures—such as single-subject rules, clear-title, and public-purpose clauses—and the kinds of problems that prompted them. The clear-title rule requires the subject of each bill to be expressed plainly in its title. The single-subject requirement ensures that each bill enacted by the legislature contains just one subject. The original-purpose requirement requires a final bill to line up with the stated purpose of the original bill. These limitations grew naturally out of a preoccupation of the Jacksonian era, curbing special interests. The US Constitution does not place comparable restrictions on Congress.

Where to limit the freedom of speech? Analysis in the context of the First Amendment to the US Constitution and the fighting words doctrine

This article is about the limits of the right to free speech. The first section provides a brief introduction to this topic, primarily in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second section describes the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which was fundamental to the topic of this paper because the United States Supreme Court created the so-called "fighting words" doctrine based on it. In the next two sections, two court cases are presented that perfectly demonstrate the limits of the right to free speech in the United States: Snyder v. Phelps and Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America. The fifth part shows the right to freedom of speech in the context of Polish civil, criminal, and constitutional law, as well as acts of international law binding on Poland. The last part is a short summary.

An American Notwithstanding Clause? Between Potestas and Potentia

Debates about judicial review and departmentalism have continued to rage, and in the wake of the last three Supreme Court appointments and current Presidential Commission on the Court, only look to intensify. Should the US adopt a notwithstanding or override provision, of the kind that exits in Canada and Israel? These countries take a departmentalist approach to allow the legislature to override the Court, “notwithstanding” its ruling. Although America is a presidential framework, a paradox emerges: evidence exists that its system already makes possible the equivalent of a notwithstanding clause. This consists of Congress and the President together “overruling” the Supreme Court. In another sense, however, this is not an accepted practice—large parts of the legal community hold that the US Constitution establishes judicial supremacy. To better understand this dynamic, we consider two kinds of power: formal and authorized (potestas) as well as direct and concrete (potentia). The contrast between the positions on both power and sovereignty of Thomas Hobbes (associated with potestas) and Baruch Spinoza (linked to potentia) helps clarify these issues in a contemporary context. It turns out that a robust departmentalist equivalent of the notwithstanding clause already exists in the US, as a matter of Hobbesian potestas but not of Spinozist potentia. Another term for the latter is pouvoir constituant. Spinoza’s perspective on political activity further clarifies the in-between nature of the American override capacity: the active or passive character of a multitude is not binary, but is a matter of degree. Without making an institutional recommendation, we note that Spinoza’s understanding of power also allows for dynamic interaction between potentia and potestas: formal authorization can contribute to the expression of direct power. It is, therefore, conceivable that additional codification of the existing American override capacity, either through a joint declaration of Congress and the Presidency or a Constitutional Amendment, can strengthen the effective sovereignty of the American people in relation to the courts.

The Rights of the Accused under the Rome Statute and the US Bill of Rights: Has 20 Years of ICC Jurisprudence Brought Those Together?

The alleged lower standard of the rights of the accused under the Rome Statute compared to those guaranteed by the US Constitution was one of the most important areas of criticism of the Rome Statute by American scholars. This criticism was made in the early 2000s and was based on the text of the Rome Statute alone, before any ICC jurisprudence existed. This article draws on the 20 years of operation of the ICC to ascertain whether the judicial interpretation and application of the procedural rights of the defendant, guaranteed under the Rome Statute, have made them more compatible with their counterparts under the US Constitution. The premise of this article is that the 20 years of interpretation and application of those rights may have strengthened them to the point where the gap between the procedural guarantees under the Rome Statute and the US Constitution has become negligible. This, in turn, would make the early criticism of the ICC system obsolete, at least insofar as the legal argument is concerned. Accordingly, this paper examines existing jurisprudence of the ICC in the areas of prosecutorial disclosure obligations, admission of evidence and the examination of witnesses. This is for several reasons: firstly, the selected three rights were among those criticised by American scholars in the early 2000s as falling short of what was required under the US Constitution; secondly, unlike some other criticised rights, which reflect the ICC’s institutional design and, therefore, are unlikely to change in scope, the selected three are relatively vaguely phrased, thus making it possible to transform their meaning through judicial interpretation; thirdly, the selected rights have been sufficiently elaborated on by the ICC through case law so as to carry a meaning exceeding what the Rome Statute alone provides. The findings of the study indicate that inasmuch as the ICC’s jurisprudence has moved some aspects of the three areas under examination towards their counterparts under the US Constitution, the procedural rights of the defendant before American courts generally remain more robust.