Gottlob Frege: Foundations of Arithmetic

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gottlob Frege
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Foundations Of Arithmetic

The Unnameable

2008 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 119-135
Author(s):  
Alasdair Urquhart
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
University Of Toronto ◽  
The University ◽  
Foundations Of Arithmetic ◽  
Deep Interest

Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with ‘the limits of discursive symbolism in several domains of human experience.’ The course description continues by saying: ‘Special attention will be given to the paradoxes underlying various doctrines of the inexpressible and the tensions inherent in those paradoxes. Some doctrines of semantic, ethical and religious mysticism will be critically examined.'

Derrida and Frege

Paragraph ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-195
Author(s):  
Marian Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Derrida, for reasons which he never made clear publicly, published his mémoire for the diplôme d'études supérieures only in 1990, some thirty-five years after it had been written. Had it been published much earlier, some of the dispiritingly ill-informed remarks about his work might have been avoided. The mémoire, entitled The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, reveals that he is, when required, perfectly able to write a standard thesis in straightforward French. And that, in particular, he is aware of the work of the great logician Gottlob Frege in its relation to Husserl.

Gottlob Frege, One More Time1

Hypatia ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 156-173
Author(s):  
CLAUDE IMBERT
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Gottlob Frege

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Wille
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

scholarly journals Frege and Wittgenstein: The Limits of the Analytic Style

Elements ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Sheridan
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Logical Analysis ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Gottlob Frege ◽  
Symbolic Logic ◽  
Scientific Language ◽  
German Mathematician ◽  
Broad Application ◽  
Analytic Tradition

The analytic tradition in philosophy stems from the work of German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege. Bertrand Russell brough Frege's program to render language-particularly scientific language-in formal logical terms to the forefront of philosophy in the early twentieth century. The quest to clarify language and parse out genuine philosophical problems remains a cornerstone of analytic philosophy, but investigative programs involving the broad application of formal symbolic logic to language have largely been abandoned due to the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. This article identifies the key philosophical moves that must be performed successfully in order for Frege's "conceptual notation" and other similar systems to adequately capture syntax and semantics. These moves ultimately fail as a result of the nature of linguistic meaning. The shift away from formal logical analysis of language and the emergence of the current analytic style becomes clearer when this failure is examined critically.

C.S. Peirce: Belief, Truth, and Going from the Known to the Unknown

1998 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 9-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wiggins
Keyword(s):  
High Probability ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Third ◽  
P 16 ◽  
Foundations Of Arithmetic

The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists in maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else and utterly inexplicable- not so much from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could be reached is retroduction.Now nothing justifies a retroductive inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable.That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or excuse. (Peirce, Collected Papers 1.139)Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that, if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way. (Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.145)[Scientific procedure] will at times find a high probability established by a single confirmatory instance, while at others it will dismiss a thousand as almost worthless. (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), p. 16)

Idee und Wahrheit

2020 ◽  
pp. 12-43
Author(s):  
Jan Müller
Keyword(s):  
Gottlob Frege

Jan Müller liest Walter Benjamins sprachtheoretische Schriften als Teil eines zusammenhängenden Problemaufrisses. Er setzt bei der von Benjamin als notwendig unterstellten Idee eines gelingenden Sachbezugs der Sprache an. Dieser müsse einerseits von der Sache selbst her bemessen, andererseits müsse seine wesentlich sprachliche Vermitteltheit mitgedacht werden. Benjamin löse die Spannung zwischen beiden nicht auf, sondern halte sie »als zu einer materialistischen Idee von Sprache dazugehörend« fest. Müller bestimmt in diesem Rahmen zentrale Begriffe Benjamins – wie Darstellung, Idee, Wahrheit und nicht zuletzt den der Sprache selbst – neu und stellt, wo die Sache es erfordert, überraschende Verbindungen zu Zeitgenossen – wie Gottlob Frege – her.

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