The Imperial German Navy

2020 ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
Jeremy Stocker
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Stefan Röttger ◽  
Hannes Krey

Abstract The objective of this work was to assess whether the implementation of a bridge resource management (BRM) unit into the simulator-based nautical training of the German Navy is effective in improving non-technical skills and navigation performance. To this end, questionnaire data, observations of behaviour and performance outcomes were compared between a control group and an experimental group. Data of 24 bridge teams (126 sailors) were used for the analyses. Ten teams received BRM training and 14 teams served as the control group with unchanged simulator training. Reactions to simulator training were positive in both groups but more favourable in the control group. In the BRM group, significantly more positive attitudes towards open communication and coordination, more frequent sharing of information and fewer collisions were found than in the control group. Effect sizes were rather small. This may be due to the limited scale of the BRM unit, which consisted of only one instruction-training-feedback cycle. The extension of BRM-related feedback to all simulator runs of the nautical training can be expected to produce larger effects on attitudes, behaviour and performance.


1981 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Dennis E. Showalter ◽  
Holger H. Herwig
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan J. Díaz Benítez

The secret supply of the German Navy during the Second World War has scarcely been studied until now. The goal of this article is to study one of the more active supply areas of the Etappendienst at the beginning of the war, the one known as Etappe Kanaren, as part of the Grossetappe Spanien-Portugal. In this research primary sources from German Naval War Command have been consulted. Among the main conclusions, it should be pointed out, on the one hand, the intense activity to support the Kriegsmarine during the first years of the war, despite the distance from mainland Spain and the British pressure, which finally stopped the supply operations. On the other hand, we have confirmed the active role of the Spanish government in relation to the Etappendienst: Spanish authorities allowed the supply operations, but pressure from the Allies forced the Spanish government to impede these activities.


2021 ◽  
pp. 98-165
Author(s):  
Keith Grint

This chapter covers mutinies which occur during the most dangerous times for the establishment: under conditions of war. Theoretically, any collective dissent from a legal order in a military organization is mutiny, and the events over Christmas 1914 along the Western Front in France and Belgium precisely capture this tension, with some calling it a ‘truce’ and others categorically calling it a mutiny—thus ensuring it is not repeated the following Christmas. Next we consider the Russian mutiny of 1917 that, unlike the Potemkin mutiny, occurs in a febrile national context with significant support from the political left. Some of the reverberations of Russia end up in France in 1917, straight after the failed Nivelle offensive, and this also reveals the significance of dashed expectations, as well as the dire consequences of the French state’s response. Within a year the German Navy is convulsed by similar issues, the first time it is crushed because the conditions are inadequate, but the second time, in 1918, against the backdrop of a military catastrophe and political turmoil, it is the mutiny of the German sailors that leads to the toppling of the German state. For the British and Commonwealth armies in France, post 1914, mutinies are rare, but they do occur, and it is serendipity that lends at hand. However, the largest of all British mutinies in wartime occurs in Salerno in 1943, and ironically it is stimulated by loyalty to the regiment, rather than disloyalty to the state.


The Lancet ◽  
1925 ◽  
Vol 205 (5307) ◽  
pp. 1042-1043
Keyword(s):  

1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Langhorne

When Sir Llewellyn Woodward wrote his distinguished book Great Britain and the German Navy in 1935, the last volumes of Gooch and Temperley were not yet published, and the original papers were still subject to the fifty-year rule. In 1971, all of the Gooch and Temperley collection of documents has long since been available; and the archives have been open since 1965. It is therefore possible to add to what Sir Llewellyn wrote, and this article seeks to show, not differently from him, but more fully, how the naval holiday proposals unfolded and how the general tenor of Anglo-German relations remained unaltered in this most vital area. Nothing that the Haldane Mission had done, nor even the general co-operation between London and Berlin during the Balkan Wars, could change the fundamental position—despite Baron Marschall's hopes.


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