Experimental study on the effects of a single simulator-based bridge resource management unit on attitudes, behaviour and performance

The objective of this work was to assess whether the implementation of a bridge resource management (BRM) unit into the simulator-based nautical training of the German Navy is effective in improving non-technical skills and navigation performance. To this end, questionnaire data, observations of behaviour and performance outcomes were compared between a control group and an experimental group. Data of 24 bridge teams (126 sailors) were used for the analyses. Ten teams received BRM training and 14 teams served as the control group with unchanged simulator training. Reactions to simulator training were positive in both groups but more favourable in the control group. In the BRM group, significantly more positive attitudes towards open communication and coordination, more frequent sharing of information and fewer collisions were found than in the control group. Effect sizes were rather small. This may be due to the limited scale of the BRM unit, which consisted of only one instruction-training-feedback cycle. The extension of BRM-related feedback to all simulator runs of the nautical training can be expected to produce larger effects on attitudes, behaviour and performance.

Mutinies in War

This chapter covers mutinies which occur during the most dangerous times for the establishment: under conditions of war. Theoretically, any collective dissent from a legal order in a military organization is mutiny, and the events over Christmas 1914 along the Western Front in France and Belgium precisely capture this tension, with some calling it a ‘truce’ and others categorically calling it a mutiny—thus ensuring it is not repeated the following Christmas. Next we consider the Russian mutiny of 1917 that, unlike the Potemkin mutiny, occurs in a febrile national context with significant support from the political left. Some of the reverberations of Russia end up in France in 1917, straight after the failed Nivelle offensive, and this also reveals the significance of dashed expectations, as well as the dire consequences of the French state’s response. Within a year the German Navy is convulsed by similar issues, the first time it is crushed because the conditions are inadequate, but the second time, in 1918, against the backdrop of a military catastrophe and political turmoil, it is the mutiny of the German sailors that leads to the toppling of the German state. For the British and Commonwealth armies in France, post 1914, mutinies are rare, but they do occur, and it is serendipity that lends at hand. However, the largest of all British mutinies in wartime occurs in Salerno in 1943, and ironically it is stimulated by loyalty to the regiment, rather than disloyalty to the state.

Determinants of the Implementation of Telemedicine in the German Navy—A Mixed Methods Study

ABSTRACT Introduction The history of the use of telemedicine in maritime medicine dates back to the 1930s. In the early 2000s, the German Navy built up a telemedicine network which today is installed in all ships and provides a connection to the medical infrastructure ashore. The objective of this study was to optimize the implementation of telemedicine based on the experience gained in the German Navy. For this purpose, qualitative and quantitative methods were used to identify determinants which affect the use of telemedicine in order to determine whether there is any need for optimization. Methods The study was conducted using a mixed methods design. First, guideline-based interviews were conducted with Navy medical officers who had been recruited via various email distribution lists. The interviews were then transcribed and coded. In an analysis, deductive and inductive categories were derived from the codes. Hypotheses were deduced from the interviews, too, and used to develop a questionnaire. Besides the medical officers, other Navy medical personnel with experience in the field of telemedicine took part in the survey. The study was concluded by a descriptive analysis of the quantitative data. Results The analysis of the interviews revealed that a regular use of telemedicine workstations increased the users’ confidence and, in their opinion, improved medical treatment. Technical and organizational problems posed obstacles, which increased the use of partly insecure alternatives. A proper technical support was regarded as a precondition for effectively using telemedicine. The results of the quantitative analysis showed that consultation was mainly sought for dermatological (46%), surgical (24%), and internal (22%) conditions. Conclusion The study revealed determinants for the use of telemedicine in the German Navy. Factors improving the motivation of the users should be strengthened in order to optimize the use of telemedicine. Furthermore, it can be assumed that a successful implementation will be supported by reducing or eliminating obstacles. The findings on the main reasons for seeking medical advice could be taken into account in the further planning of specific training.

Hans Gerhard Creutzfeldt (1885–1964) in the Third Reich

Hans Gerhard Creutzfeldt (1885–1964) is an internationally known Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology. During the time of National Socialism (1933–1945), he worked in the Charite University Hospital Berlin and moved to Kiel University as Head of the Department for Psychiatry and Neurology in 1938. Until the turn of the millennium, Creutzfeldt was considered to be of moral integrity and an opponent of the Nazi regime and its eugenics measures. Publications of the last years came to the conclusion that this depiction does not hold up. They questioned his relations to the ideas and structures of the National Socialist system, his role as a consultant in the National Socialist's forced sterilization program, a possible involvement in the Nazi euthanasia measures, and his position as a psychiatric consultant for the German navy. The article considers 2 aspects concerning the National Socialist racial hygiene in greater detail by using newly found source material. It is shown that Creutzfeldt, although he did not actively resist, was not acting in the interest of the Nazi regime, but rather was trying to save as much patients as possible by changing their diagnoses and prevent them from being killed in the euthanasia program.

Britain and Economic Warfare in German Naval Thinking in the Era of the Great War

Under the leadership of Alfred von Tirpitz, the German navy concentrated on building a battle fleet based in the North Sea rather than cruisers designed for operations in distant waters. This has led many historians to assume that commerce warfare (Handelskrieg) played no real part in German preparations for war against Britain before 1914. This chapter disputes this analysis. It shows that Germany’s naval planners in the Admiralstab believed that by converting merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers and using them to attack British commerce on the high seas the German navy would be able to cause considerable damage to British shipping and so force the Royal Navy to divert forces from the main theatre of war to distant oceans. It goes on to examine the reality of this plan during the First World War.

Landmilitärische oder seemilitärische Expertise? Transformationen der Legitimationsbasis der Kaiserlichen Marine, ca. 1871–1900 / Expertise by Land or Sea? Changing Patterns of Legitimation of the German Navy, c. 1871–1900

Unmittelbar vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg hatte die deutsche Marine eine enorme politische und kulturelle Bedeutung. Ihre von souveränen Experten gebauten Kriegsschiffe galten als hochmoderne Spitzentechnik, die die nationale Leistungsfähigkeit symbolisierten und einen weltpolitischen Aufstieg Deutschlands zu verbürgen schienen. Wie hatten die Seestreitkräfte eine solch starke Stellung erlangt? Diese Frage drängt sich umso mehr auf, bedenkt man, dass die Marine in den frühen 1870er Jahren als recht unbedeutend galt und weit hinter der Armee zurückblieb, ja tatsächlich unter der Kontrolle von Generälen stand. Der Aufsatz verfolgt, wie der rasche technische Wandel im Schiffbau dazu führte, dass im Zuge der öffentlichen Verhandlungen um ein schweres Schiffsunglück die neue normative Erwartung entstand, dass die Marine von seemilitärischen Experten geführt werden müsse. Obwohl die Seestreitkräfte noch längere Zeit von Armeegenerälen geleitet wurden, begann doch eine schrittweise Wahrnehmungsveränderung, die die Institution schließlich aus dem Schatten der Armee führte. In dem Maße, in dem es den Akteuren der Marine gelang, sich erfolgreich als Experten zu inszenieren und legitimieren, vergrößerte sich auch ihr politischer Handlungsspielraum. Der Bedeutungszuwachs der Marine ergab sich also nicht von selbst, sondern erst, als der technische Wandel in Bezug auf die seemilitärische Expertise der Leitung der Flotte öffentlich verhandelt wurde. Im Sinne einer Kulturgeschichte der Technik geht der Beitrag also am Beispiel der Seestreitkräfte der Frage nach, wie über die politische Bedeutung technischer Herausforderungen gesellschaftlich kommuniziert wurde.